From: Michael Furlan Date: Sat, 2 Dec 2000 10:59:24 CST For two weeks, Starting Monday December 4th, Brooks D. Simpson will discuss his latest published book, "Ulysses S. Grant, Triumph Over Adversity, 1822-1865" in the newsgroup soc.history.war.us-civil-war. Got to http://www.thecivilwargroup.com/grant.html to find links to several reviews of "Ulysses S. Grant." **** From: Michael Furlan Date: Sun, 3 Dec 2000 21:57:00 CST Subject: Attn: Brooks Simpson, What's the most interesting thing you learned? I'm going to start with the question that Brian Lamb asked you last: "What's the most interesting thing you earned in this book that you didn't know before you started this?" With only 30 seconds left in the interview you mentioned the strained relationship between Grant and Lincoln and the way Grant resolved his personal problems through his military success at the end of the war. Anything you'd like to add, now that you've got plenty of time? **** From: "Brooks D. Simpson" Subject: Re: Attn: Brooks Simpson, What's the most interesting thing you learned? Date: Sun, 3 Dec 2000 23:01:24 CST Michael Furlan wrote: > > I'm going to start with the question that Brian Lamb asked you last: > > "What's the most interesting thing you earned in this book that you > didn't know before you started this?" > > With only 30 seconds left in the interview you mentioned the strained > realationship between Grant and Lincoln and the way Grant resolved his > personal problems through his military success at the end of the war. > > Anything you'd like to add, now that you've got plenty of time? Hmmm. I think that I learned a lot about command relationships over the course of writing the book. Too many of us like to point fingers at one general or another as the reason for victory or defeat in a single battle. But command relationships are just that: relationships. Moreover, if we think of command as a team concept, one that includes staff officers as well as commanders, we have a better idea of how armies went about what they did. I also learned that sometimes it really pays to get the story right. There are so many tales about Grant's life that are repeated without any effort an examining the valifity of the story. The old story that Lincoln said of Grant, "I can't spare this man; he fights!" is pretty much refuted by a closer examination of the tale; command decisons at Shiloh, Chattanooga, and during the 1864 campaign cannot be understood without a careful combing of available evidence (which suggests, for example, that Grant intended to order an assault up Missionary Ridge, but only after the attacking forces had regrouped at the base of the ridge); a few tales about Grant's personal life that don't stand up well under scrutiny. Historians might display a little more caution before repeating each other to the point that a dubious account comes to be accepted as fact. **** Subject: TO: Brooks D. Simpson From: sedrickfranklin@hotmail.com Date: Mon, 4 Dec 2000 18:16:30 CST Mr. Simpson: A reviewer of your biography made a point I also noticed in my reading: "It is striking...that when slaves such as Dred Scott and William Jones appear, briefly, in these pages, they are referred to as 'Dred' and 'William' following their initial appearance. Yet after first establishing the full name of, say, Lorenzo Thomas or Leonidas Polk, who also make brief appearances, they are subsequently referred to as 'Thomas' and 'Polk,' not 'Lorenzo' and 'Leonidas.' It would be wrong to read a lot into this kind of insensitivity, but it has no place in modern scholarship." Why did you refer to Dred Scott and William Jones, people of color, by their first names? Sedrick Franklin **** Subject: Re: TO: Brooks D. Simpson From: "Brooks D. Simpson" Date: Mon, 4 Dec 2000 20:59:43 CST sedrickfranklin@hotmail.com wrote: > > Mr. Simpson: [snip] > Why did you refer to Dred Scott and William Jones, people of color, by > their first names? The fact that this observation was made by Geoffrey Perret, someone who ignores the fate of the freedmen during Grant's second term--not a single word on that--suggests an overly hostile intent. But Scott and Jones are not the only people referred to by first names (the Polk and Thomas comments are a bit strange to me, as they are not in any way close associates). As I refer to Julia Grant as Julia, for example, the point escapes me. I refer to Dred Scott (pages 70-71) as both "Dred" and Scott," partly for variation's sake; I speak of Mary Robinson (a Dent family slave) by her full name (and never "Mary,") but I could not discover the surname of the Dent slave named "Julia." Perhaps in part I was attempting to humanize these people; but I believe that Mr. Perret and perhaps others are reading a heck of a lot into this as if it was a calculated choice to demean African Americans. Now that I learn that someone might take it that way, I'll adjust. Having suggested that it's by no means a general rule, the force of the point (whatever it is) seems blunted. Do you find any evidence of an effort to demean African Americans in the book or in any of my other writings? **** Subject: Re: Attn: Brooks Simpson, Cotton From: Michael Furlan Date: Mon, 4 Dec 2000 23:55:02 CST "The Department of the Gulf is one great mass of corruption," Hunter informed Grant, "Cotton and politics, instead of the war, appear to have engrossed the army." p. 276 Cotton which cost 14 cents per pound in 1860 sold for a time for more than a dollar during the War. You can imagine the wild scramble for quick and easy profits that this must have caused. Grant had "cotton" problems not just with Gen Banks (above) but also with a congressman, his own father and most notoriously was provoked into the "jewish" order. Has anyone written a book on the cotton trade, legal and "black market" during the War? **** Subject: Re: Attn: Brooks Simpson, Cotton From: "Brooks D. Simpson" Date: Tue, 5 Dec 2000 01:15:52 CST > Has anyone written a book on the cotton trade, legal and "black > market" during the War? Although Ludwell Johnson's account of the Red River campaign touches on this issue, there's been no full study of the cotton contraband trade and what it led to. Grant opposed it, as did Sherman; Lincoln, however, supported it for some time. Equally neglected and at least equally controversial is the question of the collapse and reinstatement of prisoner exchanges. **** From: Rich Rostrom Subject: To Brooks Simpson: re _Grant Speaks_ Date: Tue, 5 Dec 2000 07:13:01 CST Sir, as a pre-eminent biographer of Grant, what is your opinion of Mr. Ev Ehrlich's fictionalized 'autobiography' of Grant, which he called _Grant Speaks_. Several ACW scholars of note praised it in cover notes, and I found parts of it to be interesting, but much of it was clunky and implausible. Have you read it, and if so what did you think of it? **** Subject: For Dr Simpson: Grant and his subordinates From: spencer@panix.com (David Spencer) Date: Tue, 5 Dec 2000 12:58:39 CST In the _Memoirs_, Grant gives brief assessments of various generals. It's a striking example of Grant's writing ability: frank, brief, informative and apparently just and objective -- and those assessments have been the basis of their targets' post-war reputations. (The winners may not write the history books, but the winning general gets to write the epitaphs of his subordinates.) Do you consider those judgments just and objective? What of the generals Grant didn't review? More generally, could you comment on Grant's management of his subordinates? Is there a general theme to his command style? There seem to have been two major changes in style: First, at Vicksburg, he could not have executed the campaign without confidence that his subordinates could act autonomously within the framework of his plan, and required only startlingly brief communications to make major changes in disposition and intent. How much did his confidence in his own position affect his confidence that he could allow his subordinates broad authority without endangering his plan? And second, once he became general-in-chief, he gave his principal subordinates -- Sherman, Meade, Thomas, Banks, Burnside, Sheridan -- almost complete independence, subject to broad strategic direction, and only interfered if they repeatedly demonstrated an inability to use the authority effectively or boldly. Another question: Why did Grant never get the results from the Eastern generals that he did from the Western generals? Why did he not develop the same trust of the Eastern generals? Was it just because he raised up the Western generals, but had to take the Eastern generals as he found them? Was he wary of exciting resentment from the Easterners if he took a firm hand? Were the Easterners just more cautious? And what of the bizarre relationship with Meade? -- particularly compared to the relationship with Sherman and Sheridan, or even with Thomas? -- dhs spencer@panix.com **** Subject: Re: To Brooks Simpson: re _Grant Speaks_ From: "Brooks D. Simpson" Date: Tue, 5 Dec 2000 16:18:36 CST Although I'm familiar with the work in question, I haven't had the time to read it. I have been amused at the discussion that it has generated in some circles. You can't claim that your book is filled with historical insights and then retreat behind the excuse that it is only fiction when people assail the basic flaws in the book. I also find the central literary conceit of the book -- the double life -- needless. You could do many of the things this book claims to do within the bounds of other narrative forms. That happens in Gore Vidal's Lincoln book. The phrase "too cute by half" recurs to me whenever I hear people arguing over the merits of _Grant Speaks_. **** Subject: For Brooks Simpson: Grant and Granger From: 75270_3703a@csi.com (scott s.) Date: Tue, 5 Dec 2000 19:32:24 CST Grant seems to have a greater than average dislike for Gordon Granger. Obviously he was unhappy with his movement after Chattanooga, but there seems to be more to it than that. Any ideas on this subject? scott s. **** Subject: Re: For Brooks Simpson: Grant and Granger From: scribe7716@aol.com (Scribe7716) Date: Tue, 5 Dec 2000 20:53:21 CST > (scott s.) wrote: >Grant seems to have a greater than average dislike for Gordon Granger. >Obviously he was unhappy with his movement after Chattanooga, but there >seems to be more to it than that. piggybacking on scott s. Grant also seemed to be unfair in his treatment of Benjamin Prentiss after Shiloh. How did Grant decide who his beau sabres -- Sherman, McPherson, Sheridan, et al -- were to be, and how did he relegate others -- Prentiss, Granger, et al -- to his scarp heap? **** Subject: Re: For Brooks Simpson: Grant and Granger From: "Robert Taubman" Date: Wed, 6 Dec 2000 07:58:06 CST ,,,,and adding to the list; Grant's dislike