From: Michael Furlan Newsgroups: soc.history.war.us-civil-war,alt.war.civil.usa,alt.thought.southern,soc.history Subject: Author Visit, Dean B. Mahin Date: Thu, 26 Sep 2002 02:08:37 GMT From September 30th to October 13th, Dean B. Mahin will visit the newsgroup soc.history.war.us-civil-war to discuss his books, "One War at a Time: The International Dimensions of the American Civil War" and "The Blessed Place of Freedom: Europeans in Civil War America." Some on-line info about those two works: Publisher's Press Release: http://showcase.netins.net/web/creative/lincoln/news/mahpress.htm Description, Brassey's web site: http://www.brasseysinc.com/Books/1574883011.htm Amazon listing, with table of contents, 6 pages of chapter 1, and index: http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/1574882090/ref=lib_rd_ss_TT06/104-9999841-1195957?v=glance&s=books&vi=reader&img=14#reader-link. Author Interview, Abraham Lincoln on Line web site: http://showcase.netins.net/web/creative/lincoln/books/mahin.htm Author Interview, Civil War Book News web site: http://www.cw-book-news.com/release%20info/12-99/onewar.html Review, Civil War Interactive web site: http://www.civilwarinteractive.com/reviewonewar.htm Review, American Diplomacy web site: http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/archives_roll/2001_03-06/book_jones_forgotten/book_jones_forgotten.html Review, "Crossfire," quarterly journal of the American Civil War Roundtable (UK), London: http://www.americancivilwar.org.uk/books/onewar.htm The only online item so far on "The Blessed Place of Freedom" is on Brassey's web site: http://www.brasseysinc.com/Books/1574884840.htm. From: "Phil Leigh" Newsgroups: soc.history.war.us-civil-war,alt.war.civil.usa,alt.thought.southern,soc.history Subject: Re: Author Visit, Dean B. Mahin Date: 26 Sep 2002 10:45:11 GMT I've read ONE WAR AT A TIME and enjoyed it. Nice job in getting him. He used to post in this ng too, but I haven't seen him recently. -- Phil From: DUMahin@aol.com (Dean B. Mahin) Newsgroups: soc.history.war.us-civil-war Subject: Re: Author Visit, Dean B. Mahin Date: 30 Sep 2002 22:15:01 GMT Greetings to the Civil War Newsgroup! "One War at a Time" focused on the reactions of governments (including the Union and Confederate governments and governments in Europe and Mexico) to major international issues during the CW. "The Blessed Place of Freedom" focuses on the roles and reactions of European individuals who were in America during the war as immigrants, correspondents, other observers, and volunteers. I will welcome questions or comments on any of these topics: the foreign policies of the Union and Confederate governments; the role of Abraham Lincoln in Union diplomacy; the reactions of the major European governments to the CW; the reasons for the strong sympathy with the Confederate cause within the upper class in Britain; the reasons why Britain and France never extended diplomatic recognition to the Confederate government; Union and Confederate reactions to the French intervention in Mexico and the installation of an Austrian archduke on a new Mexican throne; diplomatic consequences of the construction of warships for the Confederacy in Britain and France and the operations of the Alabama and other Confederate commerce raiders; Union and Confederate attitudes toward the dominant British role in the blockade-running system; the reactions of European immigrants in North and South to major civil war issues including the election and reelection of Lincoln, secession, conscription, slavery, and emancipation; the roles of immigrants and foreign volunteers in the Union and Confederate armies; the performance of the Irish Brigade at Fredericksburg and the half-German XI Corps at Chancelorsville; and the reactions of Europeans who came to America during the war as correspondents, military observers, and other visitors. Dean B. Mahin From: Rod Underwood Newsgroups: soc.history.war.us-civil-war Subject: Re: Author Visit, Dean B. Mahin Date: 30 Sep 2002 22:15:05 GMT Dean: In "One War at a Time" you state that this phrase is an axiom of Lincoln's foreign policy. Is this one of his quotations? If not, to whom is this phrase attributed? From: "Gregory E. Garland" Newsgroups: soc.history.war.us-civil-war Subject: Re: Author Visit, Dean B. Mahin Date: Tue, 1 Oct 2002 05:37:34 CST To borrow a thread from the unmoderated group: If Lee doesn't stand at Antietam and just withdraws across the Potomac with Harper's Ferry showing yet another big CSA victory, do you think Britain still goes ahead with plans to recognize the CSA and call for peaceful separation? From: "Patrick LaSalle" Newsgroups: soc.history.war.us-civil-war Subject: Re: Author Visit, Dean B. Mahin Date: Tue, 1 Oct 2002 05:44:52 CST How close did the various European powers, both major and minor, come to recognizing the Confederacy??? Did any of them actually do so??? Which of them were stalwart supporters of the Union??? As far as Mexico is concerned, how did the Confederacy and the Union react to this??? Was the Monroe Doctrine put into play by either of them??? How did the Confederate reaction mirror its future designs on Central America and the Caribbean, if at all??? Did Lincoln ever consider enacting the Monroe Doctrine and pushing the French out, and how did he come to that decision??? What about the rest of the world??? I know you wanted to focus mainly on European reaction and Union and Confederate foreign relations pertaining to Europe, and you don't have to answer this question if you don't want to. I was just wondering if you did any research or stumbled upon anything on the reaction of the non-European world. Was there a reaction??? What was it??? Who supported who, and who waited to see what would happen??? Basically everything I asked concerning Europe. Again, if you don't want to answer its fine. I know this isn't exactly what you wanted to discuss. I'm a big foreign policy wonk, and this aspect of the Civil War has always caught my attention. I plan on getting your book. It looks really interesting. I'd just like to say thanks for stopping by and taking the time to talk with us amateur enthusiasts (I hope to be a pro one of these days when I finish college). Its a real treat for someone such as yourself to come and talk about your work. Not many would be so kind to do so. I'm sure you probably have other things to do, like write another book, and I think I speak for all of us here when I express my supreme gratitude for taking the time to speak with us on this subject. Thank you. Patrick LaSalle From: DUMahin@aol.com (Dean B. Mahin) Newsgroups: soc.history.war.us-civil-war Subject: Re: Author Visit, Dean B. Mahin Date: 1 Oct 2002 12:30:04 GMT Rod Underwood wrote> In "One War at a Time" you state that this phrase is an axiom of > Lincoln's foreign policy. Is this one of his quotations? If not, to > whom is this phrase attributed? The phrase "one war at a time" reflected Lincoln's need to avoid a war with England while he was fighting a war with the Confederacy. It summed up his reaction to the "Trent" crisis that arose in late l861 when a Union navy captain took two Confederate envoys (Slidell and Mason) off a British mail packet in the Bahama strait. The British were furious at this insult to the British flag, and began preparations for a war with the United States including sending 11,000 men to defend the British colony in Canada. The British government sent an ultimatum threatening to break off diplomatic relations with the United States unless the envoys were released in seven days. Although reluctant to respond to British pressure, Lincoln knew that he could fight only one war at a time and that he must avoid a foreign war with Britain during the civil war at home. So he ordered the release of the envoys. While it is not clear whether Lincoln actually used the words "one war at a time", the phrase became the axiom of his foreign policy and was used in the press including an editorial by Horace Greeley on the day Lincoln's funeral train passed through New York. The phrase also reflected the second most important principle of Lincoln's foreign policy which was to prevent recognition and support of the Confederacy by the British government. Lincoln and Seward had repeatedly insisted earlier in l861 that British recognition of Confederate independence would ultimately lead to war with the United States. While "One war at a time" reflected Lincoln's need to avoid a foreign war during the civil war, it also reflected his well-calculated threat of a later war with Britain if it recognized the Confederacy. It was a brilliant strategy, and it worked. Although the British upper classes welcomed the Confederacy for geopolitical, political, and commercial reasons, the British government got Lincoln's message, remained neutral during the war, and never recognized Confederate independence. Dean B. Mahin DUMahin@aol.com From: Wesley Taylor Newsgroups: soc.history.war.us-civil-war Subject: Re: Author Visit, Dean B. Mahin Date: 1 Oct 2002 15:40:01 GMT On 1 Oct 2002 12:30:04 GMT, DUMahin@aol.com (Dean B. Mahin) wrote: >Although reluctant to respond to British pressure, Lincoln knew that >he could fight only one war at a time and that he must avoid a foreign >war with Britain during the civil war at home. So he ordered the >release of the envoys. While it is not clear whether Lincoln actually >used the words "one war at a time", the phrase became the axiom of his >foreign policy and was used in the press including an editorial by >Horace Greeley on the day Lincoln's funeral train passed through New >York. >The phrase also reflected the second most important principle of >Lincoln's foreign policy which was to prevent recognition and support >of the Confederacy by the British government. Lincoln and Seward had >repeatedly insisted earlier in l861 that British recognition of >Confederate independence would ultimately lead to war with the United >States. While "One war at a time" reflected Lincoln's need to avoid a >foreign war during the civil war, it also reflected his >well-calculated threat of a later war with Britain if it recognized >the Confederacy. It was a brilliant strategy, and it worked. Although >the British upper classes welcomed the Confederacy for geopolitical, >political, and commercial reasons, the British government got >Lincoln's message, remained neutral during the war, and never >recognized Confederate independence. Is there, in your opinion, some action by the UK or others that would have caused the Lincoln to seek immediate war on England? Was there some action that could not be responded to later? From: DUMahin@aol.com (Dean B. Mahin) Newsgroups: soc.history.war.us-civil-war Subject: Re: Author Visit, Dean B. Mahin Date: 1 Oct 2002 15:40:12 GMT "Gregory E. Garland" wrote > > If Lee doesn't stand at Antietam and just withdraws > across the Potomac with Harper's Ferry showing yet > another big CSA victory, do you think Britain still > goes ahead with plans to recognize the CSA and call > for peaceful separation? The idea that Britain had definite plans to recognize Confederate independence but was deterred by Lee's failure to achieve a major victory at Antietam is popular among some pro-Confederate folks, but it is not accurate. Antietam took place during the "shooting season" in Britain. All the cabinet members were at their estates, and there hadn't been a cabinet meeting for some time. I read a lot of the published and unpublished correspondence that summer and fall between various cabinet members. There were a few advocates of Confederate recognition in the cabinet, but more who opposed it. When the cabinet was convened in London a while after news of Antietam, it decided to maintain British neutrality in the American war and take no new action. I think the result would have been the same if Lee had won a big victory at Antietam. Such a victory would have confirmed the persistent British belief that the Confederates would maintain their independence without European assistance. I'll go into this story in greater depth in my subsequent answer to the questions of Patrick LaSalle. Dean B. Mahin From: DUMahin@aol.com (Dean B. Mahin) Newsgroups: soc.history.war.us-civil-war Subject: Re: Author Visit, Dean B. Mahin Date: 1 Oct 2002 16:35:39 GMT "Patrick LaSalle" wrote > How close did the various European powers, both major and minor, come to > recognizing the Confederacy??? Did any of them actually do so??? Which of > them were stalwart supporters of the Union??? No real country recognized Confederate independence, although there may have been gestures of recognition by one or two small principalities. There was strong sympathy for the Confederacy in the ruling classes in Britain, but Lincoln and Seward convinced the British government that they could not recognize Confederate independence without running a substantial risk of an unwanted war with the United States during or after the internal conflict in America. I will be glad to elaborate on the adroit and successful diplomacy of Lincoln and Seward, if someone asks. Napoleon III, emperor of France, thought an independent Confederacy would be a useful buffer between the U.S. and the new "empire" in Mexico headed an Austrian archduke as emperor and buttressed by a French army. Napoleon made two proposals for joint British-French recognition and support of the Confederacy, but both were rejected by the British. Napoleon was unwilling to risk a U.S.-French war without British support, so he remained neutral. The strongest supporters of the Union in Europe were the czar of Russia and the king of Prussia. Both preferred a strong and united America as a counterweight to British power. Germany and Italy were not yet united, and the small states in Europe played very small roles in European diplomacy. Belgium was the most pro-Confederate country among the smaller nations, mainly because King Leopold's daughter Carlotta was the wife of the new emperor of Mexico. Switzerland, the only sizeable republic in Europe, strongly supported the Union cause. As far as Mexico is > concerned, how did the Confederacy and the Union react to this??? Was the > Monroe Doctrine put into play by either of them??? The French invasion of Mexico was clearly a violation of the Monroe Doctrine. No French ruler would have thought of it if the United States government had not been preoccupied with the Civil War. Lincoln had opposed the U.S. war with Mexico while a Congressman in 1848, and the strong opposition to his stand in his district in Illinois was one reason why he did not run for a second term in the House. Lincoln realized that James K. Polk had painted himself into a corner in Mexico, and all Abe's moves as president were designed to minimize the risk of U.S. entrapment in a Mexican quagmire. But he wanted Napoleon III to believe that there was a real danger of a U.S. intervention in Mexico to support the embattled republican government. As a Union victory neared, Lincoln and Seward turned up the pressure on Napoleon to withdraw his troops. The Confederates were delighted by the new "empire" in Mexico and appointed a minister to the new imperial government even before Maximillian had arrived in Mexico. But by then Napoleon had realized that official friendship with the Cponfederates was too risky, and he apparently advised Maximilian to decline the Confederate offer to send a minister to Mexico City. > > What about the rest of the world??? In the l860s most of Africa and Asia consisted of colonies of European countries. There were a number of republican governments in Latin America, who generally supported the Union cause. > I'd just like to say thanks for stopping by and taking the > time to talk with us amateur enthusiasts Thank you, Patrick. Dean B. Mahin From: Rod Underwood Newsgroups: soc.history.war.us-civil-war Subject: Re: Author Visit, Dean B. Mahin Date: 1 Oct 2002 19:10:02 GMT On 1 