Discussion with William G. Piston The following is the compilation of messages that constituted a discussion between newsgroup participants and the historian Dr. William G. Piston, author of Lee's Tarnished Lieutenant: James Longstreet and His Place in Southern History. Subject: William Garrett Piston - Special Guest From:rainbow@chickasaw.com (Brian Hampton) The moderators of news:soc.history.war.us-civil-war are proud to announce that William Garrett Piston, author of _Lee's Tarnished Lieutenant: James Longstreet and His Place in Southern History_, will be joining us in our discussions for approximately two weeks. The discussion period will begin March 8th, 1997 and end on March 24th. Dr. Piston's involvement will begin on March 10th. We would like to invite everyone to stop by and take advantage of this opportunity to discuss our favorite topic with a noted expert. Dr. Piston is currently an associate professor of history at Southwest Missouri State University in Springfield, MO where he teaches subjects related to Civil War history and is currently working on a book covering the battle of Wilson's Creek. Professor Piston regularly speaks at Civil War Round Table meetings and was recently a featured speaker at the Longstreet Symposium in Richmond, VA this past October. Besides his professional commitments, he is also an active board member of the Longstreet Memorial Fund, an organization currently raising money to build the first memorial to Lieutenant-General James Longstreet at the Gettysburg National Battlefield. According to Robert Thomas, the director of the Fund, Piston's book was one of the primary motivations for this project. While he is with us, Professor Piston should be considered an equal participant on the newsgroup, but one with an exceptional knowledge in certain areas of study. Please tailor your questions or comments to him accordingly. If you disagree with his conclusions, you should certainly feel free, even encouraged, to express this, but, as always, be polite. Even the experts make mistakes. Additionally, Professor Piston will attempt to respond to everyone who chooses to join the discussions, but please be aware that he may not be able to respond to everyone individually. This is our hobby. For him, it is a living. Appropriate topics of discussion for this event will include, but are not limited to, the following or some variation thereof: - James Longstreet - His participation in various Civil War battles - His relationship with the soldiers - His relationship with various Civil War figures - The Lost Cause and James Longstreet - His participation in post-war politics - The anti-Longstreet cabal - How the South viewed the end of the war and the influence on how we view history. These topics listed above are merely suggestions and should not be taken to limit the scope of discussion. Often, as we read a book or essay written by an expert in a specific field, many of us question the conclusions of the author. Even when we agree, we are sometimes left with even more questions that what we may have had before. Unfortunately, few of us ever get the opportunity to stand face to face with these authors to let them know how we feel about what they wrote. Well, here's your chance. Be certain to take full advantage of it. For information and updates, visit our web page at: http://www.chickasaw.com/~rainbow/soc/index.html -- The Moderators of soc.history.war.us-civil-war Subject: Longstreet and Lee From jdzik@aol.com Wed Feb 19 15:55:27 1997 > Longstreet's higher rank was not accidental. I'm curious about this. I know that Longstreet ranked Jackson when both were made lieutenant generals, and that this was intentionally done at a time when both men were prominent. However, I understood that this just followed from the fact that Longstreet had ranked Jackson when both were major generals. Were they both prominent at that time? Was Longstreet ranking Jackson as intentional when both were promoted to major generals as it was when both were promoted to lieutenant generals? From: rainbow@chickasaw.com (Brian Hampton) Date: Thu, 20 Feb 1997 14:00:23 GMT On Wed, 19 Feb 1997 20:55:27 GMT, in soc.history.war.us-civil-war jdzik@aol.com (JDzik) wrote: >I'm curious about this. I know that Longstreet ranked Jackson when both >were made lieutenant generals, and that this was intentionally done at a >time when both men were prominent. However, I understood that this just >followed from the fact that Longstreet had ranked Jackson when both were >major generals. Rather than attempt to explain this myself, I'll quote William Piston, inserting the sources he drew this information from: "Lee had some reservations about Jackson and felt the need to explain the desire to retain him [George Eggleston, _A Rebel's Collection_, pg. 153]. Lee reassured the president that his opinion of Jackson had been 'greatly enhanced' by the Maryland campaign [OR 19, pt. 2, pg. 643]. Privately, however, Lee expressed the opinion that Jackson was 'by no means as rapid a marcher as Longstreet' and that he had 'an unfortunate habit of never being on time.' Longstreet, however, he endorsed without hesitation or qualification." [Freeman, _Lee's Lieutenants_, vol. 2, pg. 247 ; Vandiver, _Mighty Stonewall_, pg. 406] An explanation about that last sentence: Lee's endorsement of Longstreet for lieutenant-general was given without explanation. One can conclude that no explanation was needed. His performance under Lee's command had been exceptional up to that time with hardly a single point on which Lee could offer criticism. In reports to Richmond, Lee had had nothing but praise for Longstreet, referring to him as a "capital soldier" and privately as "the staff in my right hand." Lee, apparently, did not feel it necessary to explain his requirements for promotion. Jackson, however, had severely botched his assignments during the Seven Days. The public at large may not have recognized this, but Lee was certainly aware of it as were officials in Richmond. His performance since that time had been outstanding, with the possible exception of Cedar Mountain. When Lee wrote his endorsement of Jackson, he did feel the need to explain to Richmond why he was doing so. When the promotions were handed out, Jackson was near the bottom of the list, Longstreet holding the position as the senior lieutenant-general in the Confederate army. Longstreet's previous promotion to major-general was due to Johnston's confidence him. Since Jackson was not with the army at that time, there is no relation between the two promotions. Johnston, incidentally, tried to have Longstreet promoted so that he could be second in command, but because of the former's riff with Davis, Richmond did not have a sympathetic ear. From jdzik@aol.com Thu Feb 20 11:33:21 1997 Brian Hampton writes: > When the promotions were handed out, Jackson was near the bottom of > the list, Longstreet holding the position as the senior > lieutenant-general in the Confederate army. Thanks for a most informative post. A question on this quoted section: I thought that Longstreet's promotion was dated one day in advance of Jackson's, thus resulting in Longstreet having the higher rank. Were there other Lt Generals also promoted the same day as Longstreet? How were the details of order within rank handled other then through dating promotions? Also, while you are certainly correct that Jackson had done poorly during the Seven Days, which might in itself be sufficient for the order of ranks, wasn't the fact that Longstreet had ranked Jackson when both were major generals sufficient in the absence of unusual circumstances to explain the ordering of promotions? Finally, you imply that there were other lt generals appointed at the same time as Longstreet and Jackson. Do you happen to know what the relative ordering of these men were both as major generals and lieutenant generals? If Jackson had moved down the list, I'd expect that to have been an implied criticism of him. Then again, if the rank orders stayed roughly the same, I'd expect the ordering to be more neutral. From William G. Piston Date: Fri, 14 Mar 1997 23:10:56 GMT > From: jdzik@aol.com (JDzik) > Newsgroups: soc.history.war.us-civil-war > Subject: Re: Longstreet and Lee > I thought that Longstreet's promotion was dated one day in advance > of Jackson's, thus resulting in Longstreet having the higher rank. > Were there other Lt Generals also promoted the same day as Longstreet? > How were the details of order within rank handled other then through > dating promotions? For a complete list of promotions and their dates of seniority, see Charles C. Jones, A ROSTER OF GENERAL OFFICERS, HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS, SENATORS, REPRESENTATIVES, MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS, &C &C, IN THE CONFEDERATE SERVICE DURING THE WAR BETWEEN THE STATES (Rochmond: Southern Historical Society, 1876). I do not have a copy, by my notes indicate that of the seven major generals appointed to rank from October 11, five out-ranked Jackson. In other words, the men were listed in order of intended seniority in the bill passed by the Confederate Congress. On this list, Jackson was number six out of seven. To judge whether there was implied criticism of Jackson, you should check the dates of rank in the prewar army. By having his commission date one day earlier, Longstreet was being singled out, given clear seniority over the whole group, not just Jackson. His prewar rank alone would not justify this distinction. Subject: Longstreet and McLaws From: rainbow@chickasaw.com (Brian Hampton) Date: Fri, 07 Mar 1997 18:14:40 GMT Professor Piston: The relationship between James Longstreet and LaFayette McLaws is, in my opinion, one of the least understood yet potentially one of the most illuminating relationships of Civil War. We see in this relationship examples of the best and the worst in men’s behavior, both in terms of how the two treated each other and how their abilities as commanders contributed to or detracted from the cause of victory. Close friends at the beginning of the war, Longstreet and McLaws were enemies by war’s end. The events that occurred during the war to cause this dramatic shift in feeling and how the two men reacted to the changed circumstances of their relationship tells us a lot about how petty men could be and how selfless they could become despite the past. Three moments stand out in my mind as the most defining points in the Longstreet-McLaws relationship, and I wonder if you could give your thoughts on any or all of the following points. I realize this is a rather detailed question, so if you feel a more general statement on all of this would be more appropriate, that would be most welcome. 