for George H. Thomas. What caused this? Thanx. **** Subject: Question for Dr.Simpson From: Stephen McCullough Date: Wed, 6 Dec 2000 16:22:14 CST If I can jump ahead to your future second volume of Grant for my two questions, I have often wondered about the Grant administration's attempts to annex or acquire Santo Domingo and when Grant became an imperialist. From his memoirs, Grant expresses a distaste for the Mexican War and imperialistic reasons behind it. Did he change his mind on the United States becoming a colonial power or am I placing too much importance on his Mexican war statements? Also, did Grant or his secretary Of state, Hamilton Fish, play an active role in the removal of Charles Sumner from the chairmanship of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee or was it an initiative of congressional Republicans? I have always been perplexed by the depth of Grant's hostility toward Sumner. Was it merely Sumner's stand on Santo Domingo or was it deeply personal on Grant's part? Stephen McCullough NMSU Library (and MA candidate in History) **** Subject: For Mr. Simpson From: "Lynn" Date: Wed, 6 Dec 2000 16:22:26 CST Sir I am getting your book when I go to Scottsdale next week, but I have a couple of questions. One is that I can't remember ever reading of Grant's sense of humor. Had he one? Thanks. Lynn **** Subject: Re: For Brooks Simpson: Grant and Granger From: "Lynn" Date: Wed, 6 Dec 2000 16:41:45 CST "Robert Taubman" wrote in message news:5spX5.60842$3u1.18291059@news3.rdc1.on.home.com... > ,,,,and adding to the list; > > Grant's dislike for George H. Thomas. What caused this? And General Warren? There seems to be a lot of dislike among all of them. Jealously maybe? I can't forgive his treatment of General Warren. **** Subject: Re: For Brooks Simpson: Grant and Granger From: Michael Furlan Date: Wed, 6 Dec 2000 16:41:55 CST On Wed, 6 Dec 2000 07:58:06 CST, "Robert Taubman" wrote: >Grant's dislike for George H. Thomas. What caused this? "Old Slow Trot" always moved too slowly on the offensive to satisfy Grant. And Thomas had been rude to Grant upon their first meeting at Chattanooga in Oct. '63. **** Subject: Re: For Brooks Simpson: Grant and Granger From: Michael Furlan Date: Wed, 6 Dec 2000 16:42:11 CST On Tue, 5 Dec 2000 20:53:21 CST, scribe7716@aol.com (Scribe7716) wrote: >Grant also seemed to be unfair in his treatment of Benjamin Prentiss after >Shiloh. Prentiss surrendered at Shiloh didn't he? Wouldn't he have been in a prison camp? **** From: Michael Furlan Subject: Re: For Brooks Simpson: Grant and Granger Date: Wed, 6 Dec 2000 17:48:48 CST On Wed, 6 Dec 2000 16:41:45 CST, "Lynn" wrote: >And General Warren? There seems to be a lot of dislike among all of them. >Jealously maybe? I can't forgive his treatment of General Warren. Yes, Warren should have been fired much earlier. **** Subject: Re: Question for Dr.Simpson From: ABBEYK@webtv.net (Hawk) Date: Wed, 6 Dec 2000 20:41:58 CST If the gunboats USS Tyler and USS Lexington were not at Shiloh to support Grant, what would his chances have been in stopping the Confederates? ~~Hawk **** Subject: Re: For Brooks Simpson: Grant and Granger From: Michael Furlan Date: Wed, 6 Dec 2000 20:42:00 CST On Wed, 6 Dec 2000 16:41:45 CST, "Lynn" wrote: >And General Warren? Which reminds me: "Once, while the army was still north of the James, Grant asked James Wilson if he knew what was wrong with the Army of the Potomac. Thinking it would be a waste of time to list everything, Wilson instead offered a solution. Load Ely Parker up with whiskey and then let the Seneca chief loose with a scalping knife and a tomahawk with instructions to bring back the scalps of several generals. Grant, smiling, had but one question: which ones? Any six or so would do, Wilson replied; the act in itself would send the message." p. 348, "Grant", Simpson Warren was just one of a very dis functional bunch of generals. **** Subject: Re: Question for Dr.Simpson From: deanmahin@my-deja.com Date: Thu, 7 Dec 2000 07:30:49 CST Stephen McCullough wrote: > I have always been perplexed by the depth of Grant's hostility toward Sumner. I will be very interestted in Dr. Simpson's reaction to this question. Meanwhile, a few comments. Sumner had become impossible in the foreign affairs sector. He wanted to totally dominate U.S. foreign relations. His insistence that the U.S. maintain the demand for fantastically exaggerated "indirect claims" from Britain prolonged the "Alabama claims" controversy with Britain. Sumner thought that, if the U.S. persisted with these huge claims, they could only be settled by an agreement under which Britain gave the U.S. Canada and its West Indian possession. But by then most Canadians and most Americans had little interest in the U.S. annexation of Canada. The claims issues were finally resolved by an international tribunal at Geneva in l872. All this is in the "Alabama Claims" epilogue of "One War at a Time," my book on the internaitonal dimensions of the Civil War. Dean B. Mahin DUMahin@aol.com. **** Subject: Re: For Brooks Simpson: Grant and Granger From: scribe7716@aol.com (Scribe7716) Date: Thu, 7 Dec 2000 10:40:51 CST >Michael Furlan wrote: >Prentiss surrendered at Shiloh didn't he? > >Wouldn't he have been in a prison camp? > Prentiss was paroled, exiled to the Trans-Mississippi and Grant would speak (write) ill of his performance at Shiloh. **** Subject: Re: For Brooks Simpson: Grant and Granger From: "Robert Taubman" Date: Thu, 7 Dec 2000 10:43:01 CST They are the standard answers. I'm looking for the "real" reason. Because he didn't offer Grant a seat is rather a petty reason to dislike someone. For someone as conscious of rank protocol as Thomas, it would have been out of character(?). It's too bad Grant didn't fix his eyes on the results instead of the preparations. It's easy to conduct the offensive strategy from several hundred miles away when one doesn't know what is happening in real time. "Michael Furlan" wrote in message news:2dbt2tk8duei90ms1dol4ep3po8cm6epug@4ax.com... > On Wed, 6 Dec 2000 07:58:06 CST, "Robert Taubman" > wrote: > >Grant's dislike for George H. Thomas. What caused this? > > "Old Slow Trot" always moved too slowly on the offensive to satisfy > Grant. > > And Thomas had been rude to Grant upon their first meeting at > Chattanooga in Oct. '63. > **** Subject: Re: For Brooks Simpson: Grant and Granger From: 75270_3703a@csi.com (scott s.) Date: Thu, 7 Dec 2000 13:32:49 CST In message - "Robert Taubman" writes: | |They are the standard answers. I'm looking for the "real" reason. |Because he didn't offer Grant a seat is rather a petty reason to |dislike someone. For someone as conscious of rank protocol as Thomas, |it would have been out of character(?). It's too bad Grant didn't fix |his eyes on the results instead of the preparations. It's easy to |conduct the offensive strategy from several hundred miles away when |one doesn't know what is happening in real time. | It seems like everyone associated with Rosecrans, excepting Sheridan, got harsh treatment from Grant. scott s. **** Subject: Re: For Mr. Simpson From: "G. Wilkey Richardson" Date: Thu, 7 Dec 2000 13:49:37 CST Lynn wrote: > > Sir > I am getting your book when I go to Scottsdale next week, but I have a > couple of questions. One is that I can't remember ever reading of Grant's > sense of humor. Had he one? He did. In Bruce Catton's bio, one incident I found really amusing was related. In fall 1864, Jefferson Davis made a speech in which he said that Sherman's army at Atlanta would suffer the same fate as Napoleon's at Moscow. When Grant heard of this, he remarked: "Mr. Davis has not made it quite plain who is to furnish the snow for this Moscow retreat". Wilkey **** Subject: Re: For Brooks Simpson: Grant and Granger From: "Brooks D. Simpson" Date: Thu, 7 Dec 2000 15:41:47 CST "scott s." wrote: > > Grant seems to have a greater than average dislike for Gordon Granger. > Obviously he was unhappy with his movement after Chattanooga, but there > seems to be more to it than that. Any ideas on this subject? I think Granger's behavior on Orchard Knob and a rather stupid telegram he sent Grant afterwards while intoxicated just turned Grant off. **** Subject: Re: For Brooks Simpson: Grant's Buddies, Grant's Doghouse From: "Brooks D. Simpson" Date: Thu, 7 Dec 2000 15:44:19 CST > Grant also seemed to be unfair in his treatment of Benjamin Prentiss after > Shiloh. Grant and Prentiss had a long history dating back to 1861, when Prentiss refused to give way to Grant as senior commander and then when forced to do so stalked off. Grant was not impressed. Grant believed that he had given Prentiss orders to withdraw when the going got tough while Prentiss insisted he'd been left out to dry at the Hornet's Nest. An upset Prentiss let some comments fly that eventually made their way to Grant, who was very sensitive about criticism about Shiloh. > How did Grant decide who his beau sabres -- Sherman, McPherson, Sheridan, et > al -- were to be, and how did he relegate others -- Prentiss, Granger, et al -- > to his scarp heap? Well, neither Prentiss nor Granger was the worst offender ... ... but personal loyalty and cooperation seemed to have helped form bridges of trust, and Grant valued trusted friends (and despisred those who betrayed that trust). Also, at times I'm sure Grant's critics among his peers dragged up Grant's past, and Grant was sure to remember that. As someone later noted, he was a good hater. **** Subject: Re: For Brooks Simpson: Grant and George Thomas From: "Brooks D. Simpson" Date: Thu, 7 Dec 2000 15:45:15 CST > Grant's dislike for George H. Thomas. What caused this? Although there's speculation that Grant and Thomas were not friendly as early as 1862, when Thomas temporarily took over Grant's army (while Grant was Halleck's second-in-command), I've never seen any evidence of that. Thomas was not very cooperative with Grant when Grant came to Chattanooga. Thomas liked Rosecrans, who hated Grant, and Grant liked Sherman, who had reservations about Thomas. Grant would give orders, and Thomas would try to demonstrate why they could not be executed. This is not a really productive interaction. And yet it's what Grant saw at Chattanooga, after Chattanooga, and again before Nashville. There was no real feel between the two men. Much is made of Grant's correspondence with Thomas before Nashville, but read Thomas's rather amusing lectures in return, and put yourself in Grant's place as well as Thomas's place, and you can see that there was no real effort on the part of either of them to communicate as opposed to trade barbs. **** Subject: Re: For Brooks Simpson: Grant and Granger From: ecalistri@aol.com (ECalistri) Date: Thu, 7 Dec 2000 19:06:17 CST > scribe7716@aol.com (Scribe7716) wrote: >Prentiss was