Oct 2002 16:35:39 GMT, DUMahin@aol.com (Dean B. Mahin) wrote: > I will be glad to elaborate on the adroit and successful >diplomacy of Lincoln and Seward, if someone asks. OK, I'll ask. On page 9 of "One War at a Time" you suggest that Lincoln and Seward developed an effective relationship that was based on Seward's recognition of Lincoln's unique qualities and his acceptance of the President's authority and responsibility. In Gideon Welles's diary (vol. 1, 131) the Navy Secretary states that Seward meets with Lincoln daily and influences the President's actions "not always wisely." Seward is said to exert his own judgment and experience "which are often defective expedients, to guide the Executive." Do you think their relationship was really as solid as you suggest in your book? Was one manipulating the other? Was game playing going on here? Comments? Rod From: DUMahin@aol.com (Dean B. Mahin) Newsgroups: soc.history.war.us-civil-war Subject: Re: Author Visit, Dean B. Mahin Date: 2 Oct 2002 00:50:57 GMT Wesley Taylor wrote > Is there, in your opinion, some action by the UK or others that would > have caused the Lincoln to seek immediate war on England? Was there > some action that could not be responded to later? If England had recognized Confederate independence and sent the Royal Navy to break the Union blockade of Southern ports in order to increase the supply of cotton reaching the British cotton mills, as was hoped by Confederates and suggested by some Brits, Lincoln would have been forced to recognize the existence of a naval war between the U.S. and Britain. There is no reason to believe that he wanted a war with Britain under any circumstances and there is substantial evidence of his continuing efforts to avoid war with Britain which I describe at length in "One War at a Time." I don't believe there was ever a strong prospect of such actions by Britain, chiefly because Lincoln and Seward had convinced British leaders by mid-l861 that recognition of the Confederacy or interuption of the blockade would lead to an unwanted war with the United States. Lincoln was a man of peace, who abhored the thought of a war with any foreign power. This fact was somewhat obscured by the early need to convince the Brits that recognition and support of the Confederacy could lead to war with the U.S. and the subsequent need to convince Napoleon III that his invasion of Mexico could lead to U.S. intervention in Mexico on the side of the Mexican republicans. Both of these were adroid and sucessful diplomatic bluffs, but they (and the persistent neglect of Lincoln's international role by most historians and biographers) have left considerable confusion as to Lincoln's real attitudes toward war with England or France. Dean B. Mahin From: Wesley Taylor Newsgroups: soc.history.war.us-civil-war Subject: Re: Author Visit, Dean B. Mahin Date: Wed, 2 Oct 2002 05:40:46 CST On 2 Oct 2002 00:50:57 GMT, DUMahin@aol.com (Dean B. Mahin) wrote: >Wesley Taylor wrote > >> Is there, in your opinion, some action by the UK or others that would >> have caused the Lincoln to seek immediate war on England? Was there >> some action that could not be responded to later? > >If England had recognized Confederate independence and sent the Royal >Navy to break the Union blockade of Southern ports in order to >increase the supply of >cotton reaching the British cotton mills, as was hoped by Confederates >and suggested by some Brits, Lincoln would have been forced to >recognize the existence of a naval war between the U.S. and Britain. >There is no reason to believe that he wanted a war with Britain under >any circumstances and there is substantial evidence of his continuing >efforts to avoid war with Britain which I describe at length in "One >War at a Time." I don't believe there was ever a strong prospect of >such actions by Britain, chiefly because Lincoln and Seward had >convinced British leaders by mid-l861 that recognition of the >Confederacy or interuption of the blockade would lead to an unwanted >war with the United States. > >Lincoln was a man of peace, who abhored the thought of a war with any >foreign power. This fact was somewhat obscured by the early need to >convince the Brits that recognition and support of the Confederacy >could lead to war with the U.S. and the subsequent need to convince >Napoleon III that his invasion of Mexico could lead to U.S. >intervention in Mexico on the side of the Mexican republicans. Both >of these were adroid and sucessful diplomatic bluffs, but they (and >the persistent neglect of Lincoln's international role by most >historians and biographers) have left considerable confusion as to >Lincoln's real attitudes toward war with England or France. > >Dean B. Mahin That was my reading of the situation, but I was curious to see what you thought. Thanks From: DUMahin@aol.com (Dean B. Mahin) Newsgroups: soc.history.war.us-civil-war Subject: Re: Author Visit, Dean B. Mahin Date: 2 Oct 2002 12:35:03 GMT Rod Underwood wrote > > On page 9 of "One War at a Time" you suggest that Lincoln and Seward > developed an effective relationship that was based on Seward's > recognition of Lincoln's unique qualities and his acceptance of the > President's authority and responsibility. In Gideon Welles's diary > (vol. 1, 131) the Navy Secretary states that Seward meets with Lincoln > daily and influences the President's actions "not always wisely." > Seward is said to exert his own judgment and experience "which are > often defective expedients, to guide the Executive." > Do you think their relationship was really as solid as you suggest in > your book? Was one manipulating the other? Was game playing going on > here? Comments? Welles's diary is a useful source of factual information, but his judgements are not reliable. Welles resented Seward's greater influence with Lincoln, never understood the imperatives and subtleties of Union foreign policy (which was rarely discussed at cabinet meetings), and thought the U.S. should take a much tougher line with Britain on issues related to the blockade, shipbuilding for the Confederacy in Britain, etc. John M. Taylor, the only living biographer of Seward, wrote that I had proved that "Lincoln had a real interest in foreign affairs and that no major diplomatic decision was reached without his participation and conclurrence." Lincoln set the major foreign policy goals of his administration, but he wisely relied on Seward's greater knowledge of foreign countries and of diplomatic practices. Aside from some tension in the early weeks when both men were learning their new jobs, I found no evidence of substantial disagreement between the two men. I found quite a few cases where someone recorded Lincoln's comments on an issue and very similar comments were included by Seward in a diplomatic dispatch. In my judgment, (a) the collaboration between Lincoln and Seward is one of the most effective relationships between a president and secretary of state in U. S. diplomatic history, and (b) their foreign policy, although frequently misunderstood at home and abroad, fully achieved its primary objective of preventing British or French recognition and support of the Confederacy. Dean B. Mahin From: Rod Underwood Newsgroups: soc.history.war.us-civil-war Subject: Re: Author Visit, Dean B. Mahin Date: Wed, 2 Oct 2002 16:14:19 CST I accept what you are saying, Dean, but I am still troubled about the nature of the relationship between the President and the Secretary of State. Let me cite one incident to illustrate my concern: While developing his legal position for the blockade message of April 19, Lincoln was painfully aware that such a barrier is an instrument of war between two or more parties engaged in warfare. He knew that through such action he was running the risk of implicit recognition of the Confederacy as a belligerent, rather than as a group of rebellious states. Thaddeus Stevens, the leader of Pennsylvania Republicans, ridiculed Lincoln because, he insisted, the Proclamation in legal terms meant, "we are blockading ourselves." When he confronted Lincoln on this "great blunder and absurdity," the President replied, "I don't know anything about the law of nations, and I thought it was all right." "As a lawyer, Mr. Lincoln," Stevens remarked, "I should have supposed you would have seen the difficulty at once." "Oh well," the President replied, "I'm a good enough lawyer in a Western law court, I suppose, but we don't practice the law of nations up there, and I supposed Seward knew all about it, and I left it to him. But it's done now and can't be helped so we must get along as well as we can." Now, Dean, wouldn't you agree that this incident suggests acquiescence on Lincoln's part rather than collaboration? Or perhaps the President was using self-deprecating wit to disarm Stevens? Rod __________________________________________________________ On 2 Oct 2002 12:35:03 GMT, DUMahin@aol.com (Dean B. Mahin) wrote: >John M. Taylor, the only living biographer of Seward, wrote that I had >proved that "Lincoln had a real interest in foreign affairs and that >no major diplomatic decision was reached without his participation and >conclurrence." Lincoln set the major foreign policy goals of his >administration, but he wisely relied on Seward's greater knowledge of >foreign countries and of diplomatic practices. Aside from some tension >in the early weeks when both men were learning their new jobs, I found >no evidence of substantial disagreement between the two men. I found >quite a few cases where someone recorded Lincoln's comments on an >issue and very similar comments were included by Seward in a >diplomatic dispatch. In my judgment, (a) the collaboration between >Lincoln and Seward is one of the most effective relationships between >a president and secretary of state in U. S. diplomatic history, and >(b) their foreign policy, although frequently misunderstood at home >and abroad, fully achieved its primary objective of preventing British >or French recognition and support of the Confederacy. > >Dean B. Mahin From: ABBEYK@webtv.net (Hawk) Newsgroups: soc.history.war.us-civil-war Subject: Re: Author Visit, Dean B. Mahin Date: 3 Oct 2002 10:45:33 GMT I was interested in your posts until you came up with this statement.. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Mahin: "Lincoln was a man of peace, who abhored the thought of a war with any foreign power." ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Lincoln was a war monger, who invaded the Confederacy and murdered over 600,000 American boys. How can you possibly say he was a man of peace? From: "Gregory E. Garland" Newsgroups: soc.history.war.us-civil-war Subject: Re: Author Visit, Dean B. Mahin Date: Thu, 3 Oct 2002 05:41:40 CST "Dean B. Mahin" wrote: > > "Gregory E. Garland" wrote > > > If Lee doesn't stand at Antietam and just withdraws > > across the Potomac with Harper's Ferry showing yet > > another big CSA victory, do you think Britain still > > goes ahead with plans to recognize the CSA and call > > for peaceful separation? > > The idea that Britain had definite plans to recognize Confederate > independence but was deterred by Lee's failure to achieve a major > victory at Antietam is popular among some pro-Confederate folks, but > it is not accurate. You are arguing from a misconception here. >[...] Antietam took place during the "shooting season" > in Britain. All the cabinet members were at their estates, and there > hadn't been a cabinet meeting for some time. I read a lot of the > published and unpublished correspondence that summer and fall between > various cabinet members. There were a few advocates of Confederate > recognition in the cabinet, but more who opposed it. But hadn't Palmerston, the Prime Minister, in that correspondence declared that the time had come to recognize the CSA? The same Palmerston who had forestalled an attempt by Parliament to recognize the CSA by claiming 'let us make the decision'? (meaning his Cabinet) The key there is who will oppose Palmerston and Gladstone in actuality. You are saying that Palmerston can not deliver the might and power of his government after demanding that Parliament leave the decision to him. Palmerston definitely said "Whoa!" after Antietam; if there is no Antietam does he still say whoa? (NB: I am asking this because the greater depth promised in the response to Patrick LaSalle didn't satisfy me :-)) From: DUMahin@aol.com (Dean B. Mahin) Newsgroups: soc.history.war.us-civil-war Subject: Re: Author Visit, Dean B. Mahin Date: Thu, 3 Oct 2002 07:36:11 CST Rod Underwood wrote > > While developing his legal position for the blockade message of April > 19, Lincoln was painfully aware that such a barrier is an instrument > of war between two or more parties engaged in warfare. He knew that > through such action he was running the risk of implicit recognition of > the Confederacy as a belligerent. There is no clear evidence that Lincoln realized at the time of the blockade message that the blockade would be interpreted as implicit recognition of the Confederacy, and it is also unclear whether Seward anticipated this reaction. Neither man was an international lawyer, and in those days the State Department had only clerks. But even if Lincoln had anticipated the interpretation, I doubt that it would have deterred him. The blockade was the best available means of putting pressure on the Confederacy. > Thaddeus Stevens, the leader of Pennsylvania Republicans, > ridiculed Lincoln because, he insisted, the Proclamation in legal > terms meant, "we are blockading ourselves." When he confronted Lincoln > on this "great blunder and absurdity," the President replied . . . "I'm a good enough lawyer in a Western law court, I > suppose, but we don't practice the law of nations up there, and I > supposed Seward knew all about it, and I left it to him...". Wouldn't you agree that this incident suggests acquiescence > on Lincoln's part rather than collaboration? > There are three important reasons for doubting the accuracy of this reported statement by Stevens. First, it based on an interview with Stevens reported in the New York Herald in July l867. The accuracy of reporting in those days left much to be desired. Second, it was a reported "recollection" six years later by the leader of the Radical Republicans in the House who was a strong opponent of Lincoln's policies during and after the war. Stevens was highly motivated to demonstrate that Lincoln had been an inept bumbler whose policy ideas should not be taken seriously. Third, there is considerable evidence that other options were considered and rejected by Lincoln before the blockade was proclaimed and that he chose the blockade because it was the only way to block Confederate trade without causing a war with Britain. The main option was "closing the ports" -- a declaration that the Southern ports were closed and the use of the U.S. Navy ships to collect duties or penalties from neutral ships violating the closure order. The British minister, Lord Lyons, told Seward on March 25 that this plan would lead to great pressure on the British government to use all available means to open the Confederate ports to obtain cotton which was vital for British industry. Lyons undoubtedly also expressed to Seward the opinion he reported to London - that a Union blockade under international law would be more acceptable to Britain and less hazardous for the United States than "closing the ports." The balance of evidence strongly suggests that Lincoln chose a blockade under the rules specified by international law because it allowed him to build up pressure on the Confederacy without risking an unwanted war with Britain. I found no evidence of disagreement between Lincoln and Seward concerning the blockade and I don't feel Stevens' postwar "recollection" is a significant argument against my conclusion of an effective collaboration between Lincoln