1) After the battle of Gettysburg, McLaws wrote a letter in which he severely criticized Longstreet’s handling of the battle on July 2nd. After the war, this letter was used by the anti-Longstreet cabal as support for their claims that Longstreet had grossly failed on that field; however, McLaws himself apparently never agreed with these claims as presented. Glen Tucker, in his book _Lee and Longstreet at Gettysburg_ argues that the animosity McLaws held toward Longstreet for his Gettysburg performance was misplaced and that Longstreet’s actions were motivated by directives from Lee. >From what I understand, McLaws’ problem with Longstreet was, basically, that he was too intrusive. Rather than issuing orders and allowing the division commander to carry out those orders, Longstreet took control of McLaws’ division’s part in the battle, at least until the forces were fully engaged. According to Tucker, Longstreet did this because Lee had expressed some doubts as to McLaws’ ability to carry out orders, and Longstreet wanted to ensure that everything in McLaws’ command went according to plan. In other words, Longstreet exceeded his responsibilities in order to protect McLaws from the negative judgment of Lee. Does any evidence exist to support Tucker’s claim? Regardless of that, was Longstreet out of line in his handling of that portion of the battle? Does this event set the stage for what was to come later in East Tennessee? 2) The permanent rift in the Longstreet-McLaws relationship occurred in East Tennessee when Longstreet relieved his division commander from duty, citing his failure to energetically carry out his orders. This was specifically a result of McLaws’s failures in the assault on Fort Sanders, but the incident seems to have deeper roots. In your book, you state that Longstreet’s actions in relieving McLaws were justified and further argue that he probably should have relieved McLaws earlier. Other Longstreet historians, both defenders and detractors, seem to disagree with you. Jeffry Wert argues that reliving McLaws was not justified and that this incident shows the limits of Longstreet’s abilities to effectively control his subordinates. Many Longstreet critics point to the incident as indicative of Longstreet’s hypocrisy. If McLaws deserved to be relived of command after the Knoxville campaign, they argue, then didn’t Longstreet deserve to be relieved of command after his similar actions in the Gettysburg campaign? What led to McLaws being relieved of command, and why do you feel this was justified? If McLaws did deserve to be relieved, does any truth exist to the claim that Longstreet deserved to be relieved after Gettysburg as well? 3) After the war, when the anti-Longstreet cabal emerged, LaFayette McLaws was in a prime position to publicly express his complaints with his former corps commander. If he had been a man bent on revenge, he most certainly could have had it. However, flying in the face of conventional wisdom, McLaws chose to argue against the outlandish daylight order theory and the charges that Longstreet had been grossly insubordinate. His reasons for doing this, of course, were not a desire to defend Longstreet, rather to defend Lee. McLaws felt that, in reality, these charges shed more negative light on Lee than on Longstreet since the former would have been an incompetent commander to have allowed these things to occur without reprimand. In my opinion, McLaws had a very good point. Were the members of the anti-Longstreet cabal aware of the inherent contradiction in their charges? Did they really believe what they said about Longstreet, or did they convince themselves through their own blind illogic? From: pete-hughes@slb.com (Pete Hughes) Date: Mon, 10 Mar 1997 22:30:47 GMT [tangential question] In article <33285af0.24082358@news.earthlink.net>, rainbow@chickasaw.com says... >[....] Longstreet took control of >McLaws’ division’s part in the battle, at least until the forces were fully >engaged. Longstreet, McLaws, and Lee discussed the July 2 attack in the presence of Johnston, the engineer/scout. Lee was overheard to correct McLaws+Longstreet as to the starting point and axis of the attack. Has anyone speculated what Longstreet had actually asked McLaws to do, and what Lee's correction actually was? Also, since Lee seems to have requested an 'attack up the Emmitsburg Road', and Hood/McLaws went perpendicular to the road, did Lee not get his way after all? From: (William G. Piston) Date: Fri, 14 Mar 1997 23:10:59 GMT The letter McLaws wrote just just after Gettysburg, calling Longstreet humbug and portraying him as interferring with everyone, was never read by Jubal Early. It never became part of the postwar controversy. In my opinion, McLaws was writing in the passion of the moment, at a time when he was angry. This warped his judgement. A large number of people left descriptions of Longstreet at Gettysburg. They described him as calm, collected, and professional in his conduct. Only McLaws suggested that Longstreet was nervous, irritable, and obnoxious. I agree with Tucker that the things which irritated McLaws were the result of Longstreet following Lee's directives. The fact that Mclaws never made this wartime letter public suggests that when enough time passed for him to cool down, he too realized that Lee rather than Logstreet was at fault. Regarding McLaws, Knoxville, and the various controversies in East Tenessee, etc., I refer you to my dissertation, which had about fifty more pages on the subject than the book does. If you cannot get a copy via interlibrary loan, try University Microfilms, 300 N. Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106. I think, however, that I was probably too harsh in my judgement of McLaws, and too defensive of Longstreet in regard to their relationship. Certainly the episode shows Longstreet at his worst, and were I to go over it all again I might conclude that McLaws's removal was not justified. I still believe, however, that Longstreet was fully justified in his actions regarding McIvor Law. Did Early & Co. really believe their charges against Longstreet? Jubal Early was not a confused individual misled by a devotion to Lee. He was unmitigated, willful liar who knew full well that there was not a grain of truth in his charges against Longstreet. None of Lee's staff officers endorsed his sunrise attack claims, but Early repeated them to the day of his death. The Rev. J. William Jones, editor of the Southern Historical Society Papers, certainly took an unChristian joy in the destruction of Longstreet's reputation, and since he worked closely with Early to stack the deck against Longstreet I can't see how he would NOT have known that he was spreading lies. William Nelson Pendleton, however, was so confused mentally that he may actually have believed the nonsense he spouted. Lee's reputation became caught up in Parson Pendleton's religious fanaticism, and he may have believed the lies he told. From William G. Piston Date: Fri, 14 Mar 1997 23:11:03 GMT [Pete Hughes writes:] > Longstreet, McLaws, and Lee discussed the July 2 attack in the > presence of Johnston, the engineer/scout. Lee was overheard to > correct McLaws+Longstreet as to the starting point and axis of > the attack. Has anyone speculated what Longstreet had actually > asked McLaws to do, and what Lee's correction actually was? Also, > since Lee seems to have requested an 'attack up the Emmitsburg > Road', and Hood/McLaws went perpendicular to the road, did Lee > not get his way after all? One of the mysteries of Gettysburg involves the Lee-Longstreet-McLaws debate over the angle of McLaws's attack, and the meaning of the phrase "up the Emmitsburg Road." This is a difficult issue to discuss without a map. Our knowledge regarding Lee's intention is limited to his battle report, only six pages of which make any mention of tactical dispositions. Let me give you my thoughts as best I can without a map. No one knows precisly how Lee wanted McLaws aligned, or why Longstreet objected to the angle. I can offer speculation only. The plan was to strike the Federal flank, which was thought to be in the air. I think Lee may have made two erroneous assumptions. First, that the Emmitsburg Road ran closely parallel to Cemetery Ride for most of its length. Second, that this offered the Federals a position comparable to the Confederate one at Fredericksburg. In other words, Lee thought the Federals were dug in both atop the ridge and along its base. Therefore an attack "up the Emmitsburg Road" would catch them on the flank. If Longstreet thought the southern end of the Emmitsburg Road ran some distance west of Cemetery Ridge (as we know it does), he would have assigned McLaws a slightly different angle of attack. Thus the dispute. In any case, once Hood and McLaws had made their flank march and began deploying from column into line, their movements were influenced by the local terrain. What neither Lee no Longstreet could see was the strong belt of trees and series of rock walls through which the troops had to pass. Here a map is crucial. See, for example, Map 8-1 in Pfanz's GETTYSBURG; THE SECOND DAY. Since the point was to make a surprise attack, the troops remained under cover until more or less the last minute. Thus thanks to the alignment of available cover, rather than what either Lee or Longstreet had discussed, Hood and McLaws took up positions more nearly perpendicular to the Emmitsburg Road than parallel to it. Such adjustments were routine, as no commander, contemplating sweeping movements, could anticipate precise local conditions. This means (again, a map would help here) that to attack "up the Emmitsburg Road" Longstreet would have had to order a gigantic left wheel. That is, in fact, very roughly what Law's brigade did. The real trouble, of course, is that the Federal position extended much further south than either Lee or Longstreet realized when plans were being formulted. Subject: Longstreet Fire From: sdodson@access.mountain.net (B. Haines) Date: Sat, 08 Mar 1997 20:46:37 GMT Mr. Piston, What is your opinion on the fire that