paroled, exiled to the Trans-Mississippi and Grant would speak >(write) ill of his performance at Shiloh. > Grant and Prentiss also had a run-in in August 1861, where Prentiss refused to recognize Grant as his superior officer. This seems to fit the pattern of those officers on Grant's &%#$ list, a failure to be subordinate. McClernand, Lew Wallace, Warren, and Rosecrans all certainly showed this characteristic. Eric **** Subject: Re: Question for Dr.Simpson From: ecalistri@aol.com (ECalistri) Date: Thu, 7 Dec 2000 19:07:17 CST >ABBEYK@webtv.net (Hawk) wrote: >If the gunboats USS Tyler and USS Lexington were not at Shiloh to >support Grant, what would his chances have been in stopping the >Confederates? > A visit to the battlefield, if you have not been there, is the best way to answer that question. There are substantial bluffs between the river and the battlefield. These, along with the abundant forest, greatly restricted the effective field of fire of the gunboats. The gunboats had to be pretty much firing blind. Still, just the sound of those big booming guns could have an impact. A rebel force attempting to move northward along the river, crossing the river or entering the landing would have had to contend with the big guns of the Lexington and Tyler, but this never happened during the battle. The backwater prevented organized troop movements along the river. On the battlefield today, a line of cannon represent "Grant's Final Line" which was never breached, or even seriously pressured. Forces attacking this line would not have been subjected to effective (ie direct) fire from the gunboats, except on the extreme right, where the terrain was practically impassable anyway. It's possible that the idea of facing the fire of the gunboats discouraged the rebel assaults, but it is more likely that the attack was played out by late afternoon. The rebel troops had had a three day march from Corinth, followed by a very tough all day fight. They were disorganized, scattered across many miles of battlefield and many units were without ammunition. In short, unless you want to argue that the rebs were "scared off" by the gunboats, they really played a very small role. Eric **** Subject: Re: Question for Dr.Simpson From: ecalistri@aol.com (ECalistri) Date: Thu, 7 Dec 2000 19:07:58 CST Congrats to Dr Simpson on his excellent book. And kudos to his publisher and publicist for getting out the word!! I have several questions regarding the Union's western offensive in the Spring of 1862, mostly regarding the relationship between Halleck and Grant. Had they met prior to the war? Did Halleck ever visit Cairo prior to Grant's leaving in February? In reading the OR message traffic between McClellan, Buell and Halleck, there does not seem to have been any sort of agreed upon plan in advance of the start of operations? Is that assessment correct? Prior to Fort Donleson Halleck seems to want to find a replacement for Grant, Hitchcock for example. After Donelson, Halleck starts his anti-Grant campaign with McClellan. Yet, after Shiloh, Grant manages to hang on, and eventually regain command. Did Halleck ever want to get rid of Grant? Or did his opinion change enough through May and June of 1862 to allow Grant to move up when Halleck went east? Eric **** From: "Brooks D. Simpson" Subject: Re: For Brooks Simpson: Grant and Warren Date: Fri, 8 Dec 2000 00:26:26 CST Lynn wrote: > And General Warren? There seems to be a lot of dislike among all of them. > Jealously maybe? I can't forgive his treatment of General Warren. At first Grant thought so highly of Warren that he would have named him to replace Meade should that have been necessary. But Warren's performance during the Overland campaign was shaky at best. Meade wanted to relieve him in June. Warren's treatment at Five Forks was not for Five Forks alone. It was payback. And of course Sheridan relieved Warren, not Grant. **** From: "Brooks D. Simpson" Subject: Re: Question for Dr.Simpson Date: Fri, 8 Dec 2000 00:26:43 CST Hawk wrote: > > If the gunboats USS Tyler and USS Lexington were not at Shiloh to > support Grant, what would his chances have been in stopping the > Confederates? The same. The gunboats offered no meaningful support -- they were not used to offer enfilade fire, for example. **** From: "Brooks D. Simpson" Subject: Re: For Mr. Simpson Date: Fri, 8 Dec 2000 00:27:00 CST > One is that I can't remember ever reading of Grant's > sense of humor. Had he one? Yes. Sometimes it was subtle, sometimes more cutting. Once, when told Charles Sumner did not believe in the Bible, Grant replied: "That's because he didn't write it." **** Subject: Re: Question for Dr.Simpson From: "Brooks D. Simpson" Date: Fri, 8 Dec 2000 00:27:53 CST Stephen McCullough wrote: > > If I can jump ahead to your future second volume of Grant for my two > questions, I have often wondered about the Grant administration's > attempts to annex or acquire Santo Domingo and when Grant became an > imperialist. From his memoirs, Grant expresses a distaste for the > Mexican War and imperialistic reasons behind it. Did he change his mind > on the United States becoming a colonial power or am I placing too much > importance on his Mexican war statements? A little of each. Grant's statements on the Mexican War were offered long after the fact. You don't see the same antiwar comments in his writings at the time. However, the annexation project involved the voluntary acquiescence of the residents of Santo Domingo, so it was seen as something quite different. Grant's imperalism, such as it was, was more evident when it came to a canal or Hawaii. > Also, did Grant or his > secretary Of state, Hamilton Fish, play an active role in the removal of > Charles Sumner from the chairmanship of the Senate Foreign Relations > Committee or was it an initiative of congressional Republicans? An initiative of congressional Republicans with Grant's approval. > I have > always been perplexed by the depth of Grant's hostility toward Sumner. > Was it merely Sumner's stand on Santo Domingo or was it deeply personal > on Grant's part? There were several good reasons why Grant did not like Sumner. First, Sumner treated him rudely even before the big break of 1870. Second, Sumner simply did not make clear to Grant privately that he thought the treaty unwise. Third, Sumner blasted Grant in several speeches, impunging his integrity and comparing the annexation project to Kansas-Nebraska. He never did the same thing to Lincoln. Grant kept on good terms with some treaty opponents. He simply felt that Sumner betrayed him by leading him to understand that Sumner would support the treaty. **** From: Rich Rostrom Subject: Re: For Mr. Simpson Date: Fri, 8 Dec 2000 07:14:39 CST "G. Wilkey Richardson" wrote: >Lynn wrote: >> >> Grant's sense of humor. Had he one? > He did... (quip in response to Davis...) Another story of Grant is that in 1864, as the Army of the Potomac prepared to cross the Rappahannock, a reporter approached Grant and asked how long it would take to get to Richmond. "Four days," said Grant, 'flooring' the reporter. "That is," Grant added, "provided General Lee agree to cooperate. But as I expect he will object, it will take a good deal longer." **** From: Stephen McCullough Subject: Re: Question for Dr.Simpson Date: Fri, 8 Dec 2000 07:15:10 CST "Brooks D. Simpson" wrote: > > Stephen McCullough wrote: > > > > If I can jump ahead to your future second volume of Grant for my two > > questions, I have often wondered about the Grant administration's > > attempts to annex or acquire Santo Domingo and when Grant became an > > imperialist. From his memoirs, Grant expresses a distaste for the > > Mexican War and imperialistic reasons behind it. Did he change his mind > > on the United States becoming a colonial power or am I placing too much > > importance on his Mexican war statements? > > A little of each. > > Grant's statements on the Mexican War were offered long > after the fact. You don't see the same antiwar comments in > his writings at the time. > > However, the annexation project involved the voluntary > acquiescence of the residents of Santo Domingo, so it was > seen as something quite different. Grant's imperalism, such > as it was, was more evident when it came to a canal or > Hawaii. > Thanks for clearing that up for me. Having just finished a lengthy paper on US-Haitian relations during John Langston's tenure as US minister to Haiti, I find it intersting to compare and contrast Grant's Santo Domingo project with Arthur's turning down Haitian President Salomon offer in 1883 of either selling or leasing the US strategic naval bases. It was my opinion that the whole Santo Domingo fiasco scared off Arthur and Secretary of State Frelinghuysen from pursing this offer. Stephen McCullough NMSU Library **** Subject: Re: For Mr. Simpson From: dpw@berlioz.cs.arizona.edu (Don Waugaman) Date: Fri, 8 Dec 2000 14:07:11 CST On Fri, 8 Dec 2000 07:14:39 CST, Rich Rostrom wrote: >"G. Wilkey Richardson" wrote: >>Lynn wrote: >>> Grant's sense of humor. Had he one? >> He did... (quip in response to Davis...) >(Another about making Richmond in four days..) I seem to recall it was Grant who claimed to be tone-deaf and only know two different tunes: one was "Yankee Doodle", the other was not "Yankee Doodle." **** Subject: Re: Attn: Brooks Simpson, "The Crater" From: Michael Furlan Date: Fri, 8 Dec 2000 15:02:32 CST On Mon, 4 Dec 2000 18:13:33 CST, "Brooks D. Simpson" wrote: >and the Crater (where Grant should not have left Burnside and Meade to >their own devices). Was that assault doomed even before it started, or could Grant have overcome the botched planning had he showed up the morning of the assault? **** Subject: Re: For Dr Simpson: Grant and his subordinates From: Michael Furlan Date: Fri, 8 Dec 2000 15:02:34 CST On Tue, 5 Dec 2000 12:58:39 CST, spencer@panix.com (David Spencer) wrote: >Why did Grant never get the results from the Eastern generals that he >did from the Western generals? Why did he not develop the same trust >of the Eastern generals? Was it just because he raised up the Western >generals, but had to take the Eastern generals as he found them? Was >he wary of exciting resentment from the Easterners if he took a firm >hand? Were the Easterners just more cautious? I think that they had all been so thoroughly indoctrinated into the McClellan school of "sitzkrieg" that it was almost impossible to jolt them out of it, even when the man doing the urging was as determined as Grant. **** Subject: Re: Attn: Brooks Simpson, "Get The Story Right" From: Michael Furlan Date: Fri, 8 Dec 2000 15:02:39 CST On Sun, 3 Dec 2000 23:01:24 CST, "Brooks D. Simpson" wrote: >I also learned that sometimes it really pays to get the story right. Which brings up the question of how do you work, and how