and Seward. Dean B. Mahin From: Robert Kolker Newsgroups: soc.history.war.us-civil-war Subject: Re: Author Visit, Dean B. Mahin Date: 3 Oct 2002 13:40:00 GMT Dean B. Mahin wrote: > > > There is no clear evidence that Lincoln realized at the time of the > blockade message that the blockade would be interpreted as implicit > recognition of the Confederacy, and it is also unclear whether Seward > anticipated this reaction. Neither man was an international lawyer, > and in those days the State Department had only clerks. But even if > Lincoln had anticipated the interpretation, I doubt that it would have > deterred him. The blockade was the best available means of putting > pressure on the Confederacy. If the action of the Confederacy were viewed as insurrection and breach of law (as opposed to a Revolution for Liberty), use of blockade would still be a kosher means of ending the insurrection and restoring law and order. From a certain point of view the declaration of nationhood and sovreignty by the Confederates had as much legal force as the declaration of sovreignty by the Montana Freemen about seven years ago (or so, I don't quite remember the date). The FBI did not think for one minute, that they were recognizing the sovreignty of the Freemen when they surrounded their cabin. The only way the Confederacy would be sovreign is if the Union had been worn down and conceded the matter to the Southrons. If you want a Revolution you have to succeed. Unsucessful Revolutions are treated as insurrection or brigandry, a criminal act. The Southrons are very fortunate that the Union did not set out to hang the ringleaders and primary military men. Can you see Robert E. Lee at the end of a rope? Bob Kolker From: DUMahin@aol.com (Dean B. Mahin) Newsgroups: soc.history.war.us-civil-war Subject: Re: Author Visit, Dean B. Mahin Date: Thu, 3 Oct 2002 11:30:10 CST "Gregory E. Garland" wrote > > > > But hadn't Palmerston, the Prime Minister, > declared that the time had come to recognize the CSA? ...You are saying that Palmerston can not deliver the might and power of his government..." You should read Chapter 9 of "One War at a Time" which reviews what actually happened in the Britain before and after Antietam. Here are the essential points. (1) Palmerston had opposed recognition of Confederate independence and intervention in the American war in the spring and early summer. But he believed the Confederacy would maintain its independence and was increasingly concerned about the bloodshed in America and the hardships in the British cotton industry due to the Union blockade of Confederate ports. When he heard that the Federals had taken a "complete smashing" at the second Manassas, he wrote the foreign minister, Lord Russell, that if Lee's invasion of Maryland was successful "would it not be time for us to consider whether ... England and France might not address the contending parties and recommand an arrangement based on separation?" This is a far cry from the firm decision for intervention that is often attributed to Palmerston or to the entire cabinet. Palmerston's interest in intervention waned rapidly after news that Lee's invasion of Maryland had failed and Lincoln planned to issue an Emancipation Proclamation. (2) The British have a cabinet form of government. No prime minister is able to deliver the "might and power" of his government unless he is supported by a majority of the members of the cabinet. Even if Palmerston had consistently advocated British recognition and intervention, which he did not, no action would have been possible without the support of the cabinet. There was no majority in the cabinet for intervention, before or after Antietam. Dean B. Mahin From: "Patrick LaSalle" Newsgroups: soc.history.war.us-civil-war Subject: Re: Author Visit, Dean B. Mahin Date: 3 Oct 2002 18:15:18 GMT "Gregory E. Garland" wrote in message news:3D9BBB6A.BCC3162E@iu.net... > But hadn't Palmerston, the Prime Minister, in that correspondence > declared that the time had come to recognize the CSA? The same > Palmerston who had forestalled an attempt by Parliament to recognize > the CSA by claiming 'let us make the decision'? (meaning his Cabinet) > The key there is who will oppose Palmerston and Gladstone in > actuality. You are saying that Palmerston can not deliver the > might and power of his government after demanding that Parliament > leave the decision to him. Palmerston definitely said "Whoa!" after > Antietam; if there is no Antietam does he still say whoa? Its from my understanding that Palmerston regularly went from wanting to recognize the Confederacy, to hesitating and not being sure whether it was the right thing. There were those in his Cabinet who were more "stable" in their belief, but I thought Palmerston had a tendency to commit himself, then back down afterwards. Maybe you can answer this as well, Prof. Mahin. From: ABBEYK@webtv.net (Hawk) Newsgroups: soc.history.war.us-civil-war Subject: Re: Author Visit, Dean B. Mahin Date: 3 Oct 2002 18:15:25 GMT The only way the Confederacy would be sovreign is if the Union had been worn down and conceded the matter to the Southrons. If you want a Revolution you have to succeed. Unsucessful Revolutions are treated as insurrection or brigandry, a criminal act. The Southrons are very fortunate that the Union did not set out to hang the ringleaders and primary military men. Can you see Robert E. Lee at the end of a rope? Bob Kolker ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~And on the other hand, if the South had won the war and brought criminal acts aganist the warring North, Could you see lincoln on the end of a rope, along with his henchmen sherman and grant? "....anyone could own a slave as long as he remained loyal to the union" From: Rod Underwood Newsgroups: soc.history.war.us-civil-war Subject: Re: Author Visit, Dean B. Mahin Date: 3 Oct 2002 18:15:28 GMT On Thu, 3 Oct 2002 07:36:11 CST, DUMahin@aol.com (Dean B. Mahin) wrote: >There is no clear evidence that Lincoln realized at the time of the >blockade message that the blockade would be interpreted as implicit >recognition of the Confederacy, and it is also unclear whether Seward >anticipated this reaction. Neither man was an international lawyer, >and in those days the State Department had only clerks. But even if >Lincoln had anticipated the interpretation, I doubt that it would have >deterred him. The blockade was the best available means of putting >pressure on the Confederacy. To the contrary, there is much clear evidence in David Donald's "Lincoln" , vol. I of "The Diary of Orville Hickman Browning", and elsewhere that Lincoln clearly understood the difference between closing ports and blockading them. Also, you seem to contradict yourself with your reference to the Lord Lyons conversation with Seward on March 25. Before this British reaction to closing the Southern ports, both Gideon Welles and Charles Sumner advised against a blockade while Lincoln made it known he supported a blockade. Also, both Lincoln and Seward studied the Treaty of Paris quite carefully. > >> Thaddeus Stevens, the leader of Pennsylvania Republicans, >> ridiculed Lincoln because, he insisted, the Proclamation in legal >> terms meant, "we are blockading ourselves." When he confronted Lincoln >> on this "great blunder and absurdity," the President replied . . . > "I'm a good enough lawyer in a Western law court, I >> suppose, but we don't practice the law of nations up there, and I >> supposed Seward knew all about it, and I left it to him...". > Wouldn't you agree that this incident suggests acquiescence >> on Lincoln's part rather than collaboration? > > >There are three important reasons for doubting the accuracy of this >reported statement by Stevens. First, it based on an interview with >Stevens reported in the New York Herald in July l867. The accuracy of >reporting in those days left much to be desired. Second, it was a >reported "recollection" six years later by the leader of the Radical >Republicans in the House who was a strong opponent of Lincoln's >policies during and after the war. Stevens was highly motivated to >demonstrate that Lincoln had been an inept bumbler whose policy ideas >should not be taken seriously. Third, there is considerable evidence >that other options were considered and rejected by Lincoln before the >blockade was proclaimed and that he chose the blockade because it was >the only way to block Confederate trade without causing a war with >Britain. OK, Dean. I wasn't aware of the source of Steven's reported statement. Again, in your third point you seem to be contradicting your statement in the first paragraph with which I take issue. >The main option was "closing the ports" -- a declaration that the >Southern ports were closed and the use of the U.S. Navy ships to >collect duties or penalties from neutral ships violating the closure >order. The British minister, Lord Lyons, told Seward on March 25 that >this plan would lead to great pressure on the British government to >use all available means to open the Confederate ports to obtain cotton >which was vital for British industry. Lyons undoubtedly also expressed >to Seward the opinion he reported to London - that a Union blockade >under international law would be more acceptable to Britain and less >hazardous for the United States than "closing the ports." The balance >of evidence strongly suggests that Lincoln chose a blockade under the >rules specified by international law because it allowed him to build >up pressure on the Confederacy without risking an unwanted war with >Britain. > >I found no evidence of disagreement between Lincoln and Seward >concerning the blockade and I don't feel Stevens' postwar >"recollection" is a significant argument against my conclusion of an >effective collaboration between Lincoln and Seward. Yes, but was the lack of disagreement due to Lincoln simply accepting Seward's views rather than real collaboration? Rod From: DUMahin@aol.com (Dean B. Mahin) Newsgroups: soc.history.war.us-civil-war Subject: Re: Author Visit, Dean B. Mahin Date: 3 Oct 2002 19:30:01 GMT ABBEYK@webtv.net (Hawk) wrote > I was interested in your posts until you came up with this statement.. > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Mahin: "Lincoln was a > man of peace, who abhored the thought of a war with any foreign power." > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Lincoln was a war monger, > who invaded the Confederacy and murdered over 600,000 American boys. How > can you possibly say he was a man of peace?" I resolved when I accepted the invitation to this Author Visit that I would avoid being drawn into debate on internal issues of the Civil War. My expertise is in international relations. The reference to Lincoln as a "man of peace" was unfortunate, and I withdraw it. I was talking only about his role in international relations. I decline to debate his resposibility and that of Confederate leaders for the bloodshed in America. Dean B. Mahin From: DUMahin@aol.com (Dean B. Mahin) Newsgroups: soc.history.war.us-civil-war Subject: Re: Author Visit, Dean B. Mahin Date: 3 Oct 2002 19:30:08 GMT Robert Kolker wrote > > The only way the Confederacy would be sovreign is if the Union had been > worn down and conceded the matter to the Southrons. If you want a > Revolution you have to succeed. Unsucessful Revolutions are treated as > insurrection or brigandry, a criminal act. William Harcourt, a relative of the doveish British minister of war, noted in "The Times" in l862 that "Rebellion, until it has succeeded, is Treason. When it successful, it becomes Independence." Dean B.Mahin From: DUMahin@aol.com (Dean B. Mahin) Newsgroups: soc.history.war.us-civil-war Subject: Re: Author Visit, Dean B. Mahin Date: 4 Oct 2002 04:25:08 GMT Rod Underwood wrote > Dean B. Mahin wrote: > >There is no clear evidence that Lincoln realized at the time of the > >blockade message that the blockade would be interpreted as implicit > >recognition of the Confederacy . . .> > To the contrary, there is much clear evidence in David Donald's > "Lincoln" , vol. I of "The Diary of Orville Hickman Browning", and > elsewhere that Lincoln clearly understood the difference between > closing ports and blockading them. Rod, I did not say that Lincoln didn't understand the difference between closing ports and blockading them, which is a different question from the question of Lincoln's possible failure to understand that some people would consider the blockade proclamation as a recognition of Confederate independence. Lincoln and Seward were dealing with the immediate effects of actions to curb Confederate trade, and may have given little thought to possible future Confederate arguments re independence. Also, you seem to contradict > yourself with your reference to the Lord Lyons conversation with > Seward on March 25. Rod, how does that contradict my conclusions? .. Third, there is considerable evidence > >that other options were considered and rejected by Lincoln before the > >blockade was proclaimed and that he chose the blockade because it was > >the only way to block Confederate trade without causing a war with > >Britain. > > Again, in your third point you seem to be contradicting your statement > in the first paragraph with which I take issue Rod, my printer is not working, so I don't have a copies of the previous messages in front of me as I post this. Please explain how the above point contradicts anything else I said. > >I found no evidence of disagreement between Lincoln and Seward > >concerning the blockade and I don't feel Stevens' postwar > >"recollection" is a significant argument against my conclusion of an > >effective collaboration between Lincoln and Seward. > > Yes, but was the lack of disagreement due to Lincoln simply accepting > Seward's views rather than real collaboration? > Rod, the job of presidents is to consider conflicting advice and decide which adviser is right. Accepting Seward's views at any time was just as important a presidential decision as rejecting them. It is not clear to what extent Seward pushed for the proclamation of the blockade and it is not possible for us to know for sure just what the relationship was between Lincoln and Seward at that time or any other. I base my conclusions about their relationship on the total available evidence of Lincoln's responses to international issues. But my research on the blockade was nearly five years ago, and I know you have gone over this ground much more recently for your new book on the blockade on the Texas coast. If you will give me a clearer indication of your arguments, I'll respond as carefully as I can. Dean B. Mahin From: DUMahin@aol.com (Dean B. Mahin) Newsgroups: soc.history.war.us-civil-war Subject: Re: Author Visit, Dean B. Mahin Date: Thu, 3 Oct 2002 23:23:34 CST "Patrick LaSalle" wrote > Its from my understanding that Palmerston regularly went from wanting to > recognize the Confederacy, to hesitating and not being sure whether it was > the right thing. There were those in his Cabinet who were more "stable" in > their belief, but I thought Palmerston had a tendency to commit himself, > then back down afterwards. Maybe you can answer this as well, Prof. Mahin. The upper classes in Britain were sympathetic to the Confederacy for political, geopolitical, and economic reasons, and all Englishmen were appalled by the bloodshed in America. They thought the Confederates would be able to sustain their independence and that it would be better for America and for Britain's cotton supply if the war could be ended as quicky as possible. [British shipbuilders, blockade runners, and cotton traders, who were getting rich from the war, hoped it would continue as long as possible.] But Palmerston and the foreign minister, Russell, didn't know what they could do to stop the war, and both men were ambivalent about British intervention. Both blew hot and cold on recognition and intervention at various times. This situation continued as long as Lincoln's position was that the war was not about slavery and the Brits were able to believe that the Union only fought for "empire" over the South. After the Emancipation Proclamation, it was a different ball game. British leaders soon realized that Britain could not intervene in the war on the side of the Confederacy without appearing to be support slavery. That seemed politically impossible in Britain. After the EP, there was no more serious talk about British recongition of the Confederacy. FYI, I have never been a professor. I worked in international relations for forty years, but have never taught it. Dean B. Mahin From: ncanfield@ameritech.net (n canfield) Newsgroups: soc.history.war.us-civil-war Subject: Re: Author Visit, Dean B. Mahin Date: 4 Oct 2002 14:00:23 GMT DUMahin@aol.com (Dean B. Mahin) wrote in message news:... > > Napoleon III, emperor of France, thought an independent Confederacy > would be a useful buffer between the U.S. and the new "empire" in > Mexico headed an Austrian archduke as emperor and buttressed by a > French army. Napoleon made two proposals for joint British-French > recognition and support of the Confederacy, but both were rejected by > the British. Napoleon was unwilling to risk a U.S.