destroyed Longstreet's home and belongings? Do you think it was of suspicious origin? From William G. Piston Date: Fri, 14 Mar 1997 23:10:23 GMT > From: sdodson@access.mountain.net (B. Haines) > Mr. Piston, > > What is your opinion on the fire that destroyed Longstreet's > home and belongings? Do you think it was of suspicious origin? I have never encountered any information regarding the origin of the fire other than the statement that it occurred. Fires were common in the 19th century and I have no reason to believe it was not accidental. Subject: Longstreet's Staff From: dmsmith001@aol.com (Dave Smith) Date: Sat, 08 Mar 1997 20:48:42 GMT Dr. Piston: We know from their extensive memoirs the members of General Lee's staff, but we also hear of the inadequacies of General Lee's staff as a functioning unit. Could you compare and contrast General Longstreet's handling and use of his staff with other corps or army commanders? From William G. Piston Date: Fri, 14 Mar 1997 23:10:35 GMT > We know from their extensive memoirs the members of General Lee's > staff, but we also hear of the inadequacies of General Lee's staff > as a functioning unit. Could you compare and contrast General > Longstreet's handling and use of his staff with other corps or army > commanders? Professor R.L. DiNardo of St.Peter's College, Jersey City, NJ, is currently working on a project to compare the make-up, quality, and functioning of the staffs of Civil War generals. I hope this will appear in a major journal before too long. Even Longstreet's worst detractors, Eckenrode and Conrad, the author's of a hatchet-job biography on Longstreet in the 1930s, were impressed with his staff, calling it the finest in the Confederacy. I agree. The success of Longstreet's staff was based on two things: the quality of the personnel and the way it functioned. Although Longstreet had some dead weight on his staff (Walton, his chief of artillery early in the war), and at least one officer who owed his position to kinship, Longstreet selected staff officers based on energy and ability, without regard to previous military service. Most important of all, he gave them clear instructions and delegated responsibility to them. A sharp contrast exists between Longstreet's staff and Jackson's. Although Jackson's staff contained some very talented officers, Jackson treated them like glorified messenger boys. He was obsessively secretive of his plans, and when he dispatched them with messages they were unable to assist the recipients of them. Longstreet on the other hand kept his staff fully informed of his overall intentions, and granted them the authority to modify his instructions if circumstances warranted. In short, Longstreet built up a system of mutual trust and responsibility which made his staff the best in the war. Subject: Metropolitan Police Force From: furlanm@tao.agoron.com (Michael Furlan) Date: Sun, 09 Mar 1997 05:13:19 GMT Dr. Piston, How did Longstreet get named head of the Metropolitan Police Force in New Orleans after the war? From: "William G. Davis" Date: Mon, 10 Mar 1997 23:42:10 GMT > But why [did Longstreet end up in] New Orleans? I'm not absolutely sure, but what I recall from Jeffrey Wert's bio of Longstreet (its been three years since I read someone else's copy) is that he was pretty much run out of other Civil Service jobs, and this came up and Grant needed someone from the south to do it, and someone who could be trusted. In the end, the whole thing backfired as Longstreet, riding in front of the black Metro Police confronted some dissidents who were occupying some government buildings (maybe even holding the mayor??). They pulled Longstreet from his horse and held him until Grant sent regular troops to the rescue. A rather ignominious end to the whole affair. I think it is shameful that a man who served the CSA so brilliantly in war was treated with such abject scorn in peace. I fear that it was his "Republicanism" and close friendship with Grant that might be at the heart of it all. I also blame Lee, a bit, for he could have said or written something after the war to ease things for some of his Generals (i.e. he could have made a peace overture to Pickett, too, but he didn't, apparently) W. G. "Jeff" Davis From: Mike Ralls Date: Fri, 14 Mar 1997 04:41:01 GMT > I also blame Lee, a bit, for he could have said or written > >something after the war to ease things for some of his Generals (i.e. he > >could have made a peace overture to Pickett, too, but he didn't, > >apparently) Lee and Pickett met some years after the war. It was a rather uncufterable meeting. After he left, Pickett said to a companion, "That man destroyed my devision" It's discribed in shelby Foote's "Stars in there Courses: The Gettysburg campaign." From William G. Piston Date: Fri, 14 Mar 1997 23:10:41 GMT > How did Longstreet get named head of the Metropolitan Police Force in New > Orleans after the war? Amid the very convoluted politics of Louisiana during Reconstruction there was a significant power struggle between the state capital, Baton Rouge, and New Orleans. Much of the oppostion to the carpetbaggers was centered in New Orleans. One way to combat that was to transform positions which were ordinarily elected or appointed locally into positions appointed by the governor. Thus as state adjutant general and commander of the state militia Longstreet was given authority over the New Orleans police, a force which had come to represent the state-level carpetbag government rather than the New Orleans city government. Subject: Longstreet: Repected? Feared? Loved? From: bigg@execpc.com (Dave Gorski) Date: Sun, 09 Mar 1997 20:42:26 GMT Professor Piston, So often I read about the love that the confederate soldier had for Gen Lee. The confidence and love that Stonewall Jackson's men had for him. The fear and dislike of Bragg's troops for him. I cannot recall reading much, if any, on the relationship that Gen Longstreet had with his troops. Why is this ? Does it have anything to do with Longstreet's post war activity ? Could you comment on the relatiosnhip that Longstreet had with his soldiers ? Thanks much, Dave Gorski From William G. Piston Date: Fri, 14 Mar 1997 23:10:48 GMT > So often I read about the love that the confederate soldier had for Gen > Lee. The confidence and love that Stonewall Jackson's men had for him. The > fear and dislike of Bragg's troops for him. I cannot recall reading much, if > any, on the relationship that Gen Longstreet had with his troops. Why is this? [snips] > Could you comment on the relatiosnhip that Longstreet had with his soldiers ? During the war itself, Longstreet held the affection of his men as completely as did Lee or Jackson. Perhaps the most significant testimony regarding this comes from Sir Arthur Fremantle, the British soldier who acompanied Lee's army during the Gettysburg campaign. Fremantle, by the way, was an intelligent observer, not the prissy fop portrayed in Ted Turner's "Gettysburg." In his diary, published as THREE MONTHS IN THE CONFEDERATE STATES, Fremantle testifies to the high regrad the common soldiers had for Longstreet. Subject: Western Concentration From: Drazen Kramaric Date: Tue, 11 Mar 1997 12:34:54 GMT Dr Piston, I am interested why President Davis agreed with Lee's proposal for invasion of Maryland in Spring/Summer of 1863. Davis was Mississippian, his own words are that: "Vicksburg is a nail which hold two parts of Confederacy together." But he eventually allowed Lee to take 75000 troops towards North. What was Lee's objective? Was that objective real one? Was Lee's strategical vision limited only on Virginian theatre? Does it mean that he possibly conducted his own private campaign not realizing what's happening in the west? Did Lee think that Johnson had enough resources for relief of Vicksburg? Was it possible to detach Longstreet with two or three divisions to the Mississippi in time to break Union siege of Vicksburg while Lee could spend summer in training of his two newly promoted Corps commanders? I'd preciate your opinion very much. Thanks for your time and effort. Respectfully, Drax From: "William Piston" Date: Tue, 01 Apr 1997 22:37:47 GMT Dear Drax, Your questions are complex. Whole books have been written on these topics. Before I give you, briefly, my thoughts, let me recommend a book which influenced me: Thomas L. Connelly and Archer Jones, THE POLITICS OF COMMAND; FACTIONS AND IDEAS IN CONFEDERATE STRATEGY. This book contributed to my decision to go to the Univ. of SC for graduate school, as the late Tom Connelly taught there. He was my direct mentor. Archer, who has since retired and now lives in his native Richmond, has also been a mentor to me. In this book Connelly and Jones discuss the wide variety of people who attempted to influence Davis' strategic direction of the war. They conclude that Lee, naturally concerned about his own army and prejudiced in favor of defending his native state, convinced Davis to focus disproportionate resources in the Virginia theater early in the war. There arose, however, an informal group which Connelly and Jones label the Western Concentration Bloc. This included Texas Senator Louis T. Wigfall, and generals J.E. Johnston and P.G.T. Beauregard; Longstreet eventually joined the group. They argued for a re-allocation of resources to defend the west, which they saw as the South's strategic, economic, and agricultural heartland. In the wake of Lee's defeat at Gettysburg they managed to convince Davis to despatch Longstreet to the west. This failed because it was a case of too little too late, because of Longstreet's inability to work with Bragg, and because of Davis' refusal to remove Bragg. You will also find the same argument, with some modification, in Herman Hattaway and Archer Jones' HOW THE NORTH WON; A MILITARY HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR, which is by far the best one-volume military study of the conflict. Historians continue to debate Lee's objectives for the summer of 1863, partly because his letters to Davis that spring can be subject to various interpretations, and partly because Lee's report following the Gettysburg campaign provides so little information regarding his intentions (it is one of the sketchiest and most unsatisfactory reports of the war). Hattaway and Jones argue that Lee intended his invasion of the North as a raid, meant to disrupt Union plans and sustain his forces at the