is it different from the way other (un-named) historians might approach an issue? **** Subject: Re: Attn: Brooks Simpson, "Missionary Ridge" From: Michael Furlan Date: Fri, 8 Dec 2000 15:02:41 CST On Sun, 3 Dec 2000 23:01:24 CST, "Brooks D. Simpson" wrote: >(which suggests, for >example, that Grant intended to order an assault up Missionary Ridge, >but only after the attacking forces had regrouped at the base of the >ridge); I'd always thought that this was the "orthodox" version. It was what I was taught in high school back in the early 1970s. Who suggests otherwise? **** Subject: Re: Attn: Brooks Simpson, Staff Officers From: Michael Furlan Date: Fri, 8 Dec 2000 15:02:41 CST On Sun, 3 Dec 2000 23:01:24 CST, "Brooks D. Simpson" wrote: >Moreover, if we think of command as a team concept, >one that includes staff officers How were some of the outstanding staff officers of the War, on either side? **** Subject: Re: Attn: Brooks Simpson, "The Crater" From: "James F. Epperson" Date: Fri, 8 Dec 2000 16:21:27 CST On Fri, 8 Dec 2000, Michael Furlan wrote: > On Mon, 4 Dec 2000 18:13:33 CST, "Brooks D. Simpson" > wrote: > >and the Crater (where Grant should not have left Burnside and Meade to > >their own devices). > > Was that assault doomed even before it started, or could Grant have > overcome the botched planning had he showed up the morning of the > assault? The assault was doomed when James Ledlie was allowed to lead it. Burnside should never had held a lottery to choose the lead division, and both Grant and Meade should have overruled the choice once they found out about it. The crucial question is the timing --- when did Grant/Meade find out about Ledlie's being chosen? I used to think this occurred too late for any change to be made, as a practical matter, but I think Brooks has convinced me otherwise. Jim Epperson http://members.aol.com/jfepperson/causes.html "Whenever I hear anyone arguing for slavery, I feel a strong impulse to see it tried on him personally." -- A. Lincoln **** Subject: Re: For Brooks Simpson: Grant and Warren From: robertbrogan@webtv.net (Robert Brogan) Date: Fri, 8 Dec 2000 22:07:18 CST >Warren's treatment at Five Forks was not for >Five Forks alone. It was payback. And of >course Sheridan relieved Warren, not Grant. Did not Grant sort of encourage Sheriden to get riid of Warren? Bob **** Subject: Re: For Mr. Simpson From: "Bob Huddleston" Date: Fri, 8 Dec 2000 22:12:22 CST I have always thought that the dinner party of CW participants I would have loved to have attended would have been one with former president Grant and his good friend, ex-Confederate Sam Clemons. The cigar smoke would have been dense but the conversation enlightening and hilarious! -- Take care, Bob **** Subject: Re: For Mr. Simpson From: "Bob Huddleston" Date: Fri, 8 Dec 2000 22:12:31 CST One of the funniest stories to come out of the CW was Grant's analysis in the Memoirs about Braggs' Old Army reputation of always fighting with everyone in sight -- including, as Grant told the story, Bragg ended up fighting with himself. The moral, as USG related the story, was that he could count on Bragg fighting with his own generals, rather than concentrating on Grant and his army. -- Take care, Bob **** Subject: Re: For Dr Simpson: Grant and his subordinates From: "Lynn" Date: Fri, 8 Dec 2000 22:12:39 CST "Michael Furlan" wrote in message news:9rd23tcac9el64alnbao9ptjd64egankei@4ax.com... > On Tue, 5 Dec 2000 12:58:39 CST, spencer@panix.com (David Spencer) > wrote: > >Why did Grant never get the results from the Eastern generals that he > >did from the Western generals? Why did he not develop the same trust > >of the Eastern generals? Was it just because he raised up the Western > >generals, but had to take the Eastern generals as he found them? Was > >he wary of exciting resentment from the Easterners if he took a firm > >hand? Were the Easterners just more cautious? > > I think that they had all been so thoroughly indoctrinated into the > McClellan school of "sitzkrieg" that it was almost impossible to jolt > them out of it, even when the man doing the urging was as determined > as Grant. The Western generals had a pretty good winning record . Would that make a difference do you think? Were not the Eastern people a little paralized by Lee ? **** Subject: Re: For Mr. Simpson From: ABBEYK@webtv.net (Hawk) Date: Sat, 9 Dec 2000 15:50:03 CST Why did Grant get the credit for stopping the Confederates at Shiloh? Was it just [because] he was in command? The Confederates drove the federals all day, through the Hornets nest, peach orchard and the bloody pond. They broke Grant's left flank and was driving them into the Tennessee river. Beauegard was so sure of victory, that he broke off his attack, to give his exhausted troops rest. It was Buell with his 17,000 + men that crossed the river that night and Lew Wallace with 7,500 fresh troops. Buell ordered the morning attack against the Rebs without notifying Grant. Beauegard could not stand up against these fresh troops and retreated. Grant was actually defeated, it was Buell that saved Grant and won the battle at Shiloh.... ~~~Hawk **** Subject: Re: For Mr. Simpson From: Geoff Blankenmeyer Date: Sat, 9 Dec 2000 17:43:40 CST Hawk wrote: > > Why did Grant get the credit for stopping the Confederates at Shiloh? > Was it just [because] he was in command? Yes, in every sense of the word. > It was Buell with his 17,000 > + men that crossed the river that night and Lew Wallace with 7,500 fresh > troops. Buell ordered the morning attack against the Rebs without > notifying Grant. The point missing here is that Buell was acting under orders and not as if in command of an independent unit. "Without notifying Grant" is a grey and hazy argument. Often in the CW, orders are received and carried out without a process of continual notification. The point remains that Grant was fully in command. There are a list of citations on the CW on CD Rom that lay out specific orders issued by Grant to specific units in the AoO. Again, Grant was fully in command. > Grant was actually defeated, it was Buell that saved > Grant and won the battle at Shiloh.... To be taken at face value, this premise would open an endless list of pratfalls that would affect some traditional interpretations of CW history if we are to begin assigning the lion's share of credit in battle to underlings abilities to follow orders. In short, if the writer's premise were accurate, there would be a great deal more tributes and monuments to A. P. Hill and far fewer to R. E. Lee. Geoff **** Subject: Re: For Mr. Simpson From: epperson@hiwaay.net (James F. Epperson) Date: Sat, 9 Dec 2000 19:30:52 CST ABBEYK@webtv.net (Hawk) wrote: >Why did Grant get the credit for stopping the Confederates at Shiloh? >Was it just [because] he was in command? The Confederates drove the >federals all day, through the Hornets nest, peach orchard and the bloody >pond. They broke Grant's left flank and was driving them into the >Tennessee river. Beauegard was so sure of victory, that he broke off his >attack, to give his exhausted troops rest. It was Buell with his 17,000 >+ men that crossed the river that night and Lew Wallace with 7,500 fresh >troops. Buell ordered the morning attack against the Rebs without >notifying Grant. Beauegard could not stand up against these fresh troops >and retreated. Grant was actually defeated, it was Buell that saved >Grant and won the battle at Shiloh.... ~~~Hawk This is one of those situations where you have a lot of the details correct, but have enough wrong that you miss the big picture. While the fighting was going on in the Hornets Nest and elsewhere, Grant was assembling a defense line along Dill Creek Branch, a deep ravine in front of Pittsburgh Landing. This line was composed of about 20,000 troops from Grant's army and 50 or so pieces of artillery. It was not going to be broken by the Confederates, although they made a valiant effort to do so; Chalmers's brigade actually got across and was trying to ascend the far side of the ravine when they were forced back. It was only after the failure of these attacks that Beauregard broke off for the night (and then fell back a mile or so; dumb). Grant did not need Wallace or Buell to hold his position on April 6th; he certainly needed them to counterattack on the 7th. Grant won the battle on the 6th, and is quite properly given the credit for it. It was Grant's determination to hold that carried the day. JFE **** Subject: Re: For Mr. Simpson From: witmergreen@aol.com (Witmergreen) Date: Sat, 9 Dec 2000 20:49:30 CST >Why did Grant get the credit for stopping the Confederates at Shiloh? Because the army did not go completely to pieces and get driven into the river on the 6th, as would have happened if Grant had lost his head and started screaming "all's lost, every man for himself", and was responsible for the orders that kept the army from going to pieces. >Was it just [because] he was in command? The Confederates drove the >federals all day, through the Hornets nest, peach orchard and the bloody >pond. And it was Grant's order to Prentiss to hold the Hornet's Nest that delayed the Confederate advance in that section of the line, holding until it was too late in the day to exploit the loss of Prentiss' men. Also, the Confederates might have been advancing, but they were hardly doing so without significant cost in casualties to themselves at the same time. >They broke Grant's left flank and was driving them into the >Tennessee river. Beauegard was so sure of victory, that he broke off his >attack, to give his exhausted troops rest. It was Buell with his 17,000 >+ men that crossed the river that night and Lew Wallace with 7,500 fresh >troops. Buell ordered the morning attack against the Rebs without >notifying Grant. Beauegard could not stand up against these fresh troops >and retreated. Grant was actually defeated, it was Buell that saved >Grant and won the battle at Shiloh.... Beauregard could not stand up to the fresh troops and counterattack, but in actuality Grant had his defenses in order sufficiently and the Confederates were bashed around sufficiently themselves by the previous day's fight that there were no guarantees at all that a Confederate attack on the second day would have succeeded. Steve **** From: Hawk Subject: Re: For Mr. Simpson Date: Mon, 11 Dec 2000 05:41:26 GMT Discussing the battle of Shiloh, Epperson wrote: ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~The big picture of course is that Beauregard retreated from being overwhelmed by fresh Federal troops. Just for the heck of it, lets give the Rebs a little credit. First they forced marched to Shiloh from Corinth, they chased the Feds all day through the Hornets nest and the Peach orchard. They captured Prentiss and most of his men. they