-French war without > British support, so he remained neutral. > > The French invasion of Mexico was clearly a violation of the Monroe > Doctrine. No French ruler would have thought of it if the United > States government had not been preoccupied with the Civil War. Lincoln > had opposed the U.S. war with Mexico while a Congressman in 1848, and > the strong opposition to his stand in his district in Illinois was one > reason why he did not run for a second term in the House. Lincoln > realized that James K. Polk had painted himself into a corner in > Mexico, and all Abe's moves as president were designed to minimize the > risk of U.S. entrapment in a Mexican quagmire. But he wanted Napoleon > III to believe that there was a real danger of a U.S. intervention in > Mexico to support the embattled republican government. As a Union > victory neared, Lincoln and Seward turned up the pressure on Napoleon > to withdraw his troops. > > The Confederates were delighted by the new "empire" in Mexico and > appointed a minister to the new imperial government even before > Maximillian had arrived in Mexico. But by then Napoleon had realized > that official friendship with the Cponfederates was too risky, and he > apparently advised Maximilian to decline the Confederate offer to send > a minister to Mexico City. > Dean B. Mahin Another question about Mexico and South America.... Read in "Battle Cry of Freedom" and elsewhere that particularly the South (as opposed to the whole U.S.) had designs on Cuba, Mexico, Nicaragua and/or possibly other Central and S.A. nations as potential areas for expansion -- especially to expand the slave system. In view of that, how did these nations regard the Confederacy? You mentioned Mexico, but what of the others? Any regard an independent CSA as a threat? (Apparently Mexico would have France behind it.) n canfield From: Rod Underwood Newsgroups: soc.history.war.us-civil-war Subject: Re: Author Visit, Dean B. Mahin Date: 4 Oct 2002 14:00:26 GMT Oh, Dean, I think we have about beaten this poor horse to death. I fear I've become too petty in my remarks. Perhaps the author would prefer to turn to his new book, "The Blessed Place of Freedom." I've not read it all but what I have seen I have enjoyed very much and I have learned a lot. Of course, I have some questions and comments about this book. Do you wish to remain with "One War" or turn to "Blessed Freedom"? Rod On 4 Oct 2002 04:25:08 GMT, DUMahin@aol.com (Dean B. Mahin) wrote: [snip] >Rod, I did not say that Lincoln didn't understand the difference >between closing ports and blockading them, which is a different >question from the question of Lincoln's possible failure to understand >that some people would consider the blockade proclamation as a >recognition of Confederate independence. Lincoln and Seward were >dealing with the immediate effects of actions to curb Confederate >trade, and may have given little thought to possible future >Confederate arguments re independence. [snip again] From: DUMahin@aol.com (Dean B. Mahin) Newsgroups: soc.history.war.us-civil-war Subject: Re: Author Visit, Dean B. Mahin Date: Fri, 4 Oct 2002 15:29:22 CST ncanfield@ameritech.net (n canfield) wrote > Another question about Mexico and South America.... Read in "Battle > Cry of Freedom" and elsewhere that particularly the South (as opposed > to the whole U.S.) had designs on Cuba, Mexico, Nicaragua and/or > possibly other Central and S.A. nations as potential areas for > expansion -- especially to expand the slave system. > In view of that, how did these nations regard the Confederacy? You > mentioned Mexico, but what of the others? Any regard an independent > CSA as a threat? Most of the interest within the United States in territorial expansion to the South and Southwest before the Civil War was expressed by Southerners. They had taken the leading roles in the annexation of Texas and in the events leading to the U.S. war with Mexico (l846-48), which led to the U.S. acquistion of California, Arizon, New Mexico, and parts of several other western States. In the l848-1850 period, the issue of slavery in the new territories gained from Mexico nearly led to civil war until it was set aside by Henry Clay's Compromise of l850. In the l840s and l850s Jefferson Davis and Judah P. Benjamin (later Confederate Secretary of State)had both been active supporters of increased territory or influence below the Rio Grande. The Mexican republicans headed by Benito Juarez were distinctly hostile to the Confederacy, especially after the Confederate government appointed a minister to the new French-supported imperial government headed by Maximilian. Although Lincoln had no intention of becoming involved in Juarez's war with the Mexican conservatives and the French invaders, he convinced Napoleon III that there was a real prospect of an American intervention on the side of the Mexican republicans. A steady stream of diplomatic messages to Paris put increasing pressure on Napoleon to withdraw his troops from Mexico. Lincoln's policy was continued after his death by Seward, as Andrew Johnson's secretary of state, and it clearly contributed to Napoleon's decision to withdraw from Mexico early in l867. I had not made a special study of the reactions of other American republics to the Civil War. I quoted in "One War at a Time" Lincoln's comments during the initial reception of several new envoys from these countries. They always emphasized the friendly relationships of the U.S. republic with other republican governments in this Hemisphere and the strong U.S. support for the republican form of government in the Hemisphere. My strong impression is that the other American republicans regarded the Union cause as the cause of freedom and republican government and therefore thought their interests would be best served by a Union victory. Dean B. Mahin From: Rod Underwood Newsgroups: soc.history.war.us-civil-war Subject: Re: Author Visit, Dean B. Mahin Date: 6 Oct 2002 00:35:10 GMT Upon review of our conversation, Dean, I find that I misread what you wrote and did not carefully absorb the content. Consequently, I reached an erroneous conclusion which I now retract. Your conclusions are sound. My brain was in low gear while my fingers were in high gear. I apologize. Rod From: drazen.kramaric@zg.hinet.hr (Drazen Kramaric) Newsgroups: soc.history.war.us-civil-war Subject: Re: Author Visit, Dean B. Mahin Date: 6 Oct 2002 21:25:11 GMT On 30 Sep 2002 22:15:01 GMT, DUMahin@aol.com (Dean B. Mahin) wrote: >I will welcome questions or comments on any of these topics: the >foreign policies of the Union and Confederate governments; How would you judge the overall Confederate foreign policy and the contribution of Confederate Secretaries of the State towards Confederate cuase in Europe? Who had the more influence in the conduct of foreign affairs, Davis or his secretaries? How did CSA finance its "diplomacy" in Europe? Were there any experts in foreign (especially European) affairs in Confederacy and were they employed to the best of their abilities? Drax From: Michael Furlan Newsgroups: soc.history.war.us-civil-war,alt.war.civil.usa,alt.thought.southern,soc.history Subject: Re: Author Visit, Dean B. Mahin Date: Fri, 11 Oct 2002 19:54:57 GMT Dean Mahin has generously offered to extend his visit until Wednesday October 16th. He will be happy to respond to any question posted to the newsgroup soc.history.war.us-civil.war by that date. From: DUMahin@aol.com (Dean B. Mahin) Newsgroups: soc.history.war.us-civil-war Subject: Author Visit, Dean B. Mahin, Part II Date: Fri, 4 Oct 2002 14:36:42 CST Rod Underwood wrote in Message No. 30 in "Author Visit, Dean B. Mahin": " "Perhaps the author would prefer to turn to his new book, "The Blessed Place of Freedom." I've not read it all but what I have seen I have enjoyed very much and I have learned a lot. Of course, I have some questions and comments about this book. Do you wish to remain with "One War" or turn to "Blessed Freedom"? " " I am happy to receive questions or comments regarding either book. Since the Author Visit thread has reached 30 messages -- and I am finding it increasingly difficult to check for new postings in the middle of the thread -- I am starting herewith a new thread entitled "Author Visit, Dean B. Mahin, Part II." I suggest that questions related to "The Blessed Place of Freedom" and/or to the role and reactions of Europeans who were in America as immigrants, correspondents, visitors, or volunteers be posted to this new thread. I will also respond to additional messages added to the original thread, but prefer they be on diplomatic issues as before, rather than on immigrants and visitors. Dean B. Mahin From: Rich Rostrom Newsgroups: soc.history.war.us-civil-war Subject: Re: Author Visit, Dean B. Mahin, Part II Date: 6 Oct 2002 00:35:17 GMT DUMahin@aol.com (Dean B. Mahin) wrote: >I suggest that questions >related to "The Blessed Place of Freedom" and/or to the role and >reactions of Europeans who were in America as immigrants, >correspondents, visitors, or volunteers be posted to this new thread. OK, here is a question. The vast majority of immigrants to the US before 1860 settled in the free states. These immigrants, like their native born neighbors, supported the Union. There were some that balked at the war effort - for instance, the Irish draft rioters in NYC - but there was little difference overall. Some immigrants did go to the South. Two groups of these were noted for pro-Union leanings: German-Americans in Missouri, and German- Americans in Texas. But again, most immigrants conformed to the attitudes of their neighbors. Professor Mahin, in your opinion, were immigrants in the North or in the South more conformant to their communities? -- Never consume legumes before transacting whatsoever | Rich Rostrom even in the outermost courtyard of a descendant of | Timur the Terrible. | rrostrom@dummy --- Avram Davidson, _Dr. Bhumbo Singh_ | 21stcentury.net From: cdclif@ku.edu (C. Clifford) Newsgroups: soc.history.war.us-civil-war Subject: Re: Author Visit, Dean B. Mahin, Part II Date: Sat, 5 Oct 2002 19:36:05 CST DUMahin@aol.com (Dean B. Mahin) wrote in message news:... I am starting herewith a new thread entitled > "Author Visit, Dean B. Mahin, Part II." I suggest that questions > related to "The Blessed Place of Freedom" and/or to the role and > reactions of Europeans who were in America as immigrants, > correspondents, visitors, or volunteers be posted to this new thread. > Dean B. Mahin Considering the number of German regiments there were in the Union army, with German-speaking commanders and soldiers, I can see why the South felt the North had recruited German mercenaries to attack them. In your research, did you find absolutely no evidence that the North circumvented its own laws and did, in fact, pay transportation or other remuneration to recruits in Germany? From: DUMahin@aol.com (Dean B. Mahin) Newsgroups: soc.history.war.us-civil-war Subject: Re: Author Visit, Dean B. Mahin, Part II Date: 6 Oct 2002 13:15:04 GMT Rich Rostrom wrote > Some immigrants did go to the South. Two groups of these were noted > for pro-Union leanings: German-Americans in Missouri, and German- > Americans in Texas. But again, most immigrants conformed to the > attitudes of their neighbors. > In your opinion, were immigrants in the North > or in the South more conformant to their communities? Most books about the role of immigrants in the Civil War have been written by ethnic authors who were eager to prove that their ethnic group had played a major role in the war in the North or South. I tried (a) to provide a balanced view of the support for and opposition to the Union or Confederate cause by members of each major ethnic group and (b) to make only those generalizations that can be fairly drawn from the available evidence. Perhaps the most important conclusion I reached was that, although most immigrants in North and South were "conformant to their communities" (to use your phrase), there were efforts to avoid or escape from military service by many men in all major immigrants groups in both North and South. Evidence of resistance to military service by immigrants has usually been ignored or played down by ethnic authors. I found much such evidence by using the easily searchable CD of the "Official Records," which had rarely been used for this purpose by previous authors. Most of the efforts to avoid or escape from military service were by individual immigrants. As you indicated, the two most important examples of resistance by large groups of immigrants were the resistance to Confederate conscription by the German farmers in the Texas Hill country and the decisive opposition to the prospective secession of Missouri by the large German element in St. Louis. There was no opposition to the Union cause by any sizeable group of immigrants in the North. Dean B. Mahin From: DUMahin@aol.com (Dean B. Mahin) Newsgroups: soc.history.war.us-civil-war Subject: Re: Author Visit, Dean B. Mahin, Part II Date: 6 Oct 2002 13:15:11 GMT cdclif@ku.edu (C. Clifford) wrote > > Considering the number of German regiments there were in the Union > army, with German-speaking commanders and soldiers, I can see why > the South felt the North had recruited German mercenaries to attack > them. In your research, did you find absolutely no evidence that > the North circumvented its own laws and did, in fact, pay > transportation or other remuneration to recruits in Germany? The idea that most of the Germans in the Union army were "mercenaries" brought over to America by the Union to ravish the South was a favorite theme of Confederate propaganda. It appealed to the strong resentment in the South of the substantial role of Hessian mercenaries in the British army during the American Revolution. Here are the facts: First, most of the Germans in the Union army had been here for some years. In 1860 there were l,229,144 residents of northern States who were born in a German state. Only about 147,000 Germans (including women and children) came to the northern states during the war, but most of these had not yet arrived when most of the German regiments were formed in l861 or early 1862 (which was also the period of strongest complaints in the South about German "mercenaries"). So it is clear that the overwhelming majority of the estimated l75,000 to 200,000 Germans in the Union army were well established immigrants who had been in America for some time. Second, while Lincoln and Seward encouraged continued immigration during the war, they refused to authorize the use of government funds to