enemy's expense. However, Tom Connelly in THE MARBLE MAN and Alan T. Nolan, in LEE CONSIDERED argue that the move was characteristic of Lee's aggressive strategy, and that Lee sought climactic battles that might end the war by devastating Northern morale. My conclusions, influenced by the above books, combining some of their ideas, but downplaying others: Lee was not conducting a private campaign. I disagree with Connelly here, for I do not see Lee's love of Virginia so strong a factor that it warped his strategic vision. Influenced it, yes; warped it, no. Instead, I agree with Nolan that Lee's primary limiting factor was his consistent commitment to an aggressive, offensive strategy. Believing battlefield victories were the key to destroying Northern morale, Lee accepted a high casualty rate and as a result pleaded that he be reinforced at the expense of other theaters. Had Lee been assigned to command in Tennessee I think he would have acted in precisely the same way, asking Davis to take risks in Virginia to reinforce Tennessee. In other words, I see Lee's bias as the natural tendency of every commander to see his command as the most important one, and to downplay or rationalize the needs of others or the significance of events elsewhere. I think Lee's success in Longstreet's absence suggests that had Longstreet (or anyone, for that matter) been sent west earlier, Lee could have kept Meade at bay even without a major battle. What, after all, did Meade accomplish from July 4, 1863 until Grant took command? Whether Longstreet or anyone leading reinforcements could have saved Vicksburg is another matter, however. The absolute dominance of the western riverways by the Union navy was in my opinion one of the greatest factors in the Union triumph. No action on land by Longstreet (or Lee, or Jackson) could over come the challenge posed by Mr. Ead's ugly but unstoppable ironclads. Subject: Lee as a Commander From: s065637@student.uq.edu.au (Kevin Jordan) Date: Wed, 12 Mar 1997 05:09:52 GMT Dear Dr. Piston, I have long felt that Lee was a magnificent motivator/leader, a great tactician, less so a strategist but a poor commander. His excessive politeness and gentleness and inability to be "tough" meant that too often his orders were not obeyed and yet Lee failed to follow up with appropriate disciplinary action. Would you please comment? Did this cost the Confederacy dear? Kevin Jordan From: "Dick Winningstad" Date: 13 Mar 1997 05:34:37 GMT s065637@student.uq.edu.au wrote in article <332a3a8f.921692@news.chickasaw.com>... Poor commander? Didn't Lee hold off armies that were 2-4 times larger for 3 plus years? There were instances where Lee's orders were not followed to the letter, but compared to the Army of the Potomac, those instances were much fewer. Tacticly, Lee was brilliant his actions in 1864 are testament to that. Strategicly I know the grounds are less solid, but I believe he was more than adequate. If the South had won Antietam or Gettysburg, we may very well have had two countries today. From: "William Piston" Date: Tue, 01 Apr 1997 22:37:59 GMT To Mr. Jordan re Lee's command style and effectiveness: The best writing on this topic is an article by Jay Luvaas in THE JOURNAL OF MILITARY HISTORY several years ago. I believe the title was "Lee and the Operational Art of War." Unfortunately, I gave my back copies of that journal to a local library, and although I kept a xerox of Luvaas' article, darned if I can find it in the chaos of my file drawers. I am going on memory for Luvaas' definitions, but he argues that while Lee had many talents, his greatest strength lay not at the strategic level (the direction of the nation's military forces to achieve the war's goals), or at the tactical level (the direction of forces in combat), but in operations (the direction of forces within a theater to achieve decisive concentration). Lee usually left the direction of battle to his subordinates, because without modern communications a commander's ability to direct a battle once joined was minimal. As every commander's style is different, it is difficult to make judgements. The testimony that Lee inspired people is overwhelming. Whether he could have achieved more had he been tougher on his subordinates is a matter of speculation. Certainly his hands-off command style is not suited for every general or every occasion, regardless of the limits of nineteenth century communications. Had Wellington commanded at Waterloo as Lee did at Gettysburg, he would have lost. I would argue that Lee's command style changed over time, but with hindsight more slowly than it should have. During the summer of 1862 he had difficulty directing the army. Hardly surprising, as he was new at his job. His solution was to locate men he could trust (Longstreet and Jackson) and have others transferred elsewhere. With subordinates he trusted, Lee was free to concentrate at the operational level, leaving tactics to them. This policy produced amazing successes as long as Lee had Longstreet and Jackson. Indeed, it marked the Army of Northern Virginia at its best. Unfortunately, Lee retained a hands-off style following Jackson's death. This was a failing on his part. Neither A.P. Hill nor Richard S. Ewell were up to corps-level command, yet Lee retained the hands-off style until Longstreet was wounded at the Wilderness. From May 1864-on Lee took part in the tactical direction of his army to a far greater degree than he had ever done before, as his corps commanders were simply not up to the tasks facing them. Subject: Lee After Jackson From: s065637@student.uq.edu.au (Kevin Jordan) Date: Wed, 12 Mar 1997 05:10:00 GMT Professor Piston, After Jacksons death Lee never successfully mounted a large attack and never attempted any sweeping manoeuvres. In your opinion how much of Lee's reputation for brilliance depends upon Jackson? Kevin Jordan From: IhateSpam@address.fake (Eric Smith [see .sig]) Date: Tue, 18 Mar 1997 05:18:21 GMT s065637@student.uq.edu.au writes: >After Jacksons death Lee never successfully mounted a large attack and >never attempted any sweeping manoeuvres. In your opinion how much of Lee's >reputation for brilliance depends upon Jackson? I would call the battle of Gettysburg a "large attack." It would seem more correct to say that after Gettysburg, Lee never mounted a large attack and was continually on the defensive, but that would seem to be more due to being outnumbered in men and materiel than to the loss of Jackson. From: mortrep@aol.com (MortRep) Date: Wed, 26 Mar 1997 12:28:36 GMT If it had been Jackson, not Ewell, at Gettysburg that first day, I believe he would have found it "practicable" to take Cemetery Hill that evening. Lee must have known that. From: rcarter@orion.it.luc.edu (Robert W. Carter) Date: Wed, 26 Mar 1997 20:46:43 GMT MortRep (mortrep@aol.com) wrote: : If it had been Jackson, not Ewell, at Gettysburg that first day, : I believe he would have found it "practicable" to take Cemetery Hill : that evening. Lee must have known that. This question has been dealt with several times on this board, so I will summarize what has been said in the past. There is little disagreement that Lt. Gen. Richard Ewell does not belong in the company of great soldiers, and he was certainly limited in his talents as á corps commander. However, judgments of his actions at Gettysburg have not always been fair. On the morning of July 1, after learning that A.P. Hill had encountered Buford's cavalry and Reynold's First Corp, Ewell rushed Rodes' and Early's divisions to Hill's assistance. He informed General Lee of this decisions, and received a reply which stated that is Ewell found the enemy force "very large" Lee wished to avoid a general engagement until the rest of the army was up. When Ewell arrived on the scene, he recognized the impossibility of avoiding an engagement. During the next three and a half hours, Ewell's corps decisively defeated the Union troops he faced, sweeping them from the field and taking over 3,000 prisoners. Ewell's actions were far from indecisive, would have pleased even Jackson, and were undertaken despite cautionary orders from his commanding general. After attacking through Gettysburg, which effected his unit's cohesion, Ewell decided to attack Cemetery Hill >if If it had been Jackson, not Ewell, at Gettysburg that first day, I >believe he would have found it "practicable" to take Cemetery Hill that >evening. Lee must have known that. Which Jackson? If Jackson of the Valley and Chancellorsville had been there, you might be right. Then again, if Jackson of the Seven Days had been there, he probably would not have bothered attacking at all, with the result that the Union would never have been pushed back to Cemetery Hill in the first place. From: "William Piston" Date: Tue, 01 Apr 1997 22:38:06 GMT To Mr. Jordan re Jackson's maneuvers: Having read the above [reference to subject line "Lee as a Commander"], you will not be surprised that I think Lee's ability to maneuver was not dependent upon on Jackson's brilliance, but that it was a significant factor. How much credit to give a commander, as opposed to his subordinate, if difficult to answer. Certainly Lee benefitted continuously from Jackson's tremendous abilities. Nevertheless, a reading of Lee's letters to Davis in which he discusses and debates what moves his army might make convinces me that Luvaas is right in his interpretation. Jackson executed Lee's plans brilliantly, but they were Lee's plans. Could Lee have perfomed the same sorts of manuevers with Hill and Ewell? We do know that he tried. His campaigns from May 1863 through May 1864 may have suffered from Jackson's absence, and Longstreet's detachment, but Lee's plans remained aggressive. That he achieved little suggests that even Lee, one of history's great commanders, owed his success in part to his subordinates. The same is true, of course, for other great leaders. Subject: Longstreet, attn: Prof. Piston From: Don Roberson & Rita Carratello Date: Fri, 14 Mar 1997 03:55:34 GMT Prof Piston: I came upon your Longstreet book at Gettysburg last year (a long trip from my home in Calif.), and was so impressed by the revisionist history that I tracked down a hardcover to keep and gave copies to the few friends who have a Civil War passing interest. I am far removed from the amateur debates I now see on this chat group (just "discovered" this week). I am particularly interested in