pushed Sherman back and Grants left flank completely collapsed. Generals Hardee and Polk was pushing back the right flank to a point where the Federal army was crowded into a narrow semi-circular area extending about half a mile from the landing. The river from Savannah to the Pittsburg landing was lined with stragglers who were panic-stricken and unfit for fighting. And as far as Grants last ditch stand, it was never seriously tested. It could have been easily flanked by Hardee and Polk. Chalmers broke off mainly from heavy fire from the gunboats, being next to the river. Actually Grant was trapped like a rat. Beauregard felt this and broke off the attack to give his men rest. He had a few hours left of daylight, he should have finished Grant off while he had the opportunity, I'm sure he would if he knew Buell was so close. But that's the way the cookie crumbled. It's really to bad the Rebs were such poor fighters....They could have won that battle. ~~Hawk **** From: Donald Plezia Subject: Re: For Brooks Simpson: Grant and George Thomas Date: Mon, 11 Dec 2000 13:08:13 GMT "Brooks D. Simpson wrote > > Grant's dislike for George H. Thomas. What caused this? > > Although there's speculation that Grant and Thomas were not > friendly as early as 1862, when Thomas temporarily took over > Grant's army (while Grant was Halleck's second-in-command), > I've never seen any evidence of that. While I have never seen any evidence of this either, it could lead to speculation that Grant might not have liked being replaced by Thomas to do the fighting, such that it was, while he became second-in-command and watched. I think it started there. As you suggested, "Grant was a good hater". Maybe Halleck had something to do with it. > Thomas was not very cooperative with Grant when Grant came > to Chattanooga. Thomas liked Rosecrans, who hated Grant, And apparently was returned in spades. Grant as president kicked Rosecrans out of a government (?) job when he was elected. I don't understand how Thomas was uncooperative with Grant? He was operating under severe circumstances. His army was still on ½ to 1/4 rations, his animals were dying for lack of forage and fodder, the cracker line was still in the process of being created and Grant knew all this. Then on November 7th, apparently to impress Washington, he ordered Thomas to attack Bragg on Missionary Ridge at Tunnel Hill. The same spot that two weeks later, Sherman, with 5 "perfectly appointed divisions", could do nothing with. The fact that he had pointed out to Grant, that the plan was unworkable due to the transportation problems and was supported by his engineering officer (Baldy Smith, I believe), does not appear "uncooperative", does it? His artillery was immobilized and little in the way of forage or fodder to make the campaign. In addition, while not a military man, it seems to me if Thomas pulled the AOTC out of Chattanooga, there wouldn't be much there to protect the city from an advance down the Ridge to the city. And guess what Bragg's biggest prize would be? One other difficulty is that Thomas's left was still controlled by Bragg and was not opened until Thomas took Orchard Hill on the 23rd. This means that Thomas would have had to cross the Tennessee to gain the right bank move up the river to the junction of the Chickamauga and recross to the right bank then move up to Tunnel Hill to make the attack. Or, he could advance past Bragg's right flank and move on Bragg's supply dump at Chickamauga Station. > and Grant liked Sherman, who had reservations about Thomas. Sherman had no reservations about Thomas until he and Grant decided to eliminate any competition for the top offices in the army. When Thomas was being considered for Anderson's Army of the Ohio, I believe, Sherman was asked to suggest other candidates he immediately named Thomas. And I think he backed it up by claiming "he was slow of mind and meticulous, but true as steel". That to me was a high compliment. I read it as saying that he planned carefully and saw to the details. The reservations, I think, started after Thomas won the battle at Missionary. Neither Grant nor Sherman was happy that the AOTC and Hooker were the heroes of the battle. > Grant would give orders, and Thomas would try to demonstrate > why they could not be executed. This is not a really > productive interaction. Would you have Thomas execute a bad order? Thomas was concerned about his left and right. When he took Orchard Hill as part of a demonstration he cleared his (Thomas) left and placed him in a more advantageous position to support Sherman as Grant had ordered. In addition, it placed his Army about a mile and half closer to the Ridge. Now, he could maneuver up the valley directly, without having to cross the river. He still was concerned with his right. He knew Hooker was coming through the valley from Lookout, but, did not know where he was exactly. When Grant started hemming and hawing with Wood about "helping" Sherman out, I think Thomas was waiting for information on Hooker. Then when Grant, goaded by Rawlins and Wilson, finally ordered Thomas to move, it started happening. > And yet it's what Grant saw at > Chattanooga, after Chattanooga, and again before > Nashville. There was no real feel between the two men. I didn't see Thomas's return letter's as amusing lectures. He was trying to explain to Grant, in City Point, what the circumstances were in Nashville, 800 miles away. The fact that Thomas had in Nashville only 5,000 men when Franklin, only 18 miles away was being fought, seems to me to be some thing Grant should be aware of. The fact that the 23,000 troops (Stanley and Schofield) that Sherman magnanimously returned to Thomas, after enlistments were up and promised furlough's to vote were given, Thomas got about 7,000 experienced men those that were sent to replace the others were raw recruits. Smith, with 12,000 men had been delayed by marching across Missouri and arrived the same day as Schofield, the date before the planned battle. You know of course, Grant criticized Thomas for being "sluggish", in the pursuit of Bragg's Army. Can you imagine what he would have said if he had "not" taken the time to re-mount? > Much is made of Grant's correspondence with Thomas before > Nashville, but read Thomas's rather amusing lectures in > return, and put yourself in Grant's place as well as > Thomas's place, and you can see that there was no real > effort on the part of either of them to communicate as > opposed to trade barbs. I don't recall Thomas's replies as being "barbed"? I do know that Grant had let Sherman run off to Savannah, facing no meaningful opposition, but taking the best troops, including more than half Thomas's AOTC, the best transportation and artillery material and the best cavalry equipment and of course the best horses and mules, right out of the theater of war and fighting. Thomas had to make all that up, somehow. Thomas was trying to explain that to Grant. But, of course Grant knew all this. He (with Lincoln, Stanton and Halleck's eager blessing), originally had ordered Sherman to destroy Hood, et al. But, Sherman either bullied him into acquiescing, or he got tired of listening to him. So, if it were found out that Sherman had lied and had not given Thomas all the support he said he did, it would reflect badly on Grant. To cover his butt, he started giving these foolish orders. He seems to be willing to sacrifice Thomas and his men to cover he and Sherman's rear. -- Cordially, D. W. Plezia **** From: James F. Epperson Subject: Re: For Mr. Simpson Date: Mon, 11 Dec 2000 15:26:25 GMT Hawk wrote: >The big picture of course is that >Beauregard retreated from being overwhelmed by fresh Federal troops. Actually, Beauregard did not know there were all that many fresh Federal troops present. He was mis-led by a false cavalry report (filed by B.H. Helm, Lincoln's brother-in-law, who was later killed at Chickamauga) that Buell was moving on Huntsville, Alabama, instead of towards Grant. Helm mis-took a single division for Buell's whole army, but Beauregard accepted the report. >Just for the heck of it, lets give the Rebs a little credit. First they >forced marched to Shiloh from Corinth, they chased the Feds all day >through the Hornets nest and the Peach orchard. The march was on the several days before the battle; you wrote this as though you thought they marched from Corinth on the 6th. >They captured Prentiss >and most of his men. they pushed Sherman back and Grants left flank >completely collapsed. If Grant's left flank had completely collapsed, the Confederates would have seized the landing. >Generals Hardee and Polk was pushing back the >right flank to a point where the Federal army was crowded into a narrow >semi-circular area extending about half a mile from the landing. The >river from Savannah to the Pittsburg landing was lined with stragglers >who were panic-stricken and unfit for fighting. And as far as Grants >last ditch stand, it was never seriously tested. Three brigades (Chalmers, Anderson, Jackson) made separate attempts to cross the ravine. >It could have been >easily flanked by Hardee and Polk. No, it couldn't. Have you ever been to Shiloh? The Federal right was anchored on Snake Creek and covered by Tilghman Branch, a ravine only slightly less formidable than Dill Creek Branch. >Chalmers broke off mainly from heavy >fire from the gunboats, being next to the river. The gunboats had little to do with it. Chalmers's attack was about 1/4 mile inland, according to the Park Service markers, in a wooded area. The gunboats were on the river (of course! ) which means they were *below* the bluffs overlooking the river itself. They had no "fire control" to avoid hitting their own men, so they were not going to be firing blindly anywhere near the Federal line. And they couldn't see Chalmers. The attack was broken up by the massed guns Grant had collected, as well as the infantry force supporting them. >Actually Grant was >trapped like a rat. Beauregard felt this and broke off the attack to >give his men rest. It certainly is true that Grant had no where to go and that Beauregard thought he had him cornered. In fact, one of the big mistakes the Confederates made was to fall back that evening. When the Federals attacked the next morning they initially struck nothing but air. JFE **** From: Joe Dzikiewicz Subject: Re: For Mr. Simpson Date: Mon, 11 Dec 2000 15:28:39 GMT Hawk writes: >Beauregard felt this and broke off the attack to >give his men rest. By your formulation, that was pretty dumb of him, wasn't it? I guess, then, that the Union won the battle because Grant kept fighting as long and as hard as he could with all that he had at his disposal, but Beauregard decided to take a break. Isn't that the end result of your