pay the transatlantic fares of any immigrant. I found no evidence of such payments. Several American diplomats in Germany complained that the lack of money for transatlantic fares prevented the immigration of many former German soldiers who were eager to enlist in the Union army. Later in the war, the fares of some immigrants were paid by American mining, railroad, and other companies who were desperate for workers, and such payments were specifically authorized by Congress in l864. But these immigrants were committed to take civilian jobs. All the Germans in the Union army got exactly the same pay as any other soldier. Thanks for a good question, Carol. Dean B. Mahin From: "Robert Willett" Newsgroups: soc.history.war.us-civil-war Subject: Re: Author Visit, Dean B. Mahin, Part II Date: 6 Oct 2002 21:25:01 GMT Dean at least one contributor to this or the other news group said his first ancestor in America was a Civil War German immigrant who had his way paid to Chicago by a German group and was promised a building lot if he came to the U. S. and served as a substitute. This was not a government program. Are you aware of this practice and how widespread was it? From: Rod Underwood Newsgroups: soc.history.war.us-civil-war Subject: Re: Author Visit, Dean B. Mahin, Part II Date: 6 Oct 2002 21:25:07 GMT Dean: On page x of "The Blessed Place of Freedom" you state that few European participants in the Civil War had anything to say about major war issues and personalities. You seldom mention any Europeans who were employed by the Union or Confederate governments who had important things to say. However, a clerk in the Union State Department, Count Adam Gurowski who was a Polish exile, had a lot to say in his two-volume diary. He assaults almost all those in authority and in particular targets his boss, the Secretary of State. At the same time he expresses his praises of liberty. (Source: "The Diary of Gideon Welles," vol. 1, 187-188; vol. 2, 100-101.) Did you for some reason decide not to include the comments of public servants or did you simply determine that this Pole was too much of a loose cannon to take seriously? Rod On Fri, 4 Oct 2002 14:36:42 CST, DUMahin@aol.com (Dean B. Mahin) wrote: >I am starting herewith a new thread entitled >"Author Visit, Dean B. Mahin, Part II." I suggest that questions >related to "The Blessed Place of Freedom" and/or to the role and >reactions of Europeans who were in America as immigrants, >correspondents, visitors, or volunteers be posted to this new thread. >I will also respond to additional messages added to the original >thread, but prefer they be on diplomatic issues as before, rather than >on immigrants and visitors. > >Dean B. Mahin From: Michael Furlan Newsgroups: soc.history.war.us-civil-war Subject: Re: Author Visit, Dean B. Mahin, Part II Date: Mon, 07 Oct 2002 00:34:59 GMT On 6 Oct 2002 13:15:11 GMT, DUMahin@aol.com (Dean B. Mahin) wrote: >Second, while Lincoln and Seward encouraged continued immigration >during the war, they refused to authorize the use of government funds >to pay the transatlantic fares of any immigrant. Why? Was there diplomatic pressure applied to the US from any of the European powers not to offer such subsidies? From: DUMahin@aol.com (Dean B. Mahin) Newsgroups: soc.history.war.us-civil-war Subject: Re: Author Visit, Dean B. Mahin, Part II Date: 7 Oct 2002 14:30:01 GMT "Robert Willett" wrote > > Dean at least one contributor to this or the other news group said his first > ancestor in America was a Civil War German immigrant who had his way paid to > Chicago by a German group and was promised a building lot if he came to the > U. S. and served as a substitute. This was not a government program. Are > you aware of this practice and how widespread was it? A number of organizations in Germany promoted German emmigration to America. Such groups were particularly important in promoting German settlements in the Texas Hill Country and elsewhere that sought to sustain German culture and language in predominantly German communities. Rod Underwood, (who has made several contributions to this "Author Visit") has an account of the organizations in Germany that promoted the German settlements in Texas in his excellent book on the Germans in Texas, "Death on the Nueces." I have no knowledge of the group promoting German emigration to Chicago, but am not surprised to hear of it. From: DUMahin@aol.com (Dean B. Mahin) Newsgroups: soc.history.war.us-civil-war Subject: Re: Author Visit, Dean B. Mahin, Part II Date: 7 Oct 2002 15:00:05 GMT Michael Furlan wrote > Dean B. Mahin) wrote: > >. . . while Lincoln and Seward encouraged continued immigration > >during the war, they refused to authorize the use of government funds > >to pay the transatlantic fares of any immigrant. Why? > Was there diplomatic pressure applied to the US from any of the > European powers not to offer such subsidies? If the U.S. government had paid transatlantic fares for immigrants with the understanding that they would enlist on arrival in America, it would have violated the British Foreign Enlistment Act. It prohibited recruiting for foreign armies within Her Majesty's dominions (the present British isles, Ireland, and all British colonies. Foreign recruiting was also prohibited by the neutrality laws of several other European countries. Emigration to America for any purpose was strongly opposed by the British establishment and press. The emigration of Irishmen was opposed by the British-dominated press and the influential clergy in Ireland. Aside from the costs and legal and diplomatic problems of foreign recruiting, Lincoln and Seward thought there were enough potential recruits in America and probably doubted that there would be enough recruits from wartime immigration to make much difference. But they realizwed that the continuing immigration during the war was "a replenishing stream" (to use a phrase in one of Lincoln's annual messages)that filled many essential jobs vacated by men who enlisted or were conscripted. Dean B. Mahin From: DUMahin@aol.com (Dean B. Mahin) Newsgroups: soc.history.war.us-civil-war Subject: Re: Author Visit, Dean B. Mahin, Part II Date: Mon, 7 Oct 2002 10:12:00 CST Rod Underwood wrote > > . . . a clerk in the Union State > Department, Count Adam Gurowski who was a Polish exile, had a lot to > say in his two-volume diary. He assaults almost all those in authority > and in particular targets his boss, the Secretary of State. . . . > Did you for some reason decide not to include the comments of > public servants or did you simply determine that this Pole was too > much of a loose cannon to take seriously? I had no reason to exclude any category of Europeans who were in America during the war. I quoted those comments by Europeans that were relevant to the major themes of the book and that contributed to a broad perspective of the roles and reactions of Europeans in America. Despite the many quotes in "Blessed Place," I did not quote or mention every European immigrant or visitor who wrote something about the war. Gurowski was indeed a loose cannon. He was a kook whose bitter criticisms of public figures were hard to understand and evaluate. I didn't consciously deciding to exclude him; I just didn't find anything of his that met my criteria and fitted into any of my chapters. Perhaps there was something that would have fitted. If so, I missed it. Dean B. Mahin From: Rod Underwood Newsgroups: soc.history.war.us-civil-war Subject: Re: Author Visit, Dean B. Mahin, Part II Date: Mon, 7 Oct 2002 12:23:39 CST May I add a comment to the material you have on pages 67-69 of "Blessed Freedom" regarding Texas German citizens who remained loyal to the Union? As you know, the Federal government was aware of loyalists throughout the South and in least one instance consideration was given to invading Texas and enlisting loyal Germans there to the Union cause. Specifically, Major General Benjamin F. Butler, commanding the Department of New England, wrote to Major General George McClellan on December 2, 1861, urging that he be allowed to lead an army of 15,000 New England troops to invade Texas. He favored landing a force at Indianola on Matagorda Bay, and then marching to San Antonio where the loyal German population could be expected to assist the United States force. (Source: ORA Series I, vol. 53. 507-509) From: DUMahin@aol.com (Dean B. Mahin) Newsgroups: soc.history.war.us-civil-war Subject: Re: Author Visit, Dean B. Mahin, Part II Date: 13 Oct 2002 19:15:03 GMT Rod Underwood wrote > . . in at least one instance consideration > was given to invading Texas and enlisting loyal Germans there to the > Union cause. . . . Major General Benjamin F. Butler, commanding the > Department of New England, wrote to Major General George McClellan on > December 2, 1861, urging that he be allowed to lead an army of 15,000 > New England troops to invade Texas. He favored landing a force at > Indianola on Matagorda Bay, and then marching to San Antonio where the > loyal German population could be expected to assist the United States > force. (Source: ORA Series I, vol. 53. 507-509) Sorry I was late in responding to this message. I missed Butler's proposal of a Union invasion of Texas in l861. Lincoln had little interest in invading Texas until mid-l963, when the arrival of French troops in the Mexican capital suggested the strong desirability at least a Union "toehold" in Texas to inhibit French support of the Confederacy via Texas or rumored French designs on Texas. Between late l863 and early l864 there were four Union moves at near the Texas border - the unsuccessful attempt in September l863 to invade eastern Texas via the Sabine River; the occupation of Brownsville on t he Rio Grande in November; the unsucessful attempt to take Galveston at the end of the year; and the disastrous expedition up the Red River toward eastern Texas in the spring of l864. I noted in "One War at a Time" that none of these movements contributed to Lincoln's primary military objectivs (crushing the Confederate army and ending the rebellion) and that these were the only military movements during the war that were made primarily because of external threats. I'd be interested in your comments, Rod, about the probable reactions of the Germans in and around San Antonio if a Union force had reached that city. You have documented thoroughly the Union sympathies of most of the Germans in the Hill Country in your "Death on the Nueces," but not all the Germans in that area were Unionists. In "The Blessed Place of Freedom" I included biographic information on Gustav Hoffmann, a former Prussian officer who was the first mayor of the German community at New Braunfels. He raised a Confederate cavaly company from the surrounding Comal County, and later commanded the 7th Texas cavalry. Dean B. Mahin From: "Rodman L. Underwood" Newsgroups: soc.history.war.us-civil-war Subject: Re: Author Visit, Dean B. Mahin, Part II Date: Sun, 13 Oct 2002 18:15:16 CST On 13 Oct 2002 19:15:03 GMT, DUMahin@aol.com (Dean B. Mahin) wrote: >Sorry I was late in responding to this message. I missed Butler's >proposal of a Union invasion of Texas in l861. Lincoln had little >interest in invading Texas until mid-l963, when the arrival of French >troops in the Mexican capital suggested the strong desirability at >least a Union "toehold" in Texas to inhibit French support of the >Confederacy via Texas or rumored French designs on Texas. Correct. New England mill owners wanted a Texas expedition to get cotton for their mills. Lincoln's concern in late 1861 was centered on taking New Orleans. He persuaded Butler that his troops could better be used in the capture of New Orleans the following April. Although Butler had wished to go to Texas, he agreed to the change of destination feeling that he could gain glory in Louisiana as well as in Texas. >I'd be interested in your comments, Rod, about the probable reactions >of the Germans in and around San Antonio if a Union force had reached >that city. Of course I can only speculate about this. I believe that in Bexar County where San Antonio is located there were about 13,000 citizens and probably only 1300 or so were Germans. To the best of my knowledge only about 200 or so of these Germans were staunch Unionists and members of the Union Loyal League. These were the fellows who might join up with a Federal army expedition. However, there might be reprisals against there families and this would discourage them. There are other factors to consider. The Union supporters there were not well organized while the secessionists were well organized, militant and aggressive. They had indimidated those who supported the Union, burned down the building where a newspaper supporting the Union published a paper, and that sort of thing. Furthermore, General Twiggs had surrendered a Union army of 2600 men to forces in San Antonio in February 1861 and this must have discouraged Germans who were loyal to the Union. Also, the county did vote for secession by a narrow margin (827 to 709). In short I think it is highly unlikely that Butler would have seen more than 50 men (at the most) join his army had it marched into San Antonio. He would have had a heck of a fight on his hands since the Texas soldiers were skilled at fighting Indians and were well equipped with the war materiels Twiggs had surrendered to them. But who knows? Perhaps other readers have contrary opinions. Rod From: Michael Furlan Newsgroups: soc.history.war.us-civil-war Subject: Re: Author Visit, Dean B. Mahin, Part II Hungarians Date: Tue, 08 Oct 2002 20:43:36 GMT You've written that about 300 to 400 Hungarians served in the Union army; Of that number 2 became generals and 8 commanded regiments. I find that number remarkable. By way of comparison, about 4,800 Norwegians served in the Union forces, but you list only one Norwegian regimental commander. What was it about the Hungarians that helped then to excel in command positions all out of proportion to their numbers? From: DUMahin@aol.com (Dean B. Mahin) Newsgroups: soc.history.war.us-civil-war Subject: Re: Author Visit, Dean B. Mahin, Part II Hungarians Date: Wed, 9 Oct 2002 07:25:23 CST Michael Furlan > You've written that about 300 to 400 Hungarians served in the Union > army; Of that number 2 became generals and 8 commanded regiments. I > find that number remarkable. > > By way of comparison, about 4,800 Norwegians served in the Union > forces, but you list only one Norwegian regimental commander. > > What was it about the Hungarians that helped then to excel in command > positions all out of proportion to their numbers? The situation of the Hungarians in America was entirely different from that of the Norwegians. There were 43,995 Norwegians in America in l860, but most of them were farmers, lumberman, and other settlers with no military background. I found only one Norwegian regimental commander, but there may have been more. There is no data on the number of Hungarians in America in l860 but the total from "Austria" (45,763)included men from the area of present-day Austria plus Hungarians, Czechs, Slovaks, Serbs, and others from the Slavic dependencies of the Austro-Hungarian empire. The era of large-scale emigration to America from eastern Europe had not yet begun. The main reason for the prominence of Hungarians in the Union army, despite their relatively small numbers in the Union population, was that many of them were "Forty-Eighters" -- men who had fought against the Austrians in the abortive Hungarian revolution of 1848 and then emigrated to the United states. Many of them had previously served in the Austrian army. Germans who had fought in the German revolution of l848 were also prominent in the Union army, although the German "Forty-Eighters" were a tiny fraction of the 1.3 million German immigrants in America in l860. I am sending your query to Steve Beszedits, a former Hungarian living in