hearing about the professional response your work. For example, Wiley Sword's 1995 book on the Chattanooga campaign (_Mountains Touched with Fire_) is still quite negative about Longstreet (e.g., "scheming" to replace Bragg, etc). What has been the professional response your work? What are the current lines of debate on Longstreet and "who's who" in the debate? [I'm also looking forward to your Wilson's Creek book; as it happens, I plan to visit there in late March] - Don Roberson From: "William Piston" Date: Tue, 01 Apr 1997 22:38:14 GMT [Don Roberson wrote:] > I am particularly interested in hearing about > the professional response your work. For example, Wiley Sword's 1995 > book on the Chattanooga campaign (_Mountains Touched with Fire_) is > still quite negative about Longstreet (e.g., "scheming" to replace > Bragg, etc). What has been the professional response your work? What are > the current lines of debate on Longstreet and "who's who" in the debate? To Mr. Roberson: I have answered your question in part in relation to the questions of others, but I will expand upon it brielfy here. I was writing about Longsreet and his place in history in terms of the big picture. Were I to examine any one battle in detail I might now reach negative conclusions about Longstreet in relation to that event. My goal was not to free Longstreet from all criticism, nor close my mind to future negative conclusions of my peers in regard to him. I did want to demonstrate why so much bias existed against Longstreet. I hoped to free Longstreet from what I saw as a double standard, from the fact that actions which in any other man would be viewed creditable are in Longstreet's case interpreted negatively. The foremost example is the way in which Lee's affection for Longstreet -- the fact that they spend so much time together, camped together, etc. -- has been twisted into evidence that Lee didn't trust him and wanted to keep a close eye on him. In terms of who is who in the current debate, I would not presume to speak for my colleagues. However, I believe that the extant writings of the following historians, all active and likely to produce more works, suggest that they believe Longstreet's strengths outweighed his weaknesses: Jeffrey Wert, Gary Gallagher, Carol Reardon, Herman Hattaway, Archer Jones, Allan Nolan, and Gordon Rhea. The following would likely disagree: Bob Krick, Emory Thomas, Steven Woodworth, and Richard McMurray. Subject: Longstreet's Papers From: dmsmith001@aol.com (Dave Smith) Dr. Piston: General Longstreet's home in Georgia burned to the ground in the late 1800s, and with it perished most of the General's papers. What aspects of General Longstreet would you like to have seen answered had those papers survived? From: rainbow@chickasaw.com (William G. Piston) Date: Fri, 14 Mar 1997 23:11:15 GMT Had Longstreet's papers survived the fire, we might have additional information concerning Longstreet's writing of his memoirs, his correspondence with friends and his former staff officers, discusing how to respond to the lies told by Early & Co. But even more important, we might have letters from the antebellum and wartime periods in which Longstreet reveled more clearly his personality and nature. I wish we had a large number of letters to and from family members discussing the ordinary events of their lives -- their hopes, dreams, and passions. The letters of Robert E. Lee, for example, offer a window into his light-hearted side, his difficult marriage, his concerns for his children. We know almost nothing about Longstreet's private life. I think that is the great loss in regard to the fire. Subject: Alignment of July 2nd attack From: "James F. Epperson" Date: Fri, 14 Mar 1997 18:00:15 -0600 On Fri, 14 Mar 1997, William G. Piston wrote: > Thus > thanks to the alignment of available cover, rather than what either Lee or > Longstreet had discussed, Hood and McLaws took up positions more nearly > perpendicular to the Emmitsburg Road than parallel to it. ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ Is this a typo for parallel? My understanding is the Hood and McLaws aligned =along= the road, roughly, thus their axis of advance was perpendicular to the road. If Prof. Piston really means "perpendicular" here, then my understanding of the battle has been very confused for a long time. Jim Epperson http://members.aol.com/jfepperson/causes.html "Just once, I wish we would encounter an alien menace that wasn't immune to bullets" -- The Brigadier, "Dr. Who" From: "William G. Davis" Date: 19 Mar 1997 18:47:16 -0600 James F. Epperson wrote in article ... > Is this a typo for parallel? My understanding is the Hood and McLaws > aligned =along= the road, roughly, thus their axis of advance was > perpendicular to the road. If Prof. Piston really means "perpendicular" > here, then my understanding of the battle has been very confused for a > long time. I believe that it might be somewhere in between. The lines of Hood and McLaws were more aligned with what is now called Confederate Avenue as it crosses the Emmitsburg Road (Confederate Avenue more closely follows the crest of Seminary Ridge as it runs south), thus putting them at an angle to the Emmitsburg Road. In actuality, therefore, neither parallel nor perpendicular is quite correct. W. G. Jeff Davis pa79th@epix.net From: (William G. Piston) Date: Thu, 20 Mar 1997 02:25:49 GMT James F. Epperson wrote > Is this a typo for parallel? Yes, I goofed. I wrote perpendicular when I meant parallel. What I should have written is that thanks to local ground cover Longstreet's attack on July 2 was more nearly parallel to the Emmitsburg Road than perpendicular to it. Sorry for the confusion. I wish I had the technology to scan and mark maps as part of our discussion. Subject: Longstreet's Opinion From: Christopher Cornish Date: 15 Mar 1997 21:05:07 GMT I am curious about a comment Longstreet makes in his articles on the Gettysburg battle collected in the Annals of War. He maintains that even if the ANV had successfully driven the Federals from their position on the second day (which he believed was the only possible time for success) by a coordinated attack on the Union right that did not occur, the overall result of such a victory would not have been great. He believed the army had already taken too many casualties to offer another fight or even pursuit; especially since a defeated Federal army would have fallen back on the fortifications around Washington. Lee would have been forced to return to Virginia after the battle. Longstreet, of course, maintained that by attacking Lee made a terrible blunder. The original plan was to force the Federals to attack on ground of their choosing by either threatening a large Northern city or by getting between the AoP and Washington and, if the Federals failed in their attack, then destroying the retreating army in detail. From previous battles, this seemed a reasonable outcome. By attacking the Federals as they stood on defense, Longstreet says the ANV could not hope to both defeat them and destroy them because of the terrible casualties attacking armies had to expect. It would have been a moral victory that would have taken some sting out of the fall of Vicksburg, but Longstreet appears to feel it would not have had much overall effect on the course of the war. Since Longstreet had probably the best understanding of the limits of attack on the battlefield, I think his analysis may be the best concerning the outcome of a Confederate victory. From: IhateSpam@address.fake (Eric Smith [see .sig]) Date: Wed, 19 Mar 1997 02:18:14 GMT Christopher Cornish writes: > Since Longstreet had probably the best understanding of the limits >of attack on the battlefield, I think his analysis may be the best >concerning the outcome of a Confederate victory. This may well have been correct from a strictly military standpoint, but from a political standpoint the appearance of a victorious Southern army loose in the North (assuming the Army of the Potomac fell back on Washington), that might threaten Northern cities like Philadelphia, would had to have had an effect like a thunderbolt. The pressure on Lincoln to come to a negotiated settlement would have been enormous from some quarters, and the incentives for England or France to recognize the Confederacy would have been strong. From: tom brennan Date: Thu, 27 Mar 1997 12:40:51 GMT A Confederate victory at Gettysburg could concievably had led to a major trans-theater Federal move such as happened after Chickamauga and Lee having to take on Grant with his tough western corps in 1863. Rosecrans beats Bragg and the Western Yankees beat Lee, the war ends in 1863. The thought is delicious to this Illinoisan. From: rainbow@chickasaw.com (Brian Hampton) Date: Tue, 01 Apr 1997 14:14:29 GMT On Thu, 27 Mar 1997 12:40:51 GMT, in soc.history.war.us-civil-war tom brennan wrote: >A Confederate victory at Gettysburg could concievably had led to a >major trans-theater Federal move such as happened after Chickamauga and >Lee having to take on Grant with his tough western corps in 1863. There is actually a question lurking here that I think is important to consider. Lee had the potential to win at Gettysburg, that is, it was possible for him to force a Federal withdrawal. (This is far different from destroying an army for anyone who wants to argue that a Confederate victory at Gettysburg automatically results in the capture of Washington.) However, Vicksburg still falls, and Pemberton's army is still captured. The strategic situation is certainly different with a Confederate victory on Northern soil, but it is not so much different that a Confederate victory becomes assured or even more likely. From: Dave Balderston Date: Tue, 01 Apr 1997 18:21:12 -0800 > Lee had the potential to win at Gettysburg, that is, it was possible for > him to force a Federal withdrawal. (This is far different from destroying > an army for anyone who wants to argue that a Confederate victory at > Gettysburg automatically results in the capture of Washington.) I think this gets at some of the assymetry between the goals of the two sides and their relative forces. While Lee achieved some spectacular military successes, he never came close to destroying the Union armies that he faced. His victories seem to be audacious spoiling attacks that were successful largely because of the commanders that he faced. After Second Appomattox