analysis? -------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------- Joe Dzikiewicz I can resist anything but temptation! **** From: 75270_3703a@csi.com (scott s.) Subject: Re: For Brooks Simpson: Grant and George Thomas Date: Mon, 11 Dec 2000 21:01:08 GMT In message - Donald Plezia writes: |And apparently was returned in spades. Grant as president kicked Rosecrans out |of a government (?) job when he was elected. Minister to Mexico. scott s. **** From: ABBEYK@webtv.net (Hawk) Subject: Re: For Mr. Simpson Date: Mon, 11 Dec 2000 21:09:17 GMT Mr. Epperson; Most of my information about the battle of Shiloh came from "Harpers" by Alfred H. Guernsey (editor 1856-1869) and Henry Mills Alden ( editor 1869- 1919) and "Rebels & Yankees" by William C. Davis and endorsed by James M. McPherson. Do you feel that you know more about "Shiloh" than these gentlemen? ~~~Hawk **** Subject: Re: Attn: Brooks Simpson, "The Crater" From: "Brooks D. Simpson" Date: Mon, 11 Dec 2000 17:23:45 CST > Was that assault doomed even before it started, or could Grant have > overcome the botched planning had he showed up the morning of the > assault? The assault was far from doomed, and I think Grant erred in not having the black troops lead it. Certainly he could have done a better job than did Burnside. If Grant really thought it was such an opportunity, he should have been hands-on. He knew by now that Meade and Burnside were not good buddies, and that Meade had failed to be successful at coordinating offensive operations, let alone that this was just too much responsiblity for Burnside to handle in light of his previous performance during the Overland campaign. **** Subject: Re: Attn: Brooks Simpson, "Get The Story Right" From: "Brooks D. Simpson" Date: Mon, 11 Dec 2000 17:24:07 CST > Which brings up the question of how do you work, and how is it > different from the way other (un-named) historians might approach an > issue? I am reluctant to rely on secondary accounts of an event. As much as possible I like to review the primary sources. All too often secondary accounts shave something off or inject an interpretation not warranted by the evidence. Let me give two examples from the work I did for the book: 1. It is one of the standards of Civil War/Grant studies that after Shiloh Abraham Lincoln, responding to pressure to remove Grant, declared, "I can't spare this man; he fights!" But it really paid off to read the original account in which that quote appeared, in a book by Alexander McClure. Why? Everything else McClure claims Lincoln siad is clearly contradicted by the documentary record. And we know that Lincoln was in fact curious about whether Grant was responsible for the losses at Shiloh (he had Stanton telegraph Halleck to that effect) and during the next year considered alternatives to Grant (McClernand, Banks, Butler). In light of the rather dubious account in which the quote is set, therefore, I concluded that this was part of a postwar Lincoln myth, nothing more. 2. The famed Yazoo bender of June 1863 is often presented as evidence that a bored Grant took advantage of a slow moment in the war to get drunk, and it didn't hurt anyone. Let's overlook for the moment the internal contradictions in the stories presented by James H. Wilson, Charles Dana, and Sylvanus Cadwallader -- although those contradictions are pretty serious. But the fact is that Grant was quite worried about the security of his lines, made a trip up the Yazoo to check on a danger point, and if something had happened (as it did some three months later at New Orleans) the consequences would have been serious (McClernand in command). It helped to reread the letters at the time to determine that Grant was already sick (including the famed Rawlins letter of June 6, which mentions Grant's health); Wilson gave the whole game away in a draft biography of Rawlins when he said that the whiskey Grant had on June 6 was for medicinal purposes, but made things worse. All you had to do was read to find out what most probably was going on and reconcile the stories into a more reasonable account consident with the facts. **** Subject: Re: For Brooks Simpson: Grant and Warren From: "Brooks D. Simpson" Date: Mon, 11 Dec 2000 17:24:08 CST Robert Brogan wrote: > > >Warren's treatment at Five Forks was not for >Five Forks alone. It was > payback. And of >course Sheridan relieved Warren, not Grant. > > Did not Grant sort of encourage Sheriden to get riid of Warren? Grant gave permission for Sheridan to act as he did because he knew how hard Warren could be when it came to cooperating. **** From: "Brooks D. Simpson" Subject: Re: Attn: Brooks Simpson, "Missionary Ridge" Date: Mon, 11 Dec 2000 17:24:09 CST Michael Furlan wrote: > > On Sun, 3 Dec 2000 23:01:24 CST, "Brooks D. Simpson" > wrote: > >(which suggests, for > >example, that Grant intended to order an assault up Missionary Ridge, > >but only after the attacking forces had regrouped at the base of the > >ridge); > > I'd always thought that this was the "orthodox" version. It was what > I was taught in high school back in the early 1970s. > > Who suggests otherwise? A good number of Thomas's biographers see the final charge as pure impulse on the part the the soldiers of the Army of the Cumberland. Indeed, it's funny to read these accounts, which one way or another fall victim to the inherent need of Thomas's biographers to denigrate Grant. **** From: "Brooks D. Simpson" Subject: Re: Attn: Brooks Simpson, Staff Officers Date: Mon, 11 Dec 2000 17:24:13 CST Michael Furlan wrote: > > On Sun, 3 Dec 2000 23:01:24 CST, "Brooks D. Simpson" > wrote: > >Moreover, if we think of command as a team concept, > >one that includes staff officers > > How were some of the outstanding staff officers of the War, on either > side? Warren was very capable (and Jim Epperson and I agree that the AoP would have been better served had Humphreys taken over a corps and left Warren as CoS in 1863); Longstreet had several good staff officers (Lee had clerks); James Wilson was a good staff officer/engineer; there are others who will come to mind. One of the problems with John Keegan's essay on Grant in The Mask of Command is that he seems not to have understood the professionalization of Grant's staff during 1863 and early 1864; his comments seem limited to the early staff, and focus too much on Rawlins. Grant trusted McPherson and Joseph Webster a great deal during those years; Rawlins was not CoS. **** Subject: Re: For Mr. Simpson From: "James F. Epperson" Date: Mon, 11 Dec 2000 17:45:31 CST On Mon, 11 Dec 2000, Hawk wrote: > Mr. Epperson; Most of my information about the battle of Shiloh came > from "Harpers" by Alfred H. Guernsey (editor 1856-1869) and Henry Mills > Alden ( editor 1869- 1919) and "Rebels & Yankees" by William C. Davis > and endorsed by James M. McPherson. Do you feel that you know more about > "Shiloh" than these gentlemen? I am not familiar with the first two individuals, nor any of their works. As for Davis and McPherson, I don't think you want to hold them up as the ultimate icons of rectitude where the Civil War is concerned, because it would not take me long to find multiple statements from both men about the Confederacy and its origins that run counter to things you have said. But two can play this game. My information about Shiloh comes from Wiley Sword ("Shiloh: Bloody April"), Larry Daniel ("Shiloh"), Bruce Catton (numerous titles), and two articles in Blue & Gray by Stacy Allen, the current chief historian at Shiloh National Military Park. Do you feel that you know more about Shiloh than these gentlemen? Jim Epperson http://members.aol.com/jfepperson/causes.html Now and then, an innocent man is sent to the Legislature. **** Subject: Re: For Brooks Simpson: Grant and George Thomas From: "Brooks D. Simpson" Date: Mon, 11 Dec 2000 20:07:24 CST Donald Plezia wrote: > > Thomas was not very cooperative with Grant when Grant came > > to Chattanooga. Thomas liked Rosecrans, who hated Grant, > > And apparently was returned in spades. Grant as president kicked Rosecrans out > of a government (?) job when he was elected. Huh? And what job would that be? Besides, Rosecrans was a Democrat. Grant was a Republican. What did Old Rosey expect? Rosecrans was clearly responsible for his problems with Grant. He tried to stab Grant in the back in 1862 and played himself up with reporters after Iuka and Corinth, and Grant found out about it. > I don't understand how Thomas was uncooperative with Grant? He was operating > under severe circumstances. His army was still on ½ > to 1/4 rations, his animals were dying for lack of forage and fodder, the > cracker line was still in the process of being created and > Grant knew all this. That was at the time of Grant's arrival. > Then on November 7th, apparently to impress Washington, he > ordered Thomas to attack Bragg on Missionary Ridge > at Tunnel Hill. Assumes a motive that must be proven. Do you have any evidence that Grant's motive was to impress Washington? > The same spot that two weeks later, Sherman, with 5 "perfectly > appointed divisions", could do nothing with. But Thomas did not know that, and he shared the same misapprehenion about the terrain. I note that Thomas never said that the Tunnel Hill offensive under Sherman was unwise. Thomas had participated in earlier discussions about a strike at Bragg's right and raised no objection until Grant assigned him to do it. The timing of the assault was not to "impress Washington," but was in reaction to news of Longstreet's departure for Knoxville. Thomas had little concern for Burnside's fate at Knoxville. Baldy Smith had thought the attack was a wise idea; Thomas had Smith check his work, and Smith reversed his decision. Grant had hoped Thomas would outflank Bragg (a different operation than that proposed to Sherman later). > The > fact that he had pointed out to Grant, that the plan was unworkable due to the > transportation problems and was supported by his > engineering officer (Baldy Smith, I believe), does not appear "uncooperative", > does it? Smith had originally proposed the plan; Thomas suggested that the best thing to do was to have Hooker take Lookout Mountain -- which would do nothing for Burnside. > His artillery was immobilized and little in > the way of forage or fodder to make the campaign. The proposed attack was not a "campaign," and I've already suggested in my account that the artillery was immobilized. Nevertheless, Thomas could have raised these objections to offensive operations in general before this moment -- and this was an improvised offensive dictated by an emergency situation (I see no recognition of that in your narrative). > In addition, while not a military man, it seems to me if Thomas pulled the AOTC > out of Chattanooga, there wouldn't be much there to > protect