Toronto who has written extensively on the Hungarians in the Union Army, in the hope that he will post additional comments on this topic. Dean B. Mahin From: Newsgroups: soc.history.war.us-civil-war Subject: Re: Author Visit, Dean B. Mahin, Part II Hungarians Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2002 21:37:55 GMT On Tue, 08 Oct 2002 20:43:36 GMT, Michael Furlan wrote: >You've written that about 300 to 400 Hungarians served in the Union >army; Of that number 2 became generals and 8 commanded regiments. I >find that number remarkable. Mike, The Hungarian population of the United States at the time of the Civil War was around 3,000. The large number of Hungarians who participated in the conflict as officers is due to the fact that the majority of these Hungarians were political refugees and veterans of the 1848-49 War of Liberation. A number of them also fought in the Crimean War and the Italian wars prior to the Civil War. With such military experience, they readily received commissions as officers in America. Hungarian involvement in the Civil War, with the names of the more prominent figures, is outlined in Ella Lonn's "Foreigners in the Union Army and Navy," as well as in Edmund Vasvary's "Lincoln's Hungarian Heroes." My own overview on this topic appears under "Hungarians in the American Civil War" at http://www.silbert.org/BandL.html. I have also contributed rather lengthy pieces to other sites, e.g. the article on Major-General Julius Stahel at http://suvcw.org/mollus/art018.pdf. I have also touched upon the subject in an article appearing in this June's issue of the Vasvary Collection Newsletter, a publication devoted to Hungarian-American affairs, and have also made a tabulation, along with appropriate comments, on some 50 of the most notable Hungarians in the Civil War for presentations I gave recently. If you or anyone else would like copies of these two writeups, I'd be more than pleased to forward them. If you have any other questions, do not hesitate to contact me. Steve Beszedits From: DUMahin@aol.com (Dean B. Mahin) Newsgroups: soc.history.war.us-civil-war Subject: Author Visit, Dean B. Mahin, Part III Date: 7 Oct 2002 13:15:05 GMT Note to lurkers and posters: Today begins the second week of the "Author Visit." I have already started a new thread (Author Visit, Dean B. Mahin, Part II) for comments on the reactions and roles of European immigrants and visitors. Drazen Kramaric's excellent posting yesterday is in the middle of 33 messages in the original thread, and may be missed by some. So I am starting today a third thread (Author Visit, Dean B. Mahin, Part III) for the continuation of discussion this week of diplomac and foreign policy issues. Drazen Kramaric (drazen.kramaric@zg.hinet.hr) wrote: "How would you judge the overall Confederate foreign policy ..." The central goals of Confederate foreign policy were (1) to obtain diplomatic recognition of Confederate independence by Britain, France, and/or other European governments; (2) to obtain any possible military support from European governments, especially the building of warships for the Confederacy in Europe and, if possible, action by the British and/or French fleets to break the Union blockade of Confederate ports; and (3)to do anything possible to increase the chances of war between the Union government and Britain or France. These were logical goals from the Confederat perspectifve, but none of them was achieved. Confederate foreign policy was based on several illusions. One was that, due to their great dependence on Confederate cotton, Britain and France would eventually have to recognize and support the Confederacy. Another was that the Confederate could ignore the slavery issue and present themselves as "feedom fighters" against intolerable Yankee oppression. Although the British responded favorably at first to both these ideas and Napoleon III thought the Confederacy would be buffer between the U.S. and his new empire in Mexico, two factors prevented European recognition and support of the Confederacy:(1) The adroit diplomacy of Lincoln and Seward convinced British and French leaders that they could not intervene in America without running a great risk of war with the United States during or after the internal conflict in America. (2) After the Emancipation Proclamation, it was clear in Euroope that the Union fought for freedom and the South fought to protect slavery. Both the British and French governments feared their citizens would not support a war on the side of slavery. Drax asked "Who had the more influence in the conduct of foreign affairs, Davis or his secretaries?" Although Davis knew little of foreign affairs, he undoubtedly set the foreign policy goals outlined above. His first two secretaries of state, Robert Toombs and R.M.T. Hunter, had no more foreign policy experience than Davis. His third secretary, Judah P. Benjamin, was much more sophisticated in foreign affairs. But by the time he got the job in l862, the Confederate policies had been set as had the basis for their failure. I doubt any other man would have been more successful in a job that was doomed to failure by factors beyond his control of significant influence. Drax asked "How did CSA finance its "diplomacy" in Europe? The Confederate government had some funds in Europe from the sale of cotton through the blockade and from the sales of "cotton bonds" in Europe. Drax's final question was "Were there any experts in foreign (especially European) affairs in Confederacy and were they employed to the best of their abilities?" There were few men in the Confederacy with much expertise in diplomacy or European affairs. Those with some diplomatic and/or European experience were strong supporters of slavery and the Confederate cause, and viewed all diplomatic questions during the war from that perspective. These are very short answers to complicated questions, all covered in detail in "One War at a Time." I'll go into more detail here, if anyone asks more specific questions. Dean B. Mahin Subject: Re: Author Visit, Dean B. Mahin, Part III From: scribe7716@aol.com (Scribe7716) Newsgroups: soc.history.war.us-civil-war Date: Mon, 7 Oct 2002 11:14:26 CST >(Dean B. Mahin) wrote: > One was that, due to their great dependence on Confederate >cotton, Britain and France would eventually have to recognize and >support the Confederacy. Another was that the Confederate could ignore >the slavery issue and present themselves as "feedom fighters" against >intolerable Yankee oppression. Although the British responded >favorably at first to both these ideas... Didn't the British, particularly the conservatives and the aristocracy, also have an interest in seeing the U.S. weakened so that it would not present such a future threat to British domination? And did not the Brish conservatives and aristocracy have an interest in seeing the concept of republican government weakened in order to stall the reform movement at home? From: Rod Underwood Newsgroups: soc.history.war.us-civil-war Subject: Re: Author Visit, Dean B. Mahin, Part III Date: Mon, 7 Oct 2002 12:24:01 CST Dean: Perhaps you would like to discuss Davis's selections as diplomats to Mexico, his first being John T. Pickett. I think Pickett gave us one of the better quotes by a diplomat who was not diplomatic! Davis sent him to Mexico to establish friendly relations. While there Pickett was asked if he was seeking Mexican recognition and he replied, "To the contrary, my business is to recognize Mexico-provided I can find a government that will stand long enough." Later he got into a fist fight, was expelled by the Mexican government, and Davis dumped him! Rod From: Rod Underwood Newsgroups: soc.history.war.us-civil-war Subject: Re: Author Visit, Dean B. Mahin, Part III Date: 8 Oct 2002 18:40:07 GMT Dean: In "The Blessed Place of Freedom," in the photograph caption of a French Duke and Count, you state, "Visitors from France were more sympathetic to the Union cause than visitors from Britain." In my research of the French forces that were approaching the Rio Grande beginning late in 1863, I found the opposite to be true. The Texas Confederates and the French invaders established very cordial relations between one another and each side courted the other. Of course the French had their eyes on at least colonizing Texas and the Confederates needed the French to intervene in their struggle to whip the Yankees. Neither side wished to do anything to disrupt the flow of cotton for their were fortunes to be made. Of course, I recognize that you are referring to "visitors" and I am referring to Maximilian's ambitions. Any comments? From: DUMahin@aol.com (Dean B. Mahin) Newsgroups: soc.history.war.us-civil-war Subject: Re: Author Visit, Dean B. Mahin, Part III Date: Tue, 8 Oct 2002 14:24:40 CST scribe7716@aol.com (Scribe7716) wrote > Didn't the British, particularly the conservatives and the aristocracy, also > have an interest in seeing the U.S. weakened so that it would not present such > a future threat to British domination? And did not the Brish conservatives and > aristocracy have an interest in seeing the concept of republican government > weakened in order to stall the reform movement at home? I found four major reasons for the strong sympathy with the Confederate cause among the British upper classes. (1) The first was historical -- the residual British resentment of the American Revolution, which the British associated more with the tea-dumping Yankees and minutemen in New England than with the Southerners. (2) The second was geopolitical -- the belief of British leaders that Confederate independence would allow the British to play "balance of power" politics in North America as they had done for years in Europe. This is essentially your point about their having "an interest in seeing the U.S. weakened." (3) The third reason was economic -- the Confederates were suppliers of a raw material vital to British industry (cotton) and a good customer for British manufactured goods, while the Yankees were compeitors of Brititish industry, trade, and shipbuilding. (4) The fourth reason was political - the British upper classes feared that a Union victory would increase pressure for democratic reforms in Britain (especially representation of the working classes in Parliament), as it did, while they though the South was ruled by an agrarian aristocracy not unlike that that effectively ruled Britain. This is essentially your point about their "having an interest in seeing the concept of republican government weakened in order to stall the reform movement at home." Dean B. Mahin From: DUMahin@aol.com (Dean B. Mahin) Newsgroups: soc.history.war.us-civil-war Subject: Re: Author Visit, Dean B. Mahin, Part III Date: Tue, 8 Oct 2002 14:24:58 CST Rod Underwood wrote > > Perhaps you would like to discuss Davis's selections as diplomats to > Mexico, his first being John T. Pickett. I think Pickett gave us one > of the better quotes by a diplomat who was not diplomatic! Davis sent > him to Mexico to establish friendly relations. While there Pickett was > asked if he was seeking Mexican recognition and he replied, "To the > contrary, my business is to recognize Mexico-provided I can find a > government that will stand long enough." Later he got into a fist > fight, was expelled by the Mexican government, and Davis dumped him! Pickett was a former army officer and soldier of fortune who has been discribed as undiplomatic, imprudent, tempermental, adventurous, and swashbuckling. He was all of these things. I described him in "One War at a Time" as "the Confederacy's most inappropriate and least successful envoy." His appointment demonstrates the poor judgment of Davis and hia early secretaries of state in selecting men suitable to be Confederate "cvommissioners" to other countries. After Pickett was expelled from Mexico, the Confederate government made no further effort to establish diplomatic relations with the republican government in Mexico. As soon as the Confederates heard in l864 that Archduke Maximilian of Austria was on his way to Mexico to become Mexico's new emperor, they quickly named a minister to the new imperial government. But, as I indicated in an earlier message, Max's sponsor(Napoleon III) got cold feet and advised him to avoid entanglements with the Confederates because they might lead to war with the United States. Dean B. Mahin From: Rod Underwood Newsgroups: soc.history.war.us-civil-war Subject: Re: Author Visit, Dean B. Mahin, Part III Date: 9 Oct 2002 01:55:21 GMT Dean, I may be mistaken, but I thought after Pickett was expelled the C.S.A. government turned next to Juan A. Quintero. On May 22, 1861, the new diplomat was given instructions to make contact with Santiago Vidaurri, the governor of the states of Nuevo Leon, Coahuila, and later Tamaulipas. Is that not so? Rod On Tue, 8 Oct 2002 14:24:58 CST, DUMahin@aol.com (Dean B. Mahin) wrote: > After Pickett was >expelled from Mexico, the Confederate government made no further >effort to establish diplomatic relations with the republican >government in Mexico. From: DUMahin@aol.com (Dean B. Mahin) Newsgroups: soc.history.war.us-civil-war Subject: Re: Author Visit, Dean B. Mahin, Part III Date: 9 Oct 2002 01:55:25 GMT Rod Underwood wrote > > In "The Blessed Place of Freedom," in the photograph caption of a > French Duke and Count, you state, "Visitors from France were more > sympathetic to the Union cause than visitors from Britain." > In my research of the French forces that were approaching the Rio > Grande beginning late in 1863, I found the opposite to be true. The > Texas Confederates and the French invaders established very cordial > relations between one another and each side courted the other. Of > course the French had their eyes on at least colonizing Texas and the > Confederates needed the French to intervene in their struggle to whip > the Yankees. Neither side wished to do anything to disrupt the flow of > cotton for their were fortunes to be made. I was referring (in the caption and in my chapter on "French in the North") to French visitors to the North, who were consistently more sympathetic to the Union cause than most of the British visitors to the North. These French observers were mainly liberal journalists who admired the American republic and looked forward to the Third Republic in France after the fall of Napoleon III. (That happened five years after our Civil War, as a result of the French defeat in the Franco-Prussian war of l870). The officers of the invading French army in Mexico were probably mostly conservatives and royalists and werein any case implementing Napoleon III's policy to seek good informal relations with the Confederates while avoiding official French recognition of Confederate independence. I recall some rumors that the French had designs on Texas, but I was doubtful whether there was any foundation for them. The important cotton trade certainly played an important role. You have undoubtedly explored this area much more thoroughly than I was able to do. I will look forward to the results of your research when your book, "Waters of Discord," is published. Dean B. Mahin From: DUMahin@aol.com (Dean B. Mahin) Newsgroups: soc.history.war.us-civil-war Subject: Re: Author Visit, Dean B. Mahin, Part III Date: Wed, 9 Oct 2002 07:24:40 CST Rod Underwood wrote com>... > > I may be mistaken, but I thought after Pickett was expelled > the C.S.A. government turned next to Juan A. Quintero. On May 22, > 1861, the new diplomat was given instructions to make contact with > Santiago Vidaurri, the governor of the states of Nuevo Leon, Coahuila, > and later Tamaulipas. Quintero was more like a consul, with an limited assignment in a limited geographic area, than a diplomat accredited to a national government. Vidaurri independent "warload" in northern Mexico who operated without much control by the embattled republican government