and Chancellorsville, it seems reasonable to suppose that he might be able to do the same thing again. This is a long way from destroying US military power, even in the East. Second Manassas was followed by Antietam and Chancellorsville was followed by Gettysburg. Lee's goal, the best he could reasonably hope for, was to keep winning tactical successes until the US got tired of the game and quit. As a practical matter, he was gambling against long odds, which more or less caught up with him at Gettysburg. As it was, he got a break when Meade neither counterattacked or pursued strongly. regards Dave Balderston From: Michael Cohen Date: Wed, 02 Apr 1997 11:16:36 -0500 I have to agree with you. If the North ahd half a leader before Meade the war would have ended in 62 or early 63. What would have happened if Hooker didn't become a coward!! From: "John D. Beatty" Date: Thu, 03 Apr 1997 16:29:57 GMT Brian Hampton wrote: > Lee had the potential to win at Gettysburg, that is, it was possible for > him to force a Federal withdrawal. (This is far different from destroying > an army for anyone who wants to argue that a Confederate victory at > Gettysburg automatically results in the capture of Washington.) However, > Vicksburg still falls, and Pemberton's army is still captured. The > strategic situation is certainly different with a Confederate victory on > Northern soil, but it is not so much different that a Confederate victory > becomes assured or even more likely. Lee winning the battle at Gettysburg would not win him the campaign. Meade would still only have to sit tight and wait for Lee to try to get around him and go back south (as Lee had to do to be reinforced). But the Confederacy would still be functionally split at the Mississippi, and there would still be Federal forces in Middle Tennessee waiting to drive towards Atlanta and the heartland. An obscure victory in Pennsylvania I don't think would have bought the south a lot of comfort. From: jmsimer@husc.harvard.edu (Joshua Simer) Date: Fri, 04 Apr 1997 17:36:12 GMT John D. Beatty (jdbeatty@execpc.com) wrote: : around him and go back south (as Lee had to do to be reinforced). But :the Confederacy would still be functionally split at the Mississippi, and :there would still be Federal forces in Middle Tennessee waiting to drive :towards Atlanta and the heartland. An obscure victory in Pennsylvania I :don't think would have bought the south a lot of comfort. I disagree. You are thinking only of the immediate military effect of such a victory. You have to take into account the psychological effect of a major southern victory in Pennsylvania (it would NOT have been "obscure" by any means). Vicksburg would still have fallen; nothing was going to change that. But the *fear* of a continued strategic offensive by the ANV against Washington or Baltimore or somewhere else would have caused some level of panic. It is quite possible that this would have led to troops being moved east from Tennessee to help. This would have delayed the resumption of the offensive in that region. Furthermore, as psychological factors go remember that Lincoln faced a difficult re-election campaign in '64. The capture of Atlanta helped allay the fears of many that the war was going badly, and helped Lincoln win. Now, subtract the effect of taking Atlanta and add the effect of having suffered a major, highly visible, defeat in Pennsylvania and you might have a McClellan victory, a negotiated settlement, and the abandonment of emancipation. I think it is clear that Gettysburg was a crucial battle - it may be that our perception of it in this day and age is out of proportion to its MILITARY significance, but I think that the perception of it AT THE TIME was also far out of proportion to its military significance. Perceptions do affect reality.... From: tom brennan Date: Sat, 05 Apr 1997 12:18:29 GMT To: soc-history-war-us-civil-war@ncren.net Joshua You stated that a U.S. defeat at Gettysburg could have led to Federal troops leaving Tennessee. Don't you think the AotT with little to do after the fall of Vicksburg would have been the sensible troops to use to reinforce the East? I think Rosecrans had his wedge in pretty deep at the time. A combined AotT-AoP ( provided they didn't fight each other harder than they fought the Rebels) under Grant would surely have destroyed Lee. From: William Piston Date: Sat, 05 Apr 1997 22:03:00 GMT You haven't really asked a question, but your wording suggests that you want my evaluation of Longstreet's remarks. First, I agree that Meade's army could have retreated to the Washington fortifications had it been driven from Gettysburg. Even stunning victories exhausted armies, and had Lee defeated Meade decisively it is still likely that Meade could have retreated in a manner to cover Washington. I think Longstreet's point was that Gettysburg was not the turning point of the war, that what the South could have accomplished there has been exaggerated. I agree. No single victory could have brought the South independence, althouh a combination of successes might have worn down northern morale to the point that Lincoln failed to win re-election. The only exception to this which I can envision would be the capture of the Army of the Potomac entire. That might have stunned Congress into negotiations. But not Lincoln. From: rainbow@chickasaw.com (Brian Hampton) Date: Sun, 06 Apr 1997 14:05:53 GMT On Fri, 04 Apr 1997 17:36:12 GMT, jmsimer@husc.harvard.edu (Joshua Simer) wrote: >I disagree. You are thinking only of the immediate military >effect of such a victory. You have to take into account the >psychological effect of a major southern victory in Pennsylvania (it would NOT have >been "obscure" by any means). What of that psychological effect? Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that Lee defeats Meade at Gettysburg and Meade retreats into the defenses of Washington, leaving the ANV, for a time, free to roam the Pennsylvania countryside. Let's further assume that the psychological impact of this is so great that Congress resolves to sue for peace. (I don't think one can assume, even for the sake of argument, that Lincoln would have agreed to this unless forced by an overwhelming majority in Congress.) What does this peace conference conclude? Is the Union just going to give back the Mississippi? What about Kentucky and Missouri? Are Arkansas and Indian Territory going to be Union or Confederate property? What about East Tennessee? In short, is the presence of a single Confederate army on Northern soil in the summer of 1863 enough to convince Union officials that they should give up everything they have gained during the two years of war? There's enough right there to start up hostilities again. Let's allow one more assumption, however. Suppose that the Union and the Confederacy do come to some sort of agreement, the details of which are left up to the reader's imagination. What of the slaves? Is the federal government going to just send back into slavery all those former slaves who have been freed under the EP? If so, how are those individuals going to react? Are they going to go willingly? I doubt it. In sum, a victory by the ANV at Gettysburg would have, as I said before, changed the strategic situation. However, to assume that it automatically leads to a Confederate victory is far too much. From: archon4777@aol.com (Archon4777) Date: Mon, 07 Apr 1997 20:02:13 GMT Possible, but again probably unnecessary. Lee HAD to go back south. After even the biggest of victories he had to resupply and reinforce. That meant going south again. Thus demonstrating to the northern wags that even if he wins in the north he can't stay. What do you thing the 19th century spinmeisters would make of that? The fact of the matter is thus, had Lee taken Longstreet's advice and moved from Gettysburg. There would have been nothing between Lee and Washington. A subsequent major federal defeat could conceivably led to the capture of Washington itself. I do believe that would be a sufficient demonstration for the northern wags. From: jadams@pioneerdt.com (Jamie Adams) Date: 8 Apr 1997 21:31:30 -0500 archon4777@aol.com (Archon4777) wrote: [snip] >The fact of the matter is thus, had Lee taken Longstreet's advice and >moved from Gettysburg. There would have been nothing between Lee and >Washington. Not true. First, how does Longstreet's move render the Army of the Potomac impotent? Second, and more to the point, there were about 25,000 troops available in the Defenses of Washington and another 10,000 or so in the vicinity that could have raced Lee to Washington and probably beaten him there. From: Darrel Date: 10 Apr 1997 11:48:34 -0400 William Piston wrote: > I think > Longstreet's point was that Gettysburg was not the turning point of the > war, that what the South could have accomplished there has been > exaggerated. I agree. I always considered Gettysburg the turning point, not because the South could have won afterwards with a victory, but because the loss was the first significant loss by the South and was the beginning of hte end. Up to this point the South was arguably winning the war. Darrel Subject: The Suffolk Campaign From: dmsmith001@aol.com (Dave Smith) Date: Sun, 16 Mar 1997 22:28:10 GMT General Longstreet's Suffolk campaign is either praised for his handling of an assignment to gather supplies and hold Federal forces at bay in the southern Virginia area, or is criticized for accomplishing nothing from a military standpoint. Critics note he neither brought General Peck's forces to battle, nor moved swiftly enough to aid General Lee in his battle with Hooker at Chancellorsville. What is your take on the matter? From: "William Piston" Date: Wed, 16 Apr 1997 05:31:08 GMT Suffolk stands as example of how a double standard is continuosly applied to Longstreet. His primary assignment was to collect food for the Army of Northern Virginia (of those looking at the big picture, I think only Hattaway and Jones in HOW THE NORTH WON and Hagerman in THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR AND THE ORIGINS OF MODERN WARFARE truly convey the degree to which the need to obtain food impacted Lee's every action), and had the assignment been given to Jackson, with the same results, biographers would fall all over themselves to praise Jackson for sticking to his main mission and not being sidetracked by military activities which were of minor