the city from an advance down the Ridge to the city. And guess what > Bragg's biggest prize would be? Oh? Did Grant tell him to abandon Chattanooga? [snip] > > and Grant liked Sherman, who had reservations about Thomas. > > Sherman had no reservations about Thomas until he and Grant decided to eliminate > any competition for the top offices in the army. This implication of some sort of self-serving conspiracy is simply ludicrous, although I'm willing to see any letters from Sherman or Grant to prove it. > When Thomas was being considered for Anderson's Army of the Ohio, I believe, > Sherman was asked to suggest other candidates he > immediately named Thomas. And I think he backed it up by claiming "he was slow > of mind and meticulous, but true as steel". That to > me was a high compliment. I read it as saying that he planned carefully and saw > to the details. The reservations, I think, started > after Thomas won the battle at Missionary. Neither Grant nor Sherman was happy > that the AOTC and Hooker were the heroes of the > battle. Evidence (other than Hooker's strange quote, which has Grant swearing)? > > Grant would give orders, and Thomas would try to demonstrate > > why they could not be executed. This is not a really > > productive interaction. > > Would you have Thomas execute a bad order? First, you have to demonstrate that the order was in fact bad. Second, there are ways to tell a superior that his/her instructions are unwise. This usually takes tack. The haughty, stern Thomas lacked that. In that way he was like Warren. > Thomas was concerned about his left and right. When he took Orchard Hill as > part of a demonstration he cleared his (Thomas) left > and placed him in a more advantageous position to support Sherman as Grant had > ordered. Read Thomas's actual orders and tell me what he intended to do on November 23. In addition, it placed his Army about a > mile and half closer to the Ridge. Now, he could maneuver up the valley > directly, without having to cross the river. He still was > concerned with his right. He knew Hooker was coming through the valley from > Lookout, but, did not know where he was exactly. When > Grant started hemming and hawing with Wood about "helping" Sherman out, I think > Thomas was waiting for information on Hooker. Then > when Grant, goaded by Rawlins and Wilson, finally ordered Thomas to move, it > started happening. What started happening? And where did Wilson goad Grant? I note no one else present at Orchard Knob has the account Wilson presented about Grant and Rawlins. Not even Cadwallader. In fact, people present on the ridge say it was Thomas who was rather nervous. > > And yet it's what Grant saw at > > Chattanooga, after Chattanooga, and again before > > Nashville. There was no real feel between the two men. > > I didn't see Thomas's return letter's as amusing lectures. He was trying to > explain to Grant, in City Point, what the circumstances > were in Nashville, 800 miles away. And not too well, I may add. Thomas said he had no horses, when there were reports that much had been done to give him mounts; others (including Lincoln) wondered whether Thomas was simply sitting and waiting; Thomas made repeated promises to attack Hood, then gave more reasons for delay; Thomas also told Grant that Hood was indeed preparing to move across the Cumberland, just as Grant predicted. Grant had told Thomas that if Thomas delayed in attacking in early December, bad weather might intervene. Thomas delayed, and bad weather came. > The fact that Thomas had in Nashville only 5,000 men when Franklin, only 18 > miles away was being fought, seems to me to be some > thing Grant should be aware of. This has no bearing on the correspondence under discussion, which opened in earnest after Franklin. The fact that the 23,000 troops (Stanley and > Schofield) that Sherman magnanimously returned to > Thomas, after enlistments were up and promised furlough's to vote were given, > Thomas got about 7,000 experienced men those that were > sent to replace the others were raw recruits. Smith, with 12,000 men had been > delayed by marching across Missouri and arrived the > same day as Schofield, the date before the planned battle. All interesting pieces of information that are not tied to the issue under discussion. [snip] > > Much is made of Grant's correspondence with Thomas before > > Nashville, but read Thomas's rather amusing lectures in > > return, and put yourself in Grant's place as well as > > Thomas's place, and you can see that there was no real > > effort on the part of either of them to communicate as > > opposed to trade barbs. > I don't recall Thomas's replies as being "barbed"? Thomas kept on giving answers as to why he would not act. These explanations changed over time. They were the usual lectures that he liked to give Grant; others read his dispatches and wondered what was going on. > I do know that Grant had let Sherman run off to Savannah, facing no meaningful > opposition, but taking the best troops, including > more than half Thomas's AOTC, the best transportation and artillery material and > the best cavalry equipment and of course the best > horses and mules, right out of the theater of war and fighting. Thomas had to > make all that up, somehow. And Thomas was facing a badly damaged force at Nashville. Yet still he failed to relay that to Grant. The primary reason for the outcome at Nashville was Hood at Franklin, not anything Thomas did. > Thomas was trying to explain that to Grant. But, of course Grant knew all this. > He (with Lincoln, Stanton and Halleck's eager > blessing), originally had ordered Sherman to destroy Hood, et al. But, Sherman > either bullied him into acquiescing, or he got tired > of listening to him. Evidence? > So, if it were found out that Sherman had lied and had not > given Thomas all the support he said he did, it > would reflect badly on Grant. To cover his butt, he started giving these > foolish orders. He seems to be willing to sacrifice > Thomas and his men to cover he and Sherman's rear. An interesting conclusion characteristic of the extremes to which Thomas's partisans are willing to go. **** From: G. Wilkey Richardson Subject: Re: Attn: Brooks Simpson, "Missionary Ridge" Date: Tue, 12 Dec 2000 23:57:09 GMT "Brooks D. Simpson" wrote: > > Michael Furlan wrote: > > > > A good number of Thomas's biographers see the final charge > as pure impulse on the part the the soldiers of the Army of > the Cumberland. An interesting case on this is Bruce Catton. In "Never Call Retreat", he accepts the above version of the Missionary Ridge assault. By the time he wrote "Grant Takes Command", he rejects that notion, and states that the "spontaneous charge" version is pure legend. And he admitted his earlier mistake in the footnotes section. > Indeed, it's funny to read these accounts, > which one way or another fall victim to the inherent need of > Thomas's biographers to denigrate Grant. I tried to read one of those once. I can't remember the name or author, but I do remember that the author had an unbelievable number of axes to grind. BTW nice to see you here again, Brooks. Wilkey -- "Being disintegrated makes me *very* angry" -- M.T. Martian. **** Subject: Re: For Dr Simpson: Grant and his subordinates From: bradm@ibm.net (Brad Meyer) Date: Wed, 13 Dec 2000 01:18:46 CST On Fri, 8 Dec 2000 15:02:34 CST, Michael Furlan wrote: >On Tue, 5 Dec 2000 12:58:39 CST, spencer@panix.com (David Spencer) >wrote: >>Why did Grant never get the results from the Eastern generals that he >>did from the Western generals? Why did he not develop the same trust >>of the Eastern generals? Was it just because he raised up the Western >>generals, but had to take the Eastern generals as he found them? Was >>he wary of exciting resentment from the Easterners if he took a firm >>hand? Were the Easterners just more cautious? > >I think that they had all been so thoroughly indoctrinated into the >McClellan school of "sitzkrieg" that it was almost impossible to jolt >them out of it, even when the man doing the urging was as determined >as Grant. Or perhaps they didn't see the sense of having their commands chewed up with little prospect of victory comensurate with the losses. Even more, by the time the armies left Spotsylvania, the rank and file had started to show the disinclination to attack entrenched positions that became the decisive features of Cold Harbor and Grant's first attack on Petersburg after crossing the James. Also, Grant came as Pope's friend and the experience with Pope was unlikely to help relations with another westerner and friend to boot. Brad Meyer "It is history that teaches us to hope" -- R E Lee **** Subject: Chewed Up was For Dr Simpson: Grant and his subordinates From: Michael Furlan Date: Wed, 13 Dec 2000 03:09:23 CST On Wed, 13 Dec 2000 01:18:46 CST, bradm@ibm.net (Brad Meyer) wrote: >Or perhaps they didn't see the sense of having their commands chewed >up with little prospect of victory comensurate with the losses. Take a look at the following: http://www.armymedicine.army.mil/history/booksdocs/wwi/casualties/fig19.gif I don't see such a dramatic increase in casualty rates as you seem to imply. Particularly when you adjust for the fact that CSA forces were not fully equipped with rifled weapons until 1863. And further consider that there were about twice as many deaths due to disease as in battle. CW armies killed lots of men even if they never moved out of camp. And that certainly provided "little prospect of victory commensurate with the losses." Maybe somebody could post the deaths in the Union army by year (by month would be better?) **** Subject: "Attacking Entrenched Positions" was For Dr Simpson: Grant and his subordinates From: Michael Furlan Date: Wed, 13 Dec 2000 03:09:31 CST On Wed, 13 Dec 2000 01:18:46 CST, bradm@ibm.net (Brad Meyer) wrote: >by the time the armies left Spotsylvania, the rank and file had >started to show the disinclination to attack entrenched positions Had their generals got them to move faster, they would not have been attacking entrenched positions at Spotsylvania. **** Subject: Re: Attn: Brooks Simpson, "Missionary Ridge" From: "Robert Taubman" Date: Wed, 13 Dec 2000 08:19:14 CST What would be the real story then? What did happen as Missionary Ridge if the versions as given in the Thomas biographies are not factual? Who do we believe and why should I believe your version of Grant's experiences? I have your Grant waiting to be read. Did all Thomas biographers "fall victim to the inherent need,,,,,,to denigrate Grant."