headed by Benito Juarez. As far as I recall, Quintero was never authorized to make contact with Juarez's government in central Mexico. In any case, I believe the instructions to Quintero were issued before the expulsion of Pickett later in l861. But I concede that your research on the confused situation in the borderlands is much more recent -- and was probably more extensive -- than mine. Dean B. Mahin From: Rod Underwood Newsgroups: soc.history.war.us-civil-war Subject: Re: Author Visit, Dean B. Mahin, Part III Date: Wed, 9 Oct 2002 10:25:42 CST Dean: This may be a little bit off topic, but in "Blessed Freedom," page 162, you say that Savannah and Wilmington were the "last links in the lifeline of the Confederacy." You point out that blockade-running ceased at those ports by January 15, 1865. I suggest that they were not the last lifeline of the Confederacy because blockade-running continued at Galveston until May 24, 1865 when the Denbigh (built in England) was caught and burned. On May 15, 1865 Union Navy Secretary Welles said, " . . .it appears that blockade running at Galveston is still carried on with much success." The Trans-Mississippi army surrendered on May 26, 1865. Rod From: "Robert Willett" Newsgroups: soc.history.war.us-civil-war Subject: Re: Author Visit, Dean B. Mahin, Part III Date: Wed, 9 Oct 2002 11:26:22 CST "Rod Underwood" wrote in message news:cpg8quo9dbpd7v0fb8ij2r29g03cbdsiu1@4ax.com... > Dean: > > This may be a little bit off topic, but in "Blessed Freedom," page > 162, you say that Savannah and Wilmington were the "last links in the > lifeline of the Confederacy." You point out that blockade-running > ceased at those ports by January 15, 1865. I suggest that they were > not the last lifeline of the Confederacy because blockade-running > continued at Galveston until May 24, 1865 when the Denbigh (built in > England) was caught and burned. On May 15, 1865 Union Navy Secretary > Welles said, " . . .it appears that blockade running at Galveston is > still carried on with much success." The Trans-Mississippi army > surrendered on May 26, 1865. > > Rod > > On 7 Oct 2002 13:15:05 GMT, DUMahin@aol.com (Dean B. Mahin) wrote: > > >Note to lurkers and posters: Today begins the second week of the > >"Author Visit." I have already started a new thread (Author Visit, > >Dean B. Mahin, Part II) for comments on the reactions and roles of > >European immigrants and visitors. So I am starting today a third thread (Author > >Visit, Dean B. Mahin, Part III) for the continuation of discussion > >this week of diplomac and foreign policy issues. > Since no significant amount of material from Galveston could be shipped to the main areas of the conflict I think for all realistic purposes the closing of Wilmington the last major port in the supply line of the eastern armies was the "closing of the Lifeline of the Confederacy. Understand your pride in your area of expertise but the Trans Mississippi was not the main arena of the conflict after the opening of the Mississippi for Union forces. From: Rod Underwood Newsgroups: soc.history.war.us-civil-war Subject: Re: Author Visit, Dean B. Mahin, Part III Date: 9 Oct 2002 17:50:01 GMT On Wed, 9 Oct 2002 11:26:22 CST, "Robert Willett" wrote: >Since no significant amount of material from Galveston could be shipped to >the main areas of the conflict I think for all realistic purposes the >closing of Wilmington the last major port in the supply line of the eastern >armies was the "closing of the Lifeline of the Confederacy. You are quite correct that blockade-running at Galveston had no effect on the war east of the Mississippi. However, Texas supplied many men who fought in the east and blockade-running helped to cloth and supply them. All kinds of war goods got through the Galveston blockade including ordnance. These armaments were used to defend the coastline and batteries went east with the troops. Also, lots of cotton was exported through Galveston and this helped finance the Confederate war effort. A more personal consequence of the fall of Mobile in August 1864 was that economic boom times came to Galveston as it was to become the only Confederate port still open. >Understand your pride in your area of expertise but the Trans Mississippi >was not the main arena of the conflict after the opening of the Mississippi >for Union forces. Nor was it ever the main arena of the CW. In fact, some maps of Texas early in the war had the state ending at Galveston. It was referred to as "the dark corner of the Confederacy." The Lone Star State has been ignored in Civil War histories. I choose to write about it out of respect of those boys and men who fought and died in "little" engagements that were far away from the main arena. Rod From: "Robert Willett" Newsgroups: soc.history.war.us-civil-war Subject: Re: Author Visit, Dean B. Mahin, Part III Date: Wed, 9 Oct 2002 13:35:25 CST "Rod Underwood" wrote in message news:8go8qucdt22qchsu3mgej6pqdn22b1nrrn@4ax.com... > On Wed, 9 Oct 2002 11:26:22 CST, "Robert Willett" > wrote: > > You are quite correct that blockade-running at Galveston had > no effect on the war east of the Mississippi. However, Texas supplied > many men who fought in the east and blockade-running helped to cloth > and supply them. All kinds of war goods got through the Galveston > blockade including ordnance. These armaments were used to defend the > coastline and batteries went east with the troops. Also, lots of > cotton was exported through Galveston and this helped finance the > Confederate war effort. A more personal consequence of the fall of > Mobile in August 1864 was that economic boom times came to Galveston > as it was to become the only Confederate port still open. But my point remains Galveston was not after the completion of the Union control of the Mississippi in 1863 a significant factor in supplying the Confederate Armies east of the Mississippi. Acknowledge that prior to summer of 1863 many Texans along with equipment went to the Armies in the east. After that summer Texas personel continued to come east by slipping across the Yankee controlled Mississippi but no major shipments of war material could be made. Therefore although Galveston remained open it was the loss of Wilmington in January 1865 that effectively closed the Lifeline of the Cofederacy. Galveston played a significant role in supplying the forces west of the Mississippi but they could neither win nor lose the war. > > >Understand your pride in your area of expertise but the Trans Mississippi > >was not the main arena of the conflict after the opening of the Mississippi > >for Union forces. > > Nor was it ever the main arena of the CW. In fact, some maps > of Texas early in the war had the state ending at Galveston. It was > referred to as "the dark corner of the Confederacy." The Lone Star > State has been ignored in Civil War histories. I choose to write about > it out of respect of those boys and men who fought and died in > "little" engagements that were far away from the main arena. I enjoy information about these little known engagements which although having little or no effect on the ultimate outcome of the war did as you point out involve sacrifice on the part of those engaged. A friend owns property very near Glorietta Pass. The ill advised Red River Campaign diverted needed Federal forces from more important targets and the Trans-Mississippi forces did their part in thwarting the effort. > > Rod > From: "James F. Epperson" Newsgroups: soc.history.war.us-civil-war Subject: Re: Author Visit, Dean B. Mahin, Part III Date: 9 Oct 2002 20:10:03 GMT On Wed, 9 Oct 2002, Rod Underwood wrote: > Dean: > > This may be a little bit off topic, but in "Blessed Freedom," page > 162, you say that Savannah and Wilmington were the "last links in the > lifeline of the Confederacy." You point out that blockade-running > ceased at those ports by January 15, 1865. I suggest that they were > not the last lifeline of the Confederacy because blockade-running > continued at Galveston until May 24, 1865 when the Denbigh (built in > England) was caught and burned. But there were no links from Galveston to the Confederate heartland after 1863, while Savannah and Wilmington had such links. Wilmington, in particular, was a vital port from the perspective of RE Lee's army. JFE Jim Epperson http://members.aol.com/jfepperson/causes.html Xerox never comes up with anything original. From: Rod Underwood Newsgroups: soc.history.war.us-civil-war Subject: Re: Author Visit, Dean B. Mahin, Part III Date: 10 Oct 2002 02:35:15 GMT On Wed, 9 Oct 2002 13:35:25 CST, "Robert Willett" wrote: >But my point remains Galveston was not after the completion of the Union >control of the Mississippi in 1863 a significant factor in supplying the >Confederate Armies east of the Mississippi. Acknowledge that prior to >summer of 1863 many Texans along with equipment went to the Armies in the >east. After that summer Texas personel continued to come east by slipping >across the Yankee controlled Mississippi but no major shipments of war >material could be made. Therefore although Galveston remained open it was >the loss of Wilmington in January 1865 that effectively closed the Lifeline >of the Cofederacy. Galveston played a significant role in supplying the >forces west of the Mississippi but they could neither win nor lose the war. Your points certainly have merit; I accept them. One historian has said that regardless of identification of blockade-running ports, "Blockade-running was only a temporary means by which the South prolonged the agony of facing the decision of defeat." >I enjoy information about these little known engagements which although >having little or no effect on the ultimate outcome of the war did as you >point out involve sacrifice on the part of those engaged. A friend owns >property very near Glorietta Pass. The ill advised Red River Campaign >diverted needed Federal forces from more important targets and the >Trans-Mississippi forces did their part in thwarting the effort. >> You bet! It certainly is an interesting way for a General (Banks) to end his military career. The boys from Louisiana and Texas nearly sacked both an army and a navy. I imagine Grant was saying to Lincoln, "I told you so!" Regards, Rod From: Rod Underwood Newsgroups: soc.history.war.us-civil-war Subject: Re: Author Visit, Dean B. Mahin, Part III Date: 10 Oct 2002 02:35:19 GMT I concur Mr. Epperson. See my post of a few minutes ago to Mr. Willett. Rod On 9 Oct 2002 20:10:03 GMT, "James F. Epperson" wrote: >But there were no links from Galveston to the Confederate heartland after >1863, while Savannah and Wilmington had such links. Wilmington, in >particular, was a vital port from the perspective of RE Lee's army. > >JFE > >Jim Epperson http://members.aol.com/jfepperson/causes.html > >Xerox never comes up with anything original. From: DUMahin@aol.com (Dean B. Mahin) Newsgroups: soc.history.war.us-civil-war Subject: Re: Author Visit, Dean B. Mahin, Part III Date: 10 Oct 2002 20:30:04 GMT > On 9 Oct 2002 20:10:03 GMT, "James F. Epperson" wrote: > > >But there were no links from Galveston to the Confederate heartland after > >1863, while Savannah and Wilmington had such links. Wilmington, in > >particular, was a vital port from the perspective of RE Lee's army. Sorry I didn't respond earlier to Rod Underwood'squestion about my statement that Savannah and Wilmington were "the last links in the lifeline of the Confederacy." Perhaps I should have said that they were the last links in the lifeline to Lee's army. It is not a coincidence that, only a few weeks after the fall of Ft. Fisher and the closure of the port of Wilmington, Lee's soldiers were starving at Petersburg and on the road to Appomattox. Until I got into research on the blockade runners, I had the impression that most of them were dashing Southerners akin to Rhett Butler in "Gone with the Wind." In fact, although a few of the ships were owned and operated by Confederates, the overwhelming majority of the blockade running ships were built in Britian, were owned by Britons, carried British cargos from British ports, and were manned by British officers and seamen. The dominant British role in the blocakde running system is clearly documented in the detailed appendix on the blockade running ships in Stephen R. Wise's "Lifeline of the Confederacy: Blockade Running During the Civil War," but none of the books on the blockade runners has stressed the British role. Southern authors have tended to convey the idea that the blockade runners were heroes of the Confederacy, like the men of the "Alabama" and the other Confederate commerce raiders. Although most of the officers of the raiders were Confederates who were former U.S. Navy officers, all of their crews were British, Irish, or other European seamen. Anyone have further questions or comments about the blockade runners or commerce raiders? Dean B. Mahin From: "Robert Willett" Newsgroups: soc.history.war.us-civil-war Subject: Re: Author Visit, Dean B. Mahin, Part III Date: 10 Oct 2002 22:15:01 GMT "Dean B. Mahin" wrote in message news:b00e6cb9.0210101221.4e6b0577@posting.google.com... > > On 9 Oct 2002 20:10:03 GMT, "James F. Epperson" wrote: > > > > >But there were no links from Galveston to the Confederate heartland after > > >1863, while Savannah and Wilmington had such links. Wilmington, in > > >particular, was a vital port from the perspective of RE Lee's army. > > Sorry I didn't respond earlier to Rod Underwood'squestion about my > statement that Savannah and Wilmington were "the last links in the > lifeline of the Confederacy." Perhaps I should have said that they > were the last links in the lifeline to Lee's army. It is not a > coincidence that, only a few weeks after the fall of Ft. Fisher and > the closure of the port of Wilmington, Lee's soldiers were starving at > Petersburg and on the road to Appomattox. > > Until I got into research on the blockade runners, I had the > impression that most of them were dashing Southerners akin to Rhett > Butler in "Gone with the Wind." In fact, although a few of the ships > were owned and operated by Confederates, the overwhelming majority of > the blockade running ships were built in Britian, were owned by > Britons, carried British cargos from British ports, and were manned by > British officers and seamen. > > The dominant British role in the blocakde running system is clearly > documented in the detailed appendix on the blockade running ships in > Stephen R. Wise's "Lifeline of the Confederacy: Blockade Running > During the Civil War," but none of the books on the blockade runners > has stressed the British role. Southern authors have tended to convey > the idea that the blockade runners were heroes of the Confederacy, > like the men of the "Alabama" and the other Confederate commerce > raiders. Although most of the officers of the raiders were > Confederates who were former U.S. Navy officers, all of their crews > were British, Irish, or other European seamen. Please cite the non-fiction authors who take this point of view about blockade runners, the names of their books and the dates of publication. From: DUMahin@aol.com (Dean B. Mahin) Newsgroups: soc.history.war.us-civil-war Subject: Re: Author Visit, Dean B. Mahin, Part III Date: 11 Oct 2002 16:25:08 GMT "Robert Willett" wrote > "Dean B. Mahin" wrote > > Until I got into research on the blockade runners, I had the > > impression that most of them were dashing Southerners akin to Rhett > > Butler in "Gone with the Wind." In fact, although a few of the ships > > were owned and operated by Confederates, the overwhelming majority of > > the blockade running ships were built in Britian, were owned by > > Britons, carried British cargos from British ports, and were manned by > > British officers and seamen.... > > > > Southern authors have tended to convey > > the idea that the blockade runners were heroes of the Confederacy ... > > > Please cite the non-fiction authors who take this point of view about > blockade runners, the names of their books and the dates of publication. Robert, I'm not clear whether you want documentation of the idea that the blockade runners were "heroes of the Confederacy" or of my statement that the majority of them were Brits. My original research on the blockade runners was more than five years ago, when I was working on "One War at a Time." I have at hand only a few of the books and articles that I consulted, plus notes on others. So I can give you only some of the information you request. The dominant British role in the blockade running system was never acknowledged by Jefferson Davis or his secretary of state, Judah P. Benjamin. They apparently did not want to admit that their economy and war effort were so dependent on imports or that their large-scale acquisition of arms, equipment, suppies, and food from Europe was so dependent on British entrepreneurs. This Confederate position was followed by most Southern authors. Perhaps I should have written that they "tend to convey the idea that the blockade runners were heroes of the Confederacy by failing to mention that the majority of the ships and crews were British and by allowing the reader to assume that they were mostly owned and operated by Confederates." In reviewing thirteen books and articles by Americans on the blockade runners, I found only rare references to the fact that the majority of the ships and crews were British. For example, Wiliam Diamond wrote a 31-page article for the Journal of Southern History detailing the crucial role played by imports brought in by the blockade runners, but I could not find the word "British" or any other indication of the ownership of the ships or the nationality of the crews. Altough the British role is clearly demonstrated in the appendix to Stephen Wise's "Lifeline of the Confederacy" which provides details on many blockade runners, there are few if any generalizations about the British role in his text. The conclusion that the majority of the ships, crews, and cargoes were British comes from various sources cited or quoted in Chapter 11 of "One War at a Time." These include several books and articles by former blockade runners, statements by the British minister in Washington and the U.S. secretary of state, the information on individual Brtish-built blockade runners in Wise's book, and other sources. Wise listed l99 blockade runners that had been built in England or Scotland. In March 1864 the British Foreign Office published a list of claims by British subjects against the U.S. government, most of which arose from the capture of 397 British-owned ships by the U.S. Navy. The British list includes British-owned ships captured from 1861 thgrough l863, but does not include later captures or blockade runners that evaded capture. The British and Wise lists, which include few of the same ships, indicate together over 500 British built-blockade runners. The actual number is undoubedly much higher. Dean B. Mahin From: "Robert Willett" Newsgroups: soc.history.war.us-civil-war Subject: Re: Author Visit, Dean B. Mahin, Part III Date: 11 Oct 2002 19:05:21 GMT "Dean B. Mahin" wrote in message news:b00e6cb9.0210110744.c4df944@posting.google.com... > "Robert Willett" wrote > > Sorry my query wasn't clear. I already knew most blockade runners were Bit owned and crewed. I think Lifeline of the Confederacy is a little clearer on that point than perhaps you do. What I was questioning was non-fiction works that try to say the owners and crew were native southerners ala Rhett Butler. My reading has certainly shown silence on the nationality of the owners and crew but not to go over to positive assertion they were native southerners. From: Rod Underwood Newsgroups: soc.history.war.us-civil-war Subject: "The Blessed Place of Freedom" Date: 6 Oct 2002 00:45:05 GMT On pages 80-81 of "The Blessed Place of Freedom," you discuss the Irish in the Confederacy who fought at the company level. Was there some reason you failed to mention one of the greatest victories by Irishmen fighting for the Confederacy? At the Battle of Sabine Pass on September 8, 1863, Lt. Richard Dowling, six guns and 43 men occupied a fort that defended the pass against a Union naval armada of 27 vessels, five batteries of artillery, and 5000 troops. Dowling was an Irish-born saloonkeeper and his Davis Guards consisted of Irishmen who had been recruited in Houston. The Davis Guards was formed as a state militia in the summer of 1860 and on October 26, 1861 it became Company F of Cook's (or the First Texas) Regiment, Heavy Artillery, Confederate States Army. Remarkably the Southerners, with their six cannon drove off the Federal expedition. The North suffered heavy losses and the Confederates had no casualties. The Confederate congress passed a resolution signed by President Davis that described the battle as " . .. . one of the most brilliant and heroic achievements in the history of this war." Years later Jefferson Davis said that this battle had " .. . . no parallel in the annals of ancient or modern warfare." From: DUMahin@aol.com (Dean B. Mahin) Newsgroups: soc.history.war.us-civil-war Subject: Re: "The Blessed Place of Freedom" Date: 6 Oct 2002 11:50:05 GMT Rod Underwood wrote > On pages 80-81 of "The Blessed Place of Freedom," you discuss the > Irish in the Confederacy who fought at the company level. Was there > some reason you failed to mention one of the greatest victories by > Irishmen fighting for the Confederacy? > At the Battle of Sabine Pass on September 8, 1863, Lt. Richard > Dowling, six guns and 43 men occupied a fort that defended the pass > against a Union naval armada of 27 vessels, five batteries of > artillery, and 5000 troops. Rod, I was well aware of the exploits of Lt. Dowling and his Irishmen at Sabine Pass and had intended to refer to them in my chapter on the "Irish in the South." I was surprised this morning to discover that I had failed to do so. I focused in my "ethnic" chapters on generalizations and conclusions about the role of each ethnic group in North and South and in the "thematic" chapters on the reactions of immigrants and visitors to various major developments and issues. I had no quotes from any of the Irishmen, and there has been little analysis of the significance of the Union failure to get a "toehold" on the Texas coast. Perhaps you are providing that in your new book on the blockade of Texas. There is already a substantial literature onthe military exploits of Irishmen, Germans, and other immigrants. I am not a military historian. I avoided purely military history except for (a) accounts by immigrants and visitors of their reactions to some major battles and (b) analysis of two cases - the Irish at Fredericksburg and the Germans at Chancelorsville - in which the participation of foreign-born soldiers led to major controversies. But I should have had something on Dowling and his Irishmen. Dean B. Mahin From: cdclif@ku.edu (C. Clifford) Newsgroups: soc.history.war.us-civil-war Subject: Author visit, Dean B. Mahin, European Attitudes Toward America Date: 11 Oct 2002 13:45:01 GMT I have just finished reading "The Blessed Place of Freedom" and found it remarkably timely in a number of ways. I was glad to read your concluding sentence in which you state that there is a striking parallel between European reactions to the Civil War and European reactions to the war on terrorism that began on 9/11/02. The same thought had been in my head while reading your book. I was particularly interested in your comments about the contrast between the very positive reports by European observers on the Confederate army and the mainly negative comments by European observers about the Union army. At first I thought they were being very inconsistent, since many of their initial criticisms applied more or less equally to both of these volunteer armies. Then I read your explanation, which seems worth quoting: "How can the difference between the reactions of foreign observers to the Union and Confederate armies be explained? For imperial, political, and economic reasons, the European observers who visited the South wanted the Confederacy to maintain its independence and therefore wanted to believe that the ragged Confederate armies were capable of preventing a Union victory. They were bombarded with statements of Confederate determination to sustain their new country, and they thought that would be enough to ensure Confederate independence. The European observers in the North, on the other hand, came to America with the persistent European belief that the Federals could not win the war and that the Union could not be restored. In the period before Gettysburg and Vicksburg, they saw nothing that changed their minds." I know your book was written mainly before 9/11, and I suppose your concluding comment about the parallel between European reactions to the Civil War and European reactions to 9/11 was added shortly after that tragic day. Would you comment on your views today about this parallel? Carol Clifford From: Nicholas Geovanis Newsgroups: soc.history.war.us-civil-war Subject: Re: Author visit, Dean B. Mahin, European Attitudes Toward America Date: Fri, 11 Oct 2002 17:30:17 CST On 11 Oct 2002, C. Clifford wrote: > I have just finished reading "The Blessed Place of Freedom" and > found it remarkably timely in a number of ways. I was glad to read > I was particularly interested in your comments about the contrast > between the very positive reports by European observers on the > Confederate army and the mainly negative comments by European > observers about the Union army. > Then I read your explanation, which seems worth quoting: > > "How can the difference between the reactions of foreign observers > to the Union and Confederate armies be explained? For imperial, > political, and economic reasons, the European observers who visited > the South wanted the Confederacy to maintain its independence and > therefore wanted to believe that the ragged Confederate armies were > capable of preventing a Union victory. Pardon my instrusion prior to the author's reply. It seems to me that a glaring omission from both of these comments (I have not read the book) is the observation that the officers of the European armies of that day were aristocrats by definition. Once here, it seems unlikely that they would have spent much time with the ranks, rather with the officer corps instead, both Union and Confederate. Given the aristocratic pretensions and, to an extent, truly aristocratic nature of the Confederacy's leadership and officer corps in the American context, one might expect the European officers to identify more closely with the Confederacy. This identification could not help but to color their reports. And yes, we can add to that the pure power-politics which might bring them to favor Confederate success. > Carol Clifford * Nick Geovanis | IT Computing Svcs Computing's central challenge: | Northwestern Univ How not to make a mess of it. | n-geovanis@nwu.edu -- Edsger Dijkstra +-------------------> From: DUMahin@aol.com (Dean B. Mahin) Newsgroups: soc.history.war.us-civil-war Subject: Re: Author visit, Dean B. Mahin, European Attitudes Toward America Date: Sat, 12 Oct 2002 12:42:54 CST cdclif@ku.edu (C. Clifford) wrote > > I know your book was written mainly before 9/11, and I suppose your > concluding comment about the parallel between European reactions to > the Civil War and European reactions to 9/11 was added shortly after > that tragic day. Would you comment on your views today about this > parallel? I am working at present on a new book about America, American institutions, and American reactions to foreign affairs issues, and have been following closely the current tensions in U.S.-European relations. I continue to see strong parallels between American-European relations during the Civil War and today. In both eras, European attitudes toward America were/are based primarily on wishful thinking and on narrow conceptions of the national interests of the European countries. During the CW the governments and most upper class people in Britain and France welcomed (for historical, political, geopolitical and economic reasons) the division of the North American giant into two countries. They wanted to believe that the Union could not win the war and that the Confederacy would sustain its independence, so they did believe this. They wanted to believe that the United States would eventually accept disunion, an independent Confederacy with slavery, and a lesser U.S. role in international affairs because they thought these things would be good for Europe. So they did believe these things. The situation today is similar. Europeans want to believe that they can focus mainly on European economic and social integration within expanded European Union and NATO organizations, without developing coherent European foreign policies or effective European forces and policies to deal with external threats. They want to believe they can expand the influence and power of the EU and NATO by admitting eastern European countries, without developing clear visions of the objectives, structure, and roles of these organizations. They want to believe that, the United States will ultimately protect Europe from any major external threat but can be forced by European criticism to behave most of the time as if it were only another medium-sized European country. All of these things would serve European interests, as these interests are perceived in Europe. So these things are believed by most European leaders. After five years of study of European reactions to the American Civil War, I continue to be amazed at the limited understanding in Europe of the real issues and ramifications of the American conflict. After many years of professional work to improve U.S.-European understanding, I am greatly distressed by the limited understanding and cooperation within the "Atlantic community" at present. Unless this is too far "off topic" for the moderaters of this group, I would welcome comments from anyone (especialy Europeans) on the comparison between American-European relations during the CW and today. Dean B. Mahin From: DUMahin@aol.com (Dean B. Mahin) Newsgroups: soc.history.war.us-civil-war Subject: Re: Author visit, Dean B. Mahin, European Attitudes Toward America Date: Sat, 12 Oct 2002 20:37:39 CST Nicholas Geovanis wrote . . . . . the officers of the European > armies of that day were aristocrats by definition.... Given the > aristocratic pretensions and, to an extent, truly aristocratic nature of > the Confederacy's leadership and officer corps in the American context, > one might expect the European officers to identify more closely with the > Confederacy. This identification could not help but to color their > reports. The aristocratic background or outlook of most of the European observers in America (the majority of whom were or had been officers) clearly colored their outlook on the American struggle. All four of the factors that resulted in upper class sympathy for the Confederacy in Britain were essentially class factors. The historical resentment of American independence from Britain was mainly by upper class Brits who resented the upstart plebians in America who had thrown off colonial rule by their betters. It was mainly the upper class Briton who was interested in Britain's world role and thought it would be better for British influence to have the North American giant divided into two countries. The upper class Brits feared a Northern victory because they associated the North with popular democracy, which they regarded as rule by the "mob"; they prefered the rather aristocractic political system in the South. Finally, upper class Brits had an economic stake in a Confederate victory because the Confederates were important suppliers and customers fo