significance. Longstreet's gathering of food contributed as much toward the survival of the army in Virginia as Jackson's Valley campaigns. In terms of the military operations Longstreet did undertake, I would rate them average in terms of competence. Most important of all, he did not waste scrare Confederate manpower to gain positions of minor military significance. As for Longstreet reaching Lee in time for Chancellorsville, that is another postwar myth. Lee never counted on it. See the extensive communications between Lee and Longstreet in the OFFICIAL RECORDS. Longstreet kept Lee very well informed of his activities, and made it quite clear that by scattering his forces to collect food and operate against Suffolk and New Berne he would be unable to return to Lee quickly. Subject: The anti-Longstreet Cabal From: furlanm@tao.agoron.com (Michael Furlan) Date: Sun, 16 Mar 1997 22:28:15 GMT Dr. Piston, Did the anti-Longstreet cabal get started before or after Longstreet declared as a Republican? From: "William Piston" Date: Wed, 16 Apr 1997 05:31:56 GMT Re the anti-Longstreet faction: The only thing which might be considered organized opposition to Longstreet prior to his becoming a Republican occurred in 1863-64 in relation to the E. Tenn. campaign. Bragg and E. M. Law corresponded with each other regarding their dislike for Longstreet, and they solicited correspondence from McLaws, hoping to blame Longstreet for Bragg's defeat at Missionary Ridge. To his credit, McLaws refused to participate, despite his anger at Longstreet in relation to Ft. Sanders. I cover this in detail in my dissertation; unfortunately, it was deleted form the book version because the editors insisted I cut the length of the manuscript drastically. Subject: Longstreet and Johnston at Seven Pines From: Dmsmith001@aol.com Date: Sun, 16 Mar 1997 22:28:22 GMT Dr. Piston, I've long held that the worst day of General Longstreet's career occurred at Seven Pines, notwithstanding the obstacles that faced him that day. What was there about the relationship between Longstreet and Joe Johnston that would cause Johnston to so aggressively cover up the roles of his subordinates in the battle? To what extent do you believe General Longstreet was involved in those efforts? Dave Smith From: "William Piston" Date: Wed, 16 Apr 1997 05:31:34 GMT Regarding Seven Pines: It was certanly Longstreet's worst performance during the war. There is no excuse for it, and even less for his refusal to accept responsibility for his mistakes. I think the best way to understand Longstreet's self-serving report and support for JEJ is to place it in perspective. In 1862 Grant refused to admit his mistakes at Shiloh, and blamed Lew Wallace unfairly. Grant's subordinates, including Sherman, backed him up, and Wallace is unfailry blamed to this day in most acounts. Grant selfishly covered his own rear end. At Seven Pines, Longstreet and Johnston did the same. Later in the war Longstreet was willing to accept responsibility. He offered his resignation when unable to clear up the mess in E. Tenn. (a mess he had not created, but made worse). He also placed his career on the line when in his Gettysburg report he stated that he would have cancelled Pickett's Charge (as we call it today) if he had possessed the authority to do so. In short, Longstreet was human, and he grew in maturity as the war progressed. Subject: Bias From: s065637@student.uq.edu.au (Kevin Jordan) Date: Tue, 11 Mar 1997 17:19:59 -1000 Professor Piston, As a non-American student of the ACW. I am constantly surprised by the depth of feeling that conflict still engenders in the U.S. In particular I am surprised by the refusal of students of that war to accept as fact any historical record which conflicts with their loyalties, particularly those of Southern persuasion.Could you comment on why this is so? Is this same attitude found among professional historians? From: (William G. Piston) Date: Thu, 20 Mar 1997 22:17:53 GMT Reply to Mr. Jordan: I think all human beings have a great capacity to place loyalty above facts; it is part of being human. How many people, for example, analyze religious beliefs in a rational, dispassionate fashion? Since war involves the taking of human life and has consequences which often extend for generations, perhaps the surprising thing is not that people react emotionally to the study of history but that any degree of objectivity is achieved at all. Is the average white Southerner any more likely to be biased than the average Israeli or Palestinian, the average Russian, German or Japanese? I think white Southerners appear to stand out because the rest of American suffers under the mistaken belief that it is objective. I don't mean to sound either cynical or defensive here. I am simply putting the problem in context. I think white Southerners may be more subject to bias for several reasons. The South lost the war and Southerners don't like to remember that. The war was, among other things, about slavery. As racism remains the foremost social problem in America, Southerners resent any suggestion that this is their fault. Both of the preceding can be dealt with by praising not the Southern cause, but Southern heroes. This is most effective if those heroes are faultless. Tom Connelly's book on Lee, entitled THE MARBLE MAN, explains this process very well. Graduate schools are supposed to teach professional historians to be objective in their analysis. If we sometime fall short, I think we at least have a better record than amateurs or Park Service employees. When it comes to the Civil War I don't think historians take sides so much as they become defensive about their interpretations. On the other hand, I think a disproportionate number of Civil War historians are Southern-born. Most of us first learned about the war as family history. For example, I did not grow up intending to be an Civil war Historian. But I did grow up aware of the fact that I was named for my Grandmother's uncle, William Thomas Garrett, a soldier in the Army of Northern Virginia. Because I must dash off to a meeting, this reply has not been checked for spelling or typos. Please excuse them. From: corinth@ix.netcom.com (Dan P Moran) Date: Sun, 23 Mar 1997 05:05:59 GMT Mr. Piston: I commend you sir on your tremendous insight on the subject of your post. I am one who attempts to tell the story from both sides, not for reasons of having ancestors both North and South, but rather that I have a responsibility as a historian to be looking at 1860-1865 from the 20/20 hindsight of 1997. If the Civil War is ever to be researched properly both sides need to be heard equally in order for the student to get the proper prospective of it. However, in alot of cases to tell of a particular battle or event in a Newsgroup posting can get rather lengthy and sometimes uninteresting to the average layman. What would work is for the article to be posted say with a Northern twang to it and then have someone include their Southern comments with either constructive critisism for learning purposes and not for firing off double canister into the other's face. There are a few out here who look at this thing from the same angle I'm describing, however, let me add one more comment as to why you see alot of verbal battles today North and South. The war ended in 1865 this is true, but the issues were never really settled. And with that last statement it does present a problem when it comes to historical emotions vice historical research. From: "James F. Epperson" Date: Wed, 26 Mar 1997 02:29:38 GMT On Sun, 23 Mar 1997, Dan P Moran wrote: > What would work is for the article to be posted say with a Northern > twang to it and then have someone include their Southern comments with > either constructive critisism for learning purposes and not for firing > off double canister into the other's face. Dan has hit one of my pet peeves and hot buttons here, i.e., the suggestion that the proper way to investigate something is to look at two equally biased but opposing views. This is dead wrong. The best way to investigate something is to read as many objective sources as possible. It simply is not true that all sources are biased. Some are, certainly. Some folks approach the study of the events of 1861-65 with an explicit intent of justifying one point of view. But most mainstream historians do not do that. Jim Epperson http://members.aol.com/jfepperson/causes.html Bombeck's Rule of Medicine: Never go to a doctor whose office plants have died. From: Mike Furlan Date: Wed, 26 Mar 1997 03:39:15 GMT On Wed, 26 Mar 1997 02:29:38 GMT, "James F. Epperson" wrote: >Dan has hit one of my pet peeves and hot buttons here, i.e., the >suggestion that the proper way to investigate something is to look at two >equally biased but opposing views. The long version: "A debate between two raving lunatics is unlikely to issue in a triumph of reason. An argument between tow pathological liars is an improbable path to truth. And exchange between two fools can scarcely be expected to end in a victory for wisdom. Adversary methods may, perhaps, be appropriate to a courtroom, where the object is the attainment of justice, but they are inappropriate to a seminar room, where the purpose is the refinement of truth. A fight between wild-eyed exponents of X and Y will help not at all if Z was in fact the case, as it usually is. And between X and not-X the difference is merely a cipher, a nullity, a zero." p. 28-9 "Historians' Fallacies" Fischer From: rainbow@chickasaw.com (Brian Hampton) Date: Tue, 01 Apr 1997 14:17:00 GMT On Wed, 26 Mar 1997 02:29:38 GMT, in soc.history.war.us-civil-war "James Epperson" wrote: >Dan has hit one of my pet peeves and hot buttons here, i.e., the >suggestion that the proper way to investigate something is to look at >two equally biased but opposing views. This is dead wrong. As support for this, I would suggest that any who disagree with Jim make an attempt at learning about the Army of Tennessee, the fall of Atlanta, etc. by reading the post-war writings of John Hood and Jospeh Johnston. On a related note, I would suggest that it is important to understand the biases involved in the study of these topics, and one way to do that is to actually read the biased accounts. If one can do this without an agenda in mind, it becomes a bit more possible understand why many accounts are biased and learn how to spot bias in more contemporary work. There is a bit of a Catch-22 here. In order to come to an understanding of "what really happened" it is necessary to be able to spot bias. However, in order to do that it is somewhat necessary to understand "what really happened." This is all a bit of a tricky process.... Subject: The Origin of Piston's Views From: "William Piston" Date: Tue, 01 Apr 1997 19:25:39 GMT [Brian Hampton wrote:] > During the time I've spent studying Longstreet I have discussed > your work with many people. Invariable I and others have asked in > various forms: > > "Where did your views of Longstreet originate from, since most of what is > written about him is so biased?" > > I think the basic question, from the various ways it has been asked, is > when and how did you becoming interested in Longstreet, what were your > influences, and what kind of obstacles did you face, i.e. how has your > work been received in the historical community? Dear Mr. Hampton, Since this special question touches upon material asked in several others, let me address it here. I attended the University of South Carolina because I wanted to study under the late Thomas L. Connelly. Growing up in Johnson City, Tennessee, during the Civil War centennial, I was aware that a Virginia-bias that filled the air. Or rather, I should say that I wondered why so many of the television shows, picture books, bubble gum trading cards, restaurant placemats, and back of packets of Dixie Crystal Sugar focused on battles and commanders relating to the Virginia theater. There far less about the war in Tennessee and nothing at all about the war in my native East Tennessee in the popular culture. I probably picked up on this, despite my youth, thanks to my grandparents. I grew up next door to them. My grandmother, Mannie Mae Harrison Piston, was a native of Cape Charles, Virginia, and stereotypically proud of all things Virginian. Her only child, my father, Robert E. Piston, was born in Cape Charles in 1918. When I was born in 1953, my father named my after his mother's uncle, William Thomas Garrett, because he remembered Uncle Billy telling him stories about his service in the Army of Northern Virginia. My father married a Nashvillian, so thanks to my Tennessee birth and Tennessee-Virginia ancestry I had many reasons to be proud of the South and enjoy the celebration of the South in the Centennial. Ironically, it was not my Tennessee mother who made me aware of the neglect of East Tennessee during the celebration, but my grandfather, Charles H. Piston. A native of Rockland, Maine, he moved south in 1917, married my grandmother in 1918, and moved with their child to Tennessee in 1928 for business reasons. Much as I admired the South, I obviously couldn't accept any negative stereotypes against Yankees, as my grandfather was one. Moreover, he used to read to me from books that did discuss the history of East Tennessee in the war. I learned to my surprise that my native region had remained loyal to the Union. My teachers at school had not told me that. I wondered why all my classmates wanted to play Johnny Reb. If we were East Tennesseeans, shouldn't we all want to play Yankees? Yet everyone was fascinated with Lee and Jackson, not Grant or Sherman. The whole point to this rather rambling story is that while I was between the ages of 10 and 15 I became aware that the history of the Civil War was not as simple as it seemed, that it was surrounded by passionate partisanship, and exciting but possibly inaccurate imagery. I developed an interest not only in historical narrative, but in historical interpretation. Not that I expressed things in these terms at age ten, mind you. But the interest was there. I enrolled at Vanderbilt University as pre-med, but soon rebelled against my family's assumption that I would be a doctor like my father and older brother. Once free from that straight-jacket, I never considered any career other than that of Civil War historian. Vanderbilt did not have a Civil War historian of note while I was there, but I loved the school and its excellent history and English faculty so much I remained there for both my B.A. (1975) and M.A. (1977). While in college I read an article by Tom Connelly criticizing the Virginia-bias in Civil War scholarship. That, combined with his excellent two-volume history of the Army of Tennessee, led my to apply for graduate school at the University of South Carolina, where he taught. The summer before I arrived his controversial THE MARBLE MAN; ROBERT E. LEE AND HIS IMAGE IN AMERICAN SOCIETY was published. Although I did not agree with all of his conclusions, I was fascinated by his exploration of the Lost Cause myths, of how Civil War history came to be written and accepted. Nevertheless, my initial desire was to write a military history of East Tennessee in the war. Tom suggested that this was not the best career move, that I should save such a pedestrian topic for a later date (I my still write it one day). I then asked him if he thought his book had exhausted the Longstreet controversy. He thought there was room for a separate study, so I was off and running on Longstreet. Studying the process of history fascinated me. I was also pleased that my work would involve a thorough examination of Southern literature, another love of mine. Prior to beginning work my knowledge of Longstreet was average. If I approached Longstreet with less bias than others, it was probably because so much of my prior interest had been in the war in the western theater. On average, I was better read on the commanders in the west than elsewhere - not the usual pattern. Frankly, although I accepted Lee as brilliant (I still do), I never found him fascinating until in college I read THE POLITICS OF COMMAND by Connelly and Archer Jones, and some of Connelly's articles on Lee. What sort of obstacles have I faced? Well, read Emory Thomas's biography of Lee. The old school interpretation is still alive. Don't misunderstand me. Thomas is a fine scholar, a superb writer, and has been kind enough to praise my work. He simply doesn't find it convincing! As the saying goes, we agree to disagree. With all due respect for their accomplishments in other areas, I think that some historians still have closed minds in relation to Longstreet. In general, the reaction of the scholarly community to my work has been mixed. I never expected to convince everyone and overall I have been very pleased by the large number of my academic peers who have praised it. I hope this answered the questions adequately. Yours, William Garrett Piston Subject: Longstreet's Reputation [Moderator’s Note: The following is a response to a question asked by moderator Brian Hampton. Somehow, the original question was lost. Basically, the question asked about how Longstreet’s reputation had changed and if, in the light of some comments Dr. Piston made in his book on Longstreet, if he were surprised at these changes.] From: William Piston Date: Sat, 05 Apr 1997 22:04:18 GMT No one is more surprised than I am concerning the changes in Longstreet's popularity since my book was published in 1987. I think the success of THE KILLER ANGELS and Ted Turner's "Gettysburg" has done more to change popular opinion than my book has. When Robert C. Thomas contacted me about the Longstreet Memorial Fund's intentions, I was amazed. I have been happy to support their efforts to get a statue placed at Gettysburg, fearing only that my endorsement might appear self-serving. Having seen the hard, selfless labor of Robert and the other members of the LMF, I am now willing to risk being misunderstood, and urge everyone who is interested to support the Fund. I also urge support for The Longstreet Society in Gainesville (where, incidently, I will be speaking at Brenau University on Longstreet in the Mexican War, on Saturday, April 19). I have never attempted to quantify the change that has occurred to date, but I am certain that a larger number of people than ever before are now aware that any evaluation of Longstreet must include a recognition that much which has been written about him is biased at best, absolute bunk at worst. Why so many minds remain closed is a mystery to me. In a review I wrote of Emory Thomas's R.E. LEE I stated that the Lee Cult is alive and well. As a novice to the internet experience, I am pleased to find Longstreet the subject of serious discussion. I don't expect everyone to reach the same conclusion about Longstreet. As I would in relation to any historical subject, I hope such discussions can begin from a position of objectivity, rather than bias either for or against Longstreet. Subject: Bragg and Longstreet From: Dmsmith001@aol.com Dr. Piston, One of the great enigmas of the Civil War, for me, is General Braxton Bragg. General Longstreet certainly had his share of problems with Bragg. In your research, have you come to any conclusions as to why a very credible combat soldier like Longstreet, coming off the success at Chickamauga, could so quickly become just another back-biter regarding Bragg in the Army of Tennessee? What was there about Bragg that made otherwise fine generals react the way they did? Dave Smith From: "William Piston" Date: Wed, 16 Apr 1997 05:30:44 GMT Regarding Longstreet and Bragg, I found no information which had not been utilized by other historians. My goal was to argue that Longstreet's reaction to Bragg was typical. While Longstreet failed to rise above the difficulties he found in the west, his actions are best explained by the almost universal difficulties soldiers found in working with Bragg; they are not evidence that Longstreet possessed an ego larger than average. Freeman, Eckenrode, Conrad, Woodworth, and others see the fact that Longstreet became mired in personal difficulties in the west as confirmation that he was stubborn and recalcitrant in his relationship with Lee. I acknowledge Longstreet's shortcomings in the west, but maintain that it was untypical behavior, standing in contrast to his relationship with Lee (where he disagreed with Lee at times on military matters, but remained Lee's intimate friend and most trusted subordinate). Why could no one get along with Bragg? Ask Grady McWhiney! Seriously, I think the answer is primarily found in Bragg's personality. Bragg had significant organizational abilities; he might have made a excellent chief-of-staff (in the modern sense), but he was a poor choice for any field command. HOME