? If the need was indeed inherent with the biographers, was there any valid reason for them to be so? Are you denigrating the Thomas biographers? These questions are not intended to be rude but with all the differing opinions, who should I believe? "Brooks D. Simpson" wrote in message news:3A354EF9.7F7DBA86@asu.edu... > Michael Furlan wrote: > > > > On Sun, 3 Dec 2000 23:01:24 CST, "Brooks D. Simpson" > > wrote: > > >(which suggests, for > > >example, that Grant intended to order an assault up Missionary Ridge, > > >but only after the attacking forces had regrouped at the base of the > > >ridge); > > > > I'd always thought that this was the "orthodox" version. It was what > > I was taught in high school back in the early 1970s. > > > > Who suggests otherwise? > > A good number of Thomas's biographers see the final charge > as pure impulse on the part the the soldiers of the Army of > the Cumberland. Indeed, it's funny to read these accounts, > which one way or another fall victim to the inherent need of > Thomas's biographers to denigrate Grant. > **** Subject: Re: Chewed Up was For Dr Simpson: Grant and his subordinates From: jdzik@aol.com (Joe Dzikiewicz) Date: Wed, 13 Dec 2000 09:15:40 CST Mike Furlan writes: >Take a look at the following: > >http://www.armymedicine.army.mil/history/booksdocs/wwi/casualties/fig19.gif > >I don't see such a dramatic increase in casualty rates as you seem to >imply. Interesting graph. Another aspect of it that I found fascinating was that the casualty figures for the period of the Overland Campaign also look milder than I expected when one considers that they are mixed in with the casualties for Gettysburg. (The periods go from July 1 through June 30, and thus the Overland Campaign and Gettysburg are at the end and start of the 1864-1864 period.) -------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------- Joe Dzikiewicz I can resist anything but temptation! **** Subject: Re: Chewed Up was For Dr Simpson: Grant and his subordinates From: Chuck Wilmot Date: Wed, 13 Dec 2000 11:10:47 CST In article <3eae3tgujeora3nudqu6vc5qpntuohi3kq@4ax.com>, Michael Furlan wrote: > On Wed, 13 Dec 2000 01:18:46 CST, bradm@ibm.net (Brad Meyer) wrote: > >Or perhaps they didn't see the sense of having their commands chewed > >up with little prospect of victory comensurate with the losses. > > Take a look at the following: > > http://www.armymedicine.army.mil/history/booksdocs/wwi/casualties/fig19.gif > > I don't see such a dramatic increase in casualty rates as you seem to > imply. Particularly when you adjust for the fact that CSA forces were > not fully equipped with rifled weapons until 1863. > > And further consider that there were about twice as many deaths due to > disease as in battle. CW armies killed lots of men even if they never > moved out of camp. And that certainly provided "little prospect of > victory commensurate with the losses." > > Maybe somebody could post the deaths in the Union army by year (by > month would be better?) > > The increase seems to me to be a little over 25 percent. Furthermore, don't the figures include the casualties in the western armies? Chuck Wilmot **** Subject: Re: Chewed Up was For Dr Simpson: Grant and his subordinates From: Michael Furlan Date: Wed, 13 Dec 2000 11:37:08 CST On Wed, 13 Dec 2000 11:10:47 CST, Chuck Wilmot wrote: >The increase seems to me to be a little over 25 percent. Furthermore, >don't the figures include the casualties in the western armies? Grant was in command of those troops too during that period, even though his HQ was in the east. **** Subject: Re: Attn: Brooks Simpson, "Missionary Ridge" From: Bill Wright Date: Wed, 13 Dec 2000 13:34:55 CST "Brooks D. Simpson" wrote: > > A good number of Thomas's biographers see the final charge > as pure impulse on the part the the soldiers of the Army of > the Cumberland. Indeed, it's funny to read these accounts, > which one way or another fall victim to the inherent need of > Thomas's biographers to denigrate Grant. Could you supply some names of these "biographers"? I've had a hard time finding a good biography of Thomas. Bill **** Subject: Question for Brooks Simpson From: "G. Wilkey Richardson" Date: Wed, 13 Dec 2000 16:07:52 CST In his book "The Generalship of Ulysses S. Grant", JFC Fuller criticizes Grant his inaction in 1864 against Sherman and Sheridan for what Fuller seemed to consider insubordination. In Sherman's case this was due to the failure to pursue Hood immediately after the fall of Atlanta, even thought Sherman's orders called out the AoT as Sherman's principal objective. For Sheridan, it was a similar failure to follow up on his victory at Cedar Creek; i.e. not following Early's army "to the death". Do you think Fuller's criticims valid or not? And why, of course. Thanx, Wilkey -- "Being disintegrated makes me *very* angry" -- M.T. Martian. **** Subject: Re: For Dr Simpson: Grant and his subordinates From: "G. Wilkey Richardson" Date: Wed, 13 Dec 2000 16:07:53 CST Brad Meyer wrote: > > > Also, Grant came as Pope's friend and the experience with Pope was > unlikely to help relations with another westerner and friend to boot. > > Brad Meyer > "It is history that teaches us to hope" > -- R E Lee I have never seen anything that event hinted at Grant and Pope being friends (or enemies, either). I would be interested in knowing the source for this. BTW, I do agree that the AoP's experience with Pope did prejudice them against generals from the West. Wilkey -- "Being disintegrated makes me *very* angry" -- M.T. Martian. **** Subject: Re: Attn: Brooks Simpson, "Missionary Ridge" From: "Donald Plezia" Date: Thu, 14 Dec 2000 10:40:28 CST There's a good one, free on : http://www.aotc.net/ You might try Francis McKinney's "Education in Violence". Van Horne's "Army of the Cumberland" is written with Thomas's cooperation. Buell's "Warrior General's" is sympathetic. There are a few other's that run in the same vein as Badeau's, Perret's and Smipson's idealized version's of Grant. Most of the rest are discussion's of his battles. -- Cordially, D. W. Plezia "Bill Wright" wrote in message news:3A37AA4D.1BA66B24@earthlink.net... > "Brooks D. Simpson" wrote: > > > > A good number of Thomas's biographers see the final charge > > as pure impulse on the part the the soldiers of the Army of > > the Cumberland. Indeed, it's funny to read these accounts, > > which one way or another fall victim to the inherent need of > > Thomas's biographers to denigrate Grant. > > Could you supply some names of these "biographers"? I've had > a hard time finding a good biography of Thomas. > > Bill > > **** From: "Brooks D. Simpson" Subject: Re: Attn: Brooks Simpson, "Missionary Ridge" Date: Thu, 14 Dec 2000 18:56:43 CST Robert Taubman wrote: > > What would be the real story then? What did happen as Missionary > Ridge if the versions as given in the Thomas biographies are not > factual? Grant intended for an assault up Missionary Ridge, first as an option, then as November 25 dragged on, as a certainty. The assault would take place in two stages: an initial rush to take the lines at the foot of the ridge, and then, after refroming, orders would go out to storm the crest. Reports at the time indicated that this was the plan. Grant explained it to Montgomery Meigs, who wired Washington with the description of the battle. Other reports filed before this controversy exploded confirm this version. A witness on Orchard Knob (a newspaper reporter named Shanks) noted that it was Thomas who grew worried and Grant who said to wait and see. The reports about an angry Grant did not emerge until later, around the time of the appearance of Battles and Leaders. Grant's annoyance was at the start of the second stage of the assault starting before he had given the okay. Read Thomas biographies (or Peter Cozzens or Tom Buell) and you will find interesting descriptions of Thomas's behavior that day. Few are supported by any evidence. > Who do we believe and why should I believe your version of > Grant's experiences? I have your Grant waiting to be read. I came to my conclusion about what happened only after reading many sources, several of which have never been incorporated before in an account of the battle (Shanks for one). I did not come to the matter with any fixed opinions. > Did all Thomas biographers "fall victim to the inherent need,,,,,,to > denigrate Grant."? I think that if you read McKinney, Cleaves, Buell, or to some extent Cozzens, you will come to the same conclusion. > If the need was indeed inherent with the biographers, was there any > valid reason for them to be so? Ask them. But I don't think you restore historical balance by simply taking the other side, and then hoping readers will split the difference. > Are you denigrating the Thomas biographers? I am offering an accurate description of their views on Grant and Thomas. > These questions are not intended to be rude but with all the differing > opinions, who should I believe? Well, read my account first, and then we'll talk. **** Subject: Re: Attn: Brooks Simpson, "Missionary Ridge" From: "Brooks D. Simpson" Date: Thu, 14 Dec 2000 18:57:14 CST Donald Plezia wrote: > There are a few other's that run in the same vein as Badeau's, Perret's and Smipson's idealized version's of Grant. I'm not sure any one who's actually read both my book and that by Geoffrey Perret confuses the two. And I believe that Perret is harder on Thomas than I am. I tend to think both men were responsible for what went on between them. But as Mr. Plezia has offered no evidence to support his assertion that my book is "idealized," I think it better not to tilt at windmills. **** Subject: Re: Question for Brooks Simpson From: "Brooks D. Simpson" Date: Thu, 14 Dec 2000 18:58:21 CST "G. Wilkey Richardson" wrote: > > In his book "The Generalship of Ulysses S. Grant", JFC Fuller > criticizes Grant his inaction in 1864 against Sherman and Sheridan > for what Fuller seemed to consider insubordination. > In Sherman's case this was due to the failure to pursue Hood > immediately after the fall of Atlanta, even thought Sherman's orders > called out the AoT as Sherman's principal objective. For Sheridan, > it was a similar failure to follow up on his victory at Cedar Creek; > i.e. not following Early's army "to the death". > > Do you think Fuller's criticims valid or not? And why, > of course. I'm less critical about the Grant-Sherman discussions after the fall of Atlanta (in which Grant got much of what he wanted before Sherman got his way--namely, a force to deal with Hood) than I am about Grant's failure to push Sheridan to cut the Virginia Central and the James River canal. Sheridan always came up with excuses, and Grant accepted them. I've contrasted that with the way Grant and Thomas bickered before nashville and concluded that in the end Grant and Sheridan had a bond of trust and Grant and Thomas did not. It's a little more than simply playing favorites, although I have faulted Grant for that